SOCIETAL SECURITY

IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

LATVIAN INSTITUTE OF
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**EXPERTISE
MAPPING
AND
RAISING
POLICY
RELEVANCE**

Editors:

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The book project "*Societal Security in the Baltic Sea region: Expertise Mapping and Raising Policy Relevance*" was initiated to learn from Nordic best practices in societal security research and develop non-Nordic research and expertise, contributing to more informed political and expert debates on societal security in the Baltic States, Poland, Northeast Russia and Belarus, and offering recommendations.

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INTRODUCTION

ANDRIS SPRŪDS AND ELIZABETE VIZGUNOVA

The book "*Societal Security in the Baltic Sea region: Expertise Mapping and Raising Policy Relevance*" assesses the evolution of the notion of societal security in the national narratives and strategies in the Baltic Sea region. It is increasingly relevant to revisit the diversity of national approaches to security in the region, as the contemporary, full-spectrum of security challenges are emerging from both within and outside the region and have the potential to leave region-wide consequences. This volume therefore analyses the national approaches to the state as a security provider and the development of the comprehensive approach to security, as well as seeks to learn from the Nordic best practices of engaging societal actors in ensuring national security on a cross-regional basis.

The inevitability of regional interdependence – characterised by positive and negative political, economic and military dynamics – in the Baltic Sea region is clearly exemplified not only by the historic developments, but also the challenging security environment of the wider European continent. Global interdependence has seemingly lost the momentum it had gained in the post-Cold War era after Russia's full-range warfare approach, employed in the Russo-Georgian six days' war of 2008, and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. In light of the "new age" warfare approach, more states of the Baltic Sea region have begun to increasingly engage with a wide spectrum of third sector players. This clearly means that a consensus – or, simply put, that a state-centric approach to defence and security seems not to match the challenges of the 21st century – has emerged. The project was therefore conceived with the practical purpose of learning from the Nordic model, built on transparency, good governance and a holistic approach to security. It is under these circumstances that both the state and the society pool their

efforts to build resilient Nordic societies. Indeed, as illustrated by the authors of the country chapters, the notion of *resilience* has become core to the evolving societal security community of the Baltic Sea region.

Taking a step back and examining the origins of the term – and therefore underlining the *problématique* of the field of security studies, still pertinent today – Barry Buzan strove to examine the contradictions "*between defence and security, [..] between individual security and national security, between national security and international security, and between violent means and peaceful ends.*"[1] The editors of this book can only agree with Buzan as he argues that finding an agreed definition of *either* aspect of security is impossible. Rather, we have sought to open the space for a debate and a learning exercise on a cross-regional basis – in doing so shedding light on a number of contradictions and bringing a further research agenda to the fore – in order to create a more integrated framework of thinking about security in the Baltic Sea region.

The definition used by the majority of authors as a starting point was conceptualised by Iulian Chiufu, defining societal security as "*dealing mainly with the preservation and affirmation of the society's identity and cohesion of society's members.*"[2] Chiufu's understanding is closely linked to Ole Weaver's definition of societal security, namely, "*sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.*"[3] However, in the latter case, societal security is still seen as one of the five security sectors (political, economic, military, environmental and societal; as Kowalska and other authors illustrate in the following chapters, the states of the Baltic Sea region have a tendency to multiply the arenas of security, widening the traditionalist definition even further). The post-Copenhagen school development illustrated that societal security can become a referent object in its own right. Eventually, as noted by Vitkus in this volume, societal security has the potential to become "*a dominant security policy referent object of top priority, to which all the other sectors, including national security, are subordinated.*"

In this volume, Aaltola and Juntunen argue that the *Nordic model* "*refers to similarities in the transparency in public administration,*"

respect for the rule of law, equality as a key value, and belief that social welfare heals societal cleavages and produces societal stability" and that "*the nation has to pull its resources together in order to have a chance of survival in a harsh world of geopolitics.*" This, coupled with the decades-long cooperation among the Nordics to ensure regional societal security, as Morsut writes in this volume, should lead to a "*society's ability to protect itself against, and manage, incidents that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger.*" This raises the relevance of *emergency preparedness,* particularly focusing on unexpected dangers that a society might need to confront. *Total defence* serves the purpose to ensure that the civil-military cooperation in both peace and wartime is used for the most effective crisis management. An equally recurrent term used by the authors is *human security.* According to Syk and Rådestad, human security serves "*to connect the protection of individuals from risks to that of empowering people to be able to handle crisis situations in a more effective way.*" The term *resilience*, as written by Juurvee, can be understood as a society's "*ability to recover quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success*". Indeed, the myriad of terms and definitions present in the various fundamental security documents and strategies across the region clearly underlines the relevance of the present efforts to define approaches to societal security.

The geopolitical realities of the region are also at core of the very creation of the Nordic model as a "third way" in the face of the East-West divide. However, the spirit of adversity in a conventional military sense is still a recurrent part of the debates over security in the region. The regional and international threats, causing concern to the states, explored in this volume, do not fit the conventional understanding of an adversary. The nature of these threats has also "softened" the thinking around territorial defence – a term which is now impossible to decouple from societal resilience. As noted by Stokholm Banke and Hjortshøj, it is also the inability to pin-point the antagonist, or to predict the coming threats that have raised the prominence of populism in Europe, securitising trans-border challenges and advocating for nativist solutions.

However, neither the interwoven pattern of histories, nor the current trans-border challenges have been helpful in forming a region-wide common approach to security. The regional approach to threats targeting societal security is weakly pronounced among the regional actors (whereas, clearly, the sub-regional approaches are an important building block of the security of the Baltic Sea region). A peculiar dichotomy of threat perception – an outward-looking, or an inward-looking one – characterises the regional players.

This, however, is somewhat paradoxical, taking into account that the systemic issues, relating to global interdependence, territorial threats, "soft" threats and the understanding of the role of the state are undergoing changes across the region. These can be clustered in the following way:

- *Approaches to global interdependence:* despite the fact that, in the contributions by Sergunin on Russia and Sivitski on Belarus, some threats are named that come from within and without the state, the "*anti-globalism and inward-looking sentiments prevail in the minds of Russian strategists, thus pushing them to refuse the concepts of resilience and psychological defence.*" On the flipside, the authors in this collection of articles agree that the efforts by the Nordic and three Baltic countries for resilience stem not only from their size, but from their high degree of openness;

- *The perceived absence/presence of territorial threats:* for instance, Ómarsdóttir's analysis shows how Iceland has come to prioritise public safety (and not societal security) over other sectors of security. As exemplified by Syk and Rådestad, it is international interdependency – for instance, the environmental/climatic crisis *across the globe* – that is changing the understanding of security and raised the need for emergency preparedness in Sweden. However, this approach is by no means universal. In Lithuania, the understanding of societal security is largely shaped by the increased awareness of a combination of three factors: firstly, the perception of Russia's military activities in the region; secondly, hybrid threats; and, finally, the "soft" threats, emerging from both outside and inside the state. In Estonia's case, military challenges in Estonia's

close proximity have reflected on the perception of threats as regards to Estonia's national security. Thus, in the case of some of the Baltic actors, many of the decisions in this realm of states' activity are made, pursuing a singular priority – that of strengthening the independence of the state;

- *The traditional reading of security and/or resilience clash:* despite the fact that most regional players reference events such as the Balkan wars, 9/11, the Iraq war, the terror attacks in Europe and the Russo-Georgian or the Russo-Ukrainian wars, as events that require innovation in redefining their approaches to security, the understanding of national security *as* societal security; and state security *as* the solution to societal insecurities is still pronounced in Russia and Belarus in particular. An insight into the shift from the modern to the post-modern conception of security is well-illustrated by Potjomkina and Vizgunova, as they describe how the notion of resilience is slowly taking root through recurring "soft" security narratives, therefore witnessing the emergence of societies as a referent object of national security strategists.

Ultimately, the volume illustrates a region-wide picture of the issues which have become subject to the process of securitisation in the region. As the collective identities evolve, their change can be, under certain circumstances, interpreted as an existential threat (or, on the contrary, not perceived as such). The perception can therefore be securitised and become a national security concern. The securitised issues across the region vary, and predominantly fall into two "baskets": the issues related to social, physical, political, demographic, environmental and information threats, which are characteristic to post-socialist countries; and the challenges related to "*large-scale migration, gender inequalities, social inclusion/exclusion debates, climate change mitigation strategies, information security and hybrid threats,*" characterising the Nordic states of the Baltic Sea region. Kuznetsov has provided the most relevant securitised issues in the domestic agenda of the Baltic Sea players in this volume.

The practical application of the volume is to open up new perspectives on the evolving notion of societal security. In particular, the book seeks

to serve as a "belt of transmission" and provide an informed analysis for the national strategy- and policy-makers, as well as the civil and private sector stakeholders. Furthermore, the book also aims to become a conceptual addition to the stock of literature on societal security, taking the analytical concept, developed by the Copenhagen School, a step further.

The volume contains contributions from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and Russia, in order to provide an all-encompassing view on the development of the concept of societal security in the Baltic Sea region. It is followed by the analysis of the national and regional approaches to societal security, as well as an attempt to conceptualise societal security.

ENDNOTES

[1] Barry Buzan, "People, States sand Fear: National Security problem in International Relations", Wheatsheaf Books, 1983, 11
[2] Iulian Chuifu, "Societal security. An agenda for the Eastern Europe", http://www.cpc-ew.ro/pdfs/societal_security.pdf
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DENMARK: SOCIETAL SECURITY IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL

CECILIE FELICIA STOKHOLM BANKE
AND ANDERS MALLE HJORTSHØJ[1]

Danish historian and former diplomat, Bo Lidegaard, has suggested that during the past two decades, Denmark has moved from a nation whose international engagement was primarily focused on promoting international stability, to a nation actively engaged in international military operations.[2] This change was initiated in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, and continued during Anders Fogh Rasmussen's Liberal Conservative government, from 2001 to 2009. In this period, Denmark became an active partner in the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2006, the war in Iraq from 2003 to 2007, and eventually the war against the Taleban and IS, from 2006 to 2013. Through these engagements, Denmark shed its small-state position and became an active player in international conflicts.[3] This change could be seen as a result of the new and expanded perception of security on Denmark's part, as well as a new notion of what constitutes a secure environment for the Danish public. From an inwardly focused position, that promoted national security through the resilience and robustness of society, Danish foreign and security policy expanded outwards to include active participation in international conflicts. As Rasmus Brun Pedersen writes, "*from a kind of balancing mediator and/or peace-keeping role during the Cold War and during the 1990s*," Denmark developed, under Fogh's tenure as prime minister, "*into a declared "strategic actor", participating directly in combat against externally defined enemies*" who were "*thought to threaten Denmark directly*."[4]

This new activist foreign policy was based on liberal values. While up to that point, Denmark fit into the general Nordic template of solidarity and an egalitarian foreign policy, a new liberal paradigm was

introduced, replacing the traditional role of Denmark "*as a state whose main priority was to promote a policy of non-involvement, uncommitted alliance and restraints in international affairs.*"[5] Thus, expanding liberal values and liberal democracy became part of providing a more secure environment, and Denmark shared the ambition with the United States and others to expand the institutional security infrastructure in Europe, integrating eastern and central European countries in a new security architecture.

Since the Arab Spring, however, Denmark's activist foreign policy has been increasingly criticised, and debates on national security have changed their focus towards Denmark's participation in international operations, and are centred around new, perceived threats, represented primarily by Russia, cyber-aggression and migration. While Danish foreign and security policy in the 1990s and 2000s was driven by an ambition to promote liberal values and democracy, recent developments in the region have changed the focus – a change that also involves a rethinking of the entire question of societal security, in Danish *samfundsmæssig sikkerhed*. This change can be traced in the recently introduced Danish Defence Agreement (Aftale på Forsvarsområdet 2017–2023) in the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, from June 2017, and in the national security debate, in which policy-makers, national experts, and opinion-makers have engaged since the annexation of Crimea, in 2014. The following paper presents a general overview of this debate, analysing three main narratives: firstly, Denmark as a small and open society; secondly, the new security challenges; and thirdly, the perceived threats and global connectivity.

DENMARK AS A SMALL AND OPEN SOCIETY

While the concept of societal security, in and of itself, has not gained the same wide currency in Denmark as in neighbouring Nordic countries,[6] many closely related concepts and concerns are steadily growing in salience and being used with increasing frequency in Danish government, military, media and academic contexts. Among these

concepts, the chief one is the notion of an increasingly *complex* security environment, on the one hand, and the attendant need, on the other, to address it through closer collaboration of different societal groupings to strengthen *resilience*. Denmark and its Nordic neighbours are not unique in having seen a growing application of these notions across the board in recent years, but their reshaping of, and adaptation to, the Danish security debate can be characterised by three predominant narratives, namely: Denmark as a small and open society; new security challenges; and, perceived threats and global connectivity.

The first narrative is that of Denmark as a small, open society with an export-oriented economy, which is highly exposed to the challenges and opportunities of globalisation. This conventional wisdom is raised almost as a matter of course in government statements, think tank reports, and expert contributions in the news media, and is inevitably tied to the need for Denmark to maintain its active multilateral foreign policy through, above all, the EU, NATO and the UN.[7] This narrative finds, perhaps, its most succinct formulation in the government's Foreign and Security Policy Strategy for 2017–2018: *"This government believes that it is in our interests as a small country to have strong multilateral organisations… When we take care of the world, we are taking care of Denmark."*[8] This is, it should be noted, a perspective common to the Nordic countries as a whole.[9] Indeed, it seems to be a distinctly Nordic way of framing the inter-relationship of domestic and foreign policy. The liberal democratic welfare state at once demands and is made possible by active multilateralism within the merican-designed postwar institutional framework: *"The Nordic societies are small and open and are highly exposed to the pressures of globalisation. Openness is one of the most significant values, strengths and expressions of resilience of the Nordic societies."*[10] While this framework is one of a traditional outlook, it has not been challenged, but rather reaffirmed, among foreign and security policy elites in its encounter with the challenges of globalisation, at any rate as a recurring rhetorical trope. Openness, even in a time of wrenching change, must remain the starting point for addressing and conceptualising new challenges.[11] Former Defence Minister Peter Christensen of the Liberal Party, for instance, remains

adamant that "*flexibility and multilateralism [are] keys to facing our challenges*" and "*active engagement in multilateral structures… is a prerequisite for our security at home.*"[12] Since the end of the Cold War, this active multilateralism has also included a substantial military component, to the extent that Danish elites hold an "Anglo-Saxon expeditionary outlook" after years of war in far-away places like Iraq and Afghanistan, as noted by Rynning.[13]

This arrangement was, of course, made possible by the "unprecedented territorial security" for Denmark that came after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, under which, rather than cautiously adapting or reviving traditional neutrality, the country's leaders settled on an increasingly activist course over successive governments.[14] A turning point came with the 9/11 attacks, after which the new Liberal-Conservative government transformed the "active internationalism" of the 1990s – multilateralist - and focused on strengthening international institutions for their own sake, to an "international activism" that focused on bilateral relations with the United States, took a more instrumental view of international organisations, and, not least, viewed participation in US-led wars as a key pillar of Denmark's new middle power status.[15]

As such, the postwar consensus on openness and activism as the guiding principles of domestic and foreign policy remains firmly in place, notwithstanding its militarisation in recent decades, as the perceived point of departure for grappling with the new security environment. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martin Lidegaard, representing the Social Liberal Party, expressed this sentiment in 2014, when reflecting upon the challenges facing Denmark following the Ukraine crisis: "*We have to continue our active policy, since threats out there, at the end of the day, are also a matter of ensuring our security at home.*"[16] The consensus-seeking culture of Danish politics, while facilitating broad-based agreements, has also served to paper over the radical shift from dovish neutrality to military activism in the 1990s and 2000s, rewriting it as part of a Nordic continuity in foreign policy.[17]

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

The second predominant narrative is that of new security challenges requiring whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, as hinted at above. In much the same way as the connection of Denmark's social and political system (the liberal democratic welfare state) to its foreign policy (activism and multilateralism) is naturalised through repetition, the changing security environment, with its complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability, is connected to the need for cooperation "across traditional boundaries"[18] between civilian, military, and civil society actors.[19] This need for cooperation across traditional boundaries is reflected, among other things, in the latest Danish Defence Agreement, which commits the armed forces to "contribute to a greater degree to the well-being and safety of the Danish people" above all through closer coordination with the State police.[20]

While societal security is not referred to as a term in official Danish documents, the concept of national security has been introduced as a catch-all for the new types of coordination and cooperation envisaged by the Liberal-Conservative government. National security, while focusing mainly on the role of civilian and military bureaucracies, also draws in broader societal elements. For example, the government-commissioned review of Danish foreign policy, requested in September 2015, and presented to the relevant ministers in May 2016,[21] envisions the Foreign Ministry as "*the international connector for the whole of society.*"[22] The review was commissioned in order to provide inputs for determining Denmark's strategic interests, suggestions for greater coordination of foreign, security and trade policy, and, not least, proposals for how to prioritise the core tasks of Danish external affairs to 2030.[23] The task was given to Ambassador Peter Taksøe-Jensen, who, in addition to answering the government's requirements, hoped to provoke a broad-based governmental and societal debate on the future direction of Danish foreign policy.[24]

While it is difficult to say whether Taksøe has succeeded in this goal, some commentators believed his review made a certain impact: in an annual review of attitudes among Danish foreign and security policy

professionals for 2016, there was widespread agreement that the Taksøe review was a harbinger of a noticeably greater influence of security policy on foreign policy in the subsequent years.[25] And both the Defence Agreement and Foreign and Security Policy Strategy assign a central role to national security, with a clear societal tinge, as the organising concept for their plans and activities.[26] The Defence Agreement, for instance, asserts that "*a robust defence and emergency preparedness in Denmark is a prerequisite for a secure society.*"[27]

Thus, although "the Danish defence's contribution to national security"[28] is emphasised and the concept of societal security is not raised directly, the Danish understanding of national security focuses as much on the safety of society as on that of the state. Similarly, the 2017 Foreign and Security Policy Strategy expresses a desire on the part of the government: "*to reach out and strengthen Denmark in collaboration with civil society organisations, the business community, universities and think tanks. Denmark is at its strongest when we stand together.*"[29] Terrorism, crime and other threats will be confronted by "making use of all relevant foreign policy instruments: civilian and military, development policy, trade policy, European policy, and migration policy" in order to achieve a "strengthening of national security."[30]

It seems ironic that the term societal security, though coined and theoretically elaborated in Denmark under the auspices of the Copenhagen School, has become a good deal more widespread elsewhere. Indeed, one could venture to claim that the notion of societal security need not be explicitly brought up in a Danish context, as the Scandinavian welfare state, with its interwoven emphasis on individual, collective and state well-being, to some degree inherently implies it. This attitude is reflected in the frequently used word *tryghed*, which, while difficult to translate, encompasses physical safety, well-being and social inclusion; this is often expressed as an overarching goal of welfare state policies.[31] Unlike other, less-developed welfare states in the western world, the universalistic Scandinavian welfare state, based on a successful alliance of working class and middle class interests, sets a goal of integrating, supporting and improving the whole of society, not just assisting those in greatest need.[32] This universalism is ingrained to such a extent that the term

"welfare state" (*velfærdsstat*) has been supplemented by the alternative term "welfare society" (*velfærdssamfund*); it is, in other words, an outlook that encompasses not only a specific set of government policies, but the character of the entire Danish nation-state.[33]

If we return to the original definition of societal security advanced by Ole Wæver, it "concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and perceived or actual threats."[34] As opposed to state security, which centres around threats to sovereignty, societal security concerns threats to *identity*, i.e. to the core of what constitutes a given society – usually, according to Wæver, ethno-national or religious units.[35] This overriding concern with identity is also characteristic of the universalist Scandinavian welfare state, as can be seen, for example, from the acrimony of debates at the crossroads of welfare and immigration.

The main difference between the universalist welfare state and societal security, perhaps, lies in the focus of societal security on maintaining the well-being of citizens "under extraordinary stresses, known as crises,"[36] whereas the welfare state guarantees it in everyday contexts. Here, the broad panoply of actions, institutions and outlooks associated with national security can serve to fill the gap between crisis situations and everyday planning for Nordic countries like Denmark struggling with the conundrums of globalisation. Denmark is fortunate in having well-developed institutions, high international competitiveness and a high standard of living. Acknowledging this, the Taksøe review, rather than arguing for root-and-branch changes, has encouraged such coordinating measures as an official annual strategy, a government planning body for national security, and significantly strengthened information services and powers of oversight for parliament, all of which are widespread in other countries.[37] One of these recommendations is reflected in the latest Defence Agreement and Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017–2018. With these measures, it is hoped, the gap between the everyday societal robustness of the welfare state, and the resilience during crises that is the essence of societal security, could be bridged, leaving Denmark better prepared for a new security environment.

Based on the recommendations of these documents, there seems to be an implicit assumption that the institutions making up Denmark's government, military and society are robust enough as they are to handle the new security environment; what is called for is greater coordination and more resources to improve on their existing strengths, and a reconceptualisation of the tasks before them.[38] This may account for why the bureaucratic focus of a term such as "national security," as opposed to the "softer" implications of a challenge framed as "societal security" or "resilience", has largely won the day in these policy statements. American influence on the structure of the Danish security bureaucracy can be traced as far back as Denmark's accession to NATO in 1949, and the merger soon after of the Ministries of War and the Navy into a common Ministry of Defence in 1950.[39] However, it is only in the last couple of years that national security, and attendant suggestions of a national annual strategy and permanent planning body, have made inroads in Denmark.[40]

As with the doctrine of multilateralism and openness in foreign policy, Denmark's domestic security institutions have been judged fundamentally adequate for future challenges, provided they are overhauled, conceptualised along the lines of national security and interagency cooperation, and properly funded.

PERCEIVED THREATS AND GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY

The third narrative centres on the spectra of perceived threats that make up this new security environment: terrorism, migration, refugees and borders, on the one hand, and cyber security, organised crime, and Russian disinformation, on the other. The common thread tying all these together is the ambiguous nature of ever-intensifying global connectivity. It is at once a source of new opportunities for Danish government, businesses and private citizens, and the source of new perceived threats, such as returning foreign fighters and large-scale migration, which eliminate the distance between Denmark's tranquil neighbourhood and the more troubled world beyond. As Taksøe's 2016

foreign policy review put it, both "the opportunities and the challenges [brought on by globalisation] are multiple and diverse."[41]

There is often a slippery continuity between different types of issue, for example when it is brought up as a crucial challenge for Danish diplomacy to "fight terrorism and refugee flows."[42] As a key measure to strengthen national security, the Foreign and Security Policy Strategy highlights the need to reduce migration to Europe and Denmark: "*We must contain the pressure on Europe's borders.*"[43]

The amorphous nature of such perceived threats also contributes to the argument for ever-greater resources and ever-widened powers for the security services, a pattern seen throughout the post-9/11 western world. Whereas threats in traditional conceptions of security are based on some concrete reality, such as the concentration of hostile military forces on one's border, non-traditional threats, such as cyber war or terrorism, are always in the realm of pure possibility: no amount of security infrastructure can offer a 100% guarantee against such attacks.[44]

Because these new type of threats are more fluid and unpredictable than an invading army, they threaten not just the state, but also "our society, our values and our way of life."[45] Vaguely defined threats against vaguely defined targets, in other words, lead to a host of difficult dilemmas concerning civil liberties, views of foreigners, and the powers of the emerging national security state – none of which, of course, is unique to Denmark. It is when faced with these challenges that the Danish and Nordic commitment to openness is really put to the test; the hardening of attitudes toward non-western immigrants, and ever-expanding surveillance throughout Danish society, are highly controversial topics for precisely this reason. Views on topics such as immigration and the role of the state are coloured by a peculiarly Danish strain of nationalism, which combines the close association of state and nation seen in the French model, with the definition of the nation as a community of descent, seen in the German model.[46] In other words, as strongly inclusive and cohesive as Danish society may be inwardly, attitudes toward outsiders are fraught with difficulties that go to the very heart of the country's definition of community, when they do not spill into outright hatred.

Since the new types of threats brought in by globalisation have yet to be clearly delineated, they remain focal points of political contestation, above all from groups such as the Danish People's Party, who view mass migration, refugee flows and jihadi terrorism as belonging to the same spectrum of issues. As noted above, such attitudes have percolated into official government policy, as political parties left and right vie to outdo the right-wing Danish People's Party in laying out increasingly stricter controls on non-western immigration.

CONCLUSION. SOCIETAL SECURITY IN TIMES OF UPHEAVAL

Overall, concepts related to, but not directly identifiable as, societal security have gained remarkable traction in the Danish security debate in recent years. They have been framed as a subset of the concept of national security with a view to revamping relevant institutions and bringing Denmark up to the institutional level of its western allies on this area. The meeting of a fundamentally robust, self-confident state and social order with the vagaries of globalisation, and not least the consequences of military activism, has occasioned a reframing of security in ways that would look familiar in far larger countries with more acute problems. Military activism abroad and growing hostility to international commitments at home, especially regarding refugees, make the continued trumpeting of active multilateralism and Nordic values a tricky proposition that is rife with contradictions. In addition, the growing commercialisation of welfare-state practices, domestic and foreign, under successive liberal governments has occasioned a shift in emphasis from societal and cultural openness to economic openness in the shape of free trade advocacy and promotion of Danish business interests.

All the same, the requirements of a new, uncertain security picture have reinforced, not weakened, a traditional rhetorical commitment to openness, as a matter of principle and pragmatism in equal measure. How this interacts with the parallel ascendancy of militarising

American-style national security concepts, and their attendant risks to civil liberties and institutional independence, remains to be seen, as does the long-term effect on the country's value system of a sustained, multifaceted vigilance against terrorism and cyber conflict. Denmark faces many of the same challenges and dilemmas as its prosperous western neighbours, and its security elites seem to have chosen to face them by supplementing a longstanding Nordic foreign and domestic policy outlook, with a more flexible, cross-boundary institutional approach in alignment with the security bureaucracies of other western nations.

However, these developments shape Denmark's security policy going forward, they will certainly be conditioned by the peculiarities of Danish political and social life. As the country's decision-makers look for a balance between handling the crises of a more unpredictable world and maintaining a values-based universalist welfare society, the tensions between rhetoric and reality will play out in a newly challenged, but strongly rooted political and social setting.

ENDNOTES

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[4] Ibid.

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NORDIC MODEL MEETS RESILIENCE – FINNISH STRATEGY FOR SOCIETAL SECURITY

MIKA AALTOLA AND TAPIO JUNTUNEN

The Finnish societal security concept has developed against the backdrop of its strong Nordic identity and value base, as well as the understanding of its geopolitical location. The first element in the Finnish orientation is based on the understanding and sustainability of the Nordic model and its values - equality, consensus, and central mediating role of the government in society. The second element grows from a bleaker reading of political realism where the nation has to pull its resources together in order to have a chance of survival in the harsh world of geopolitics. The Nordic model also echoes a societal identity of being on top of the world through different international rankings of development, from equality and healthcare to education. This self-perception translates into an image of being out of harm's way of national, ethnic, and cultural cleavages, as the society is based on equal empowerment of people and fair possibilities of social mobility. The second ideational configuration complements this view: In order for Finland to maximise its freedom in a challenging geographical location, it has to pull its resources together and take full advantage of its societal strengths and cultural capital. It can be argued that Finland represents a case where the state-led top-down model is integrated with a bottom-up necessity of legitimacy, and where the national reading of resilience has always been part of the mix of meeting internal and external security threats.

As a strategic idea and signifier that drives the agenda of national and societal security policy, resilience has emerged as an increasingly prominent conceptualisation during the past decade or so in Finland. The development of the associated signifiers from the Cold War era

concepts of territorial and spiritual defence, through the broader understanding of security in the 1990s, towards the contemporary idea of resilience, should be understood in its broader geopolitical and case-specific geographical contexts. The case of Finland brings forth both the geopolitical dimension of territorial defence and societal resilience, and blends these with the modern understanding of rendering a highly open and interconnected society that is more protected and agile in the face of what is perceived as an increasingly complex world. In this sense, the societal security, in the Finnish case, combines two tendencies: (1) the traditionally strong top-down models of national security functions with a special focus on critical infrastructure; and (2) a bottom-up understanding where various societal actors and their networks build resilience capacities that support the state and continuity of vital societal functions without an authoritarian tendency.[1] The third important element is the emphasis placed on informal consensus on matters of foreign and security policy. Unity and cohesion of the population is usually highlighted as an immunising force against hybrid influencing at the societal level. This essay sheds light on the conceptual history that can be traced beneath the Finnish societal security culture, by investigating its recent embodiment in the Security Strategy for Society (Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia, YTS), published by the Cabinet of Finland in 2017.[2]

THE 2017 SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SOCIETY

The Security Strategy for Society (YTS) 2017 is a government document aimed at the harmonisation of the different sets of national principles regarding the politics of preparedness. It also guides the preparedness activities by the various administrative branches. Although the process of developing the strategy was coordinated by the government, the document was a result of broad cooperation. The document explicitly states that, during the drafting of the document, the viewpoints of all actors, including, "the authorities, businesses, NGOs and communities, and citizens" were taken into consideration.[3] The coordination of the

implementation of the strategy is the responsibility of the Security Committee[4] (together with the ministries' heads of preparedness).

The document details different focus areas and describes the model for comprehensive security. It also reviews major concerns and defines how Finland is preparing to manage them. The aim is to reach common ground and understanding between different governmental, private and societal sector actors. The common ground is meant to facilitate the resource allocation, contribute to the needed support for a common vision, and to set a benchmark for the evaluation of the actual preparedness policies. A more implicit key audience for the document was foreign governments. The document explicitly mentions that other countries are interested in applying a similar approach and that the "Finnish cooperation model for comprehensive security is internationally unique and recognised". However, the strategic function of the document should be read on a high and broad level of national preparedness and, therefore, the document has a signalling role, by sending intended messages for allies and for potential saboteurs. The strategy is also meant to synchronise the writing of related documents by the different branches of the government, and raise awareness of the societal actors about the synchronised model.

The key to the Finnish societal security understanding is the comprehensive and cross-sectoral approach to preparedness. In this sense, comprehensiveness is understood as an inclusive model of cooperation that aims to bring "all the relevant actors from citizens to officials" together to share their knowledge, as well as analyse, plan, and practice together. The earlier strategies have highlighted governmental levels of activity. In the new document, although already visible in the previous version of the strategy released in 2010,[5] there is also a conscious effort to include and integrate activities on other levels of the society.[6] The emphasis is on continuity management, that is, on the resilience of the vital societal functions, as well as the security of the supply lines of the state and society.

The strategy emphasises the need for comprehensive security, and views societal security as one aspect of the holistic security approach. In the strategy, security is seen as an end product produced by the

inclusion of all the relevant actors and their understanding of the sources of insecurity into the process.[7] The document is seen as a successor strategy for three earlier strategies of 2003, 2006, and 2010. The main change is the inclusion of, and emphasis on, new actors – especially non-governmental associations – into the comprehensive system of preparedness. The document highlights the comprehensive approach with an exemplary model that "draws interest also internationally" and that, "also increases the feeling of human security".[8]

THE NORDIC MODEL AND COLD WAR YEARS AS FACTORS IN THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY CULTURE

In order to understand the Finnish discussions, it is useful to contextualise them against the wider developments in the security culture. The Cold War years left a cultural, epistemic, and practical legacy to the overall Finnish understanding of national security. The role of foreign policy, and especially the Finnish pressured relationship with the Soviet Union, became highly visible and offered a place for cultural, epistemic, and practical discourse. President Paasikivi's influential statement that the bedrock of Finland's existence is, "the recognition of facts" and its geographical position, provides insight into the depth of the practical reasoning driving its foreign policy as a societal prescription. The fact that was deemed to be the most important to recognise – considerable efforts and political leverage were put in play to attract as large a segment of the population as possible to support the way in which the political elite recognised these geopolitical facts – was that Finland, as a small power, was positioned next to a superpower, the Soviet Union, whose legitimate security interests (but not the illegitimate ones) the Finns were wise to take into account.[9]

The sobering statement of this "fact" echoed well with Finnish cultural underpinnings that value coming to terms with harsh realities, not only of the northern winter, but also with modest political power and with the tragic twists and turns offered to her by history. Paasikivi,

for example, often included historical "lessons" and analogies on Finland's fate in his rather pedagogically informed public speeches on foreign affairs, whilst serving as the president of Finland between 1946–56. At epistemic level, recognition of facts – based on the accumulation of the historical experience – sets an epistemic standard for accurate and politically trustworthy knowledge. It can be interpreted that the recognition of the "fact" was simultaneously a "confession" of fact, in that open and sophisticated expressions of the 'fact' provided a signal of one's status as an expert, whether one was adequate as a researcher or as a statesman. The "fact" also provided a guide for the Finnish foreign policy practice. During the tenure of President Kekkonen, Paasikivi's successor, Finland aimed to construct an intentional policy "line" that had tangibility – it gained popularity through exhaustive repetition of the terms "neutrality" and "the Finnish line" – although it resisted precise formal explication.[10] The recognition of the somewhat tragic nature and iron laws of great power politics – the centrality of great power's role in the maintenance of the international system and international institutions such as the United Nations – were also strong undercurrents that left their mark on Finnish security culture, also visible in President Koivisto's belief system, whose tenure took place amidst the crucial period of transition in international politics from 1982 to 1994.[11]

The end of the Cold War led to two important developments in the aforementioned security culture: firstly, Finnish foreign policy was no longer the focus for public discourse. Official foreign policy to a degree retreated from the media, schools, and other public mediums. Secondly, the "fact" that had previously required "recognition" had largely turned into a historical artefact. However, the most important product of the foreign policy survived the collapse of the superpower and Finnish eastern neighbour. To start with, this legacy has to do with the technical and modernist connotations of President Kekkonen's words, that in foreign policy Finns are physicians, rather than doctors. This metaphor brought into the foreground an ideational understanding of the Finnish mission as a healer of rifts and as a mediator of conflicts. This had implications in the Finnish foreign policy, as well as in the way

societal security has been conceptualised. The important part of this understanding was to establish the conditions for a healthy political state in northern Europe, and in the areas neighbouring Finland. This was in the Finnish interests for two reasons: On one hand, the lower the international tensions were, the more likely it was that Finland would not be engulfed by superpower interests, whether intentional or unintentional. On the other hand, Finland benefited from its ability to instrumentalise the healing of rifts and bridging cleavages. It is notable that the image of healing is still present in this manner. The EU membership enhanced the underlying tendency. The healing of European divisions is still seen as a priority, and unity of the Union is perceived to be a key capability and a generally enhancing factor from the perspective of Finland's security.

The second, and at times even more influential legacy, was left by the Nordic model of societal security and welfare developed during the Cold War years, through practical level cooperation and integration among the Nordics. The Nordic countries share important elements in their cultural, societal and political histories. The Nordic model refers to similarities in the transparency in public administration, respect for the rule of law, equality as a key value, and belief that social welfare heals societal cleavages and produces societal stability. The Cold War interpretation of the Nordic model conveyed a sense that there is a degree of virtue associated with the position of being in-between, which traditional geopolitics regards as a position of disadvantage and insecurity, as in the case of buffer zones between great power spheres of influence. In an important respect, the ideas of a "middle power" and "third way" between the two ideological systems freed Finland from the position where it had existed and where its possible annihilation was a function of erratic superpower relations. The geographical imagination of this approach consisted of a Nordic model that highlighted an "enlightened, anti-militaristic society that was superior" to the stagnant models of the East and West.[12] As Finland's security status changed from the policy of neutrality into being politically allied – i.e. the EU membership – and militarily non-aligned, the previous value placed on the third way receded into the background in the early 1990s.

However, the most important recent manifestation of the Nordic model in Finnish security is the strong identification with the Nordic cooperation, even in defence matters. Especially in the last decade or so, Finland has been proactively developing an increasingly close defence and security relationship with Sweden and with the other Nordic states (NORDEFCO), although it has to be said that this cooperation has been rather pragmatic and incremental in nature.[13]

The identification with the idea of "Nordicness" and a sense of belonging stemming from the historical legacy of the Nordic model is strong in contemporary Finnish discourse. For example, in 2003, then Finnish President Tarja Halonen quoted Halldór Laxness who stated that: "*The Nordic idea – I will not start to define the Nordic idea. If it has not already been defined, it would be too late now, now that this house has already been built … The fact that the house exists says more than any words can.*"[14] This quote is telling because it contrasts with the ongoing discussion concerning the construction of a common European identity. From the Finnish perspective, Nordic identity is solid and clear. It is also put in practice in different international arenas; the Nordic cooperation within different fields of multilateral diplomacy gives a few clues. President Halonen continued by pointing out the historical differences between the Nordic community and the European integration: "*The Nordic countries were a pioneering area 50 years ago. During the time when Europe was dedicated to a coal and steel union, the Nordic countries created a passport-free area, integrated labour markets and a social security system that extended beyond the internal borders. The Nordic countries have developed a citizen-centred social model that is based on human dignity, equality and well-being.*" The Nordic message still resonates in the way Finland see its role in the EU and in the international society more generally. The Nordic countries have been pioneers in creating something that Europe should look like in the future.

The importance of the Nordic model and the societal values it is deemed to represent are still frequently referred to, in the context of how the state to society relationship should be constructed and maintained in Finland. The role of the state is highlighted by the relatively large

re-distributional system, whereby the welfare state is sustained. This means that the state is accustomed to maintaining governmental networks with the civil societal actors and associations, increasingly also with the agile *ad hoc* and grass root movements represented by the so-called fourth sector of society. When it comes to party politics and more traditional political institutions, the informal culture of consensus is also still deemed important, especially in the sense that there is a widely shared understanding on the roles and responsibilities that various governmental and political actors play. The exclusion of the voice of important societal actors is politically difficult, especially in the fields of defence, foreign and security policies. The consensus orientation also includes the field of societal security. This is further enhanced by the existence of strong values placed on the unity of the nation in security matters. The unity is seen as the key asset in external security relations. The value placed on unity and solidity comes close to the contemporary notion of resilience, and also invokes the fairly recent concept of hybrid influence: it is widely perceived in Finland that a unity-seeking network creates resilience that can immunise the society against hybrid influencing.

EMERGENCE OF RESILIENCE AND HYBRIDITY

The emergence of resilience as a strategic concept in Finnish security policies and practices is based on the understanding that the external (and partly also internal) threat environment – both stemming from man-made and natural hazards – has become increasingly less predictable. Therefore, the reasoning continues, preparedness is harder to achieve with traditional preventive measures. This type of overall characterisation of the concept of security also spills over to the Finnish understanding of societal security. This spillover is further facilitated by the recent institutional – e.g. EU and NATO – strategic formulations that are changing towards a similar direction.[15]

The Security Strategy for Society published in 2017 harmonises the national principles regarding preparedness. It is based on a

comprehensive model for security, that interconnects national and societal vulnerabilities, and for "taking necessary actions in the event of different disruptions."[16] The term "disruptions" is part of the resilience vocabulary that views emergencies, catastrophes, accidents, crises, and conflicts as serious and partly unavoidable disruptions that have potential multiple and cascading ramifications.[17]

In the context of security policy, resilience is usually defined as a characteristic of a political actor – e.g. state, community, or business – that has two distinct features: (1) It tolerates disruption and maintains operational capabilities under duress, and (2) it recovers from a disruption or crisis and can learn, reform, and evolve.[18] The usual definitions of the concept are broad and they vary. It should be noted that the conceptual vagueness of recent resilience discourses also has a practical function. Sometimes the under-defined nature of concepts is useful. It allows for political and strategic flexibility of the uses and practices.[19] One useful way of understanding resilience is to see it in relation to security mentalities based on alternative or overlapping concepts, such as defence or protection. Resilience refers to the emerging area that cannot be adequately captured by the language of territorial defence or interventionist protection of human security, but which still seems tangible in the economically and technologically changing world. Thus, it could be said that resilience cannot be totally reduced to defence or protection implied by security.[20]

The definition of resilience and its worth remains under debate internationally;[21] however, the concept seems to fit relatively comfortably within the idea of comprehensive security in Finland.[22] The fact that resilience has become a key signifier appears to fit many of the state and society level practices inherent in the Finnish discourses on security. This "fit" is true to the state level, as well as the municipal and organisational level security conceptualisations within Finland. It appears to bear a family resemblance to the pre-existing understanding of the various societal relationships.[23]

The temporal context for the emergence of resilience-discourse is saturated by the spread of hybrid threats in the wake of geopolitical challenges. Open interconnected societies demand new types of

vocabularies, and "resilience" seems to offer some solution to the problematical ties, arising from the vulnerabilities of asymmetrically interconnected situations for small and "open" states like Finland. It offers a descriptor for an emergent process that does not seem to fit older paradigms of territorial defence and national security. The emergence of resilience politics finds its historical parallel in the transformation of the security-thinking in the early 1990s. The broadened understanding of defence opens up conceptual spaces, where security as a signifier for the protected human existence, met with a sense of increasingly borderless and global exposure. The image of war was also undergoing major change. These shifts led to the development of new practices, such as, crisis management, sustainable development, and conditional sovereignty (e.g. in the form of responsibility to protect).[24]

Lately, more traditional state-centric security conceptualisations have been making a come-back. The processes of state failure, Arab Spring, major internal conflicts opening up spaces for radicalisation and human migration, and other disrupting flows, have highlighted the importance of states as containers of security, and illustrated the connections between state failure and transnational challenges. This development has challenged the notion that European states and the EU can be effective security providers for the external neighbourhood, as well as for their citizens. The supposed security providers have appeared as reactive and behind the curve, in a way that has fed internal debates and rising nativist populism. This sense of new challenges stemming from the vulnerable regions and states that are perceived to face the more developed states, has enhanced the appeal of resilience. Resilience seems to offer answers to the solidification of critical functions of the open western societies, as they have multilevel transnational insecurities.

In security studies' literature, resilience politics have been often regarded as a form of security governance. It involves a conscious effort to diversify responsibilities and agencies away from state level to the societal level. Especially in western Europe and in Nordic countries, resilience politics have started to occupy the space of societal security policies. This development means that security production is brought

closer to the actual actors – market-based and non-governmental – that are actually embedded in, and exposed to, the transnational flows and value chains that might be disrupted due to complex reasons and, thereby, produce everyday complex security challenges. The state level "promise" is no longer the same than it used to be in the world of national security or top-down societal security models. The state is no longer monopolising the solidification of the relationships between communities. Instead, public-private and non-governmental relationships are based on delegation and decentralisation of the traditional responsibilities of security policy.[25]

The diluted security responsibilities of the state is, however, only one side of the coin. On the other side, resilience production is viewed as a state or inter-state responsibility. The Finnish national societal security strategy manifests this dual tendency. It highlights the importance of informal networks across the private-public-third sector divisions. At the same time, it leaves a strong coordinating role for the state and inter-state organisations, especially the EU. These dual pressures can sometimes produce contradictions between the more organic and agile societal tendencies and state-led coordination efforts. For example, when the Finnish state introduced a new intelligence legislation during the spring of 2018, it was met with significant debates on the privacy rights. A societal sense of rights can clash with the more robust sense of resilience, typical of the state that tends to emphasise the continuity of key societal functions. One side claims violated rights, while the state is claiming to protect the resilience, solidity and cohesion of the society against external threats.

The same ethical dilemmas are present in the increasingly omnipresent discourse on hybrid threats in Finland. Who is the primary producer of hybrid defence: the state, societal networks, or individual citizens? Also in the context of hybrid threats, we can sense that the state is back in the game.[26] Those hybrid threats that stem from other geopolitical actors and autocratic states are especially targeting the state, by meddling with societal actors. Wedging to broaden intra-societal cleavages, to deepen societal animosities and spreading disinformation to cause hesitation and indecision are practices that

have state level impact and can result in geopolitical effects. From this angle, the state security is seen as being at stake also when it comes to societal security, thereby increasing (or returning) the state's role in the quest for internal order and softer means of increasing societal cohesion. This recent tendency is providing a counter-force on the need to delegate responsibilities to societal actors. At the same time, societal actors are now seen as actors that have national security relevance.

The international research on resilience, especially the one conducted within international security studies, has thus far focused on questions dealing with global governance and the challenges that it is facing.[27] This branch of research has emphasised non-state threats such as, natural disasters, climate change, political crises, and terrorism. On the other hand, the research on hybrid influence operation – even hybrid warfare – has a geopolitical focus. In Finland, themes such as national security of supply, continuity management, and civil-military relations have lately been approached in a way that seems to tie resilience as a response to the hybrid domain. Both concepts are often regarded as emerging, vague, and ambiguous. The concepts are not fully symmetrical either. Resilience can be used to refer to a strategic level concept that redirects efforts in the security field. However, it does not have one single definition or use.[28] In the Finnish context, the resilience practices should be seen as an ongoing effort to reform and reformulate the field of societal security, as the possible sources of disruption have widened and become more complex, and as the role of the state has changed (and is increasingly understood to be amid a constant change and process of reorganisation)."Hybrid" is a signifier that refers to the changing tactics of actions outside state level. In combination with resilience, "hybrid" indicates the state level stakes inherent in the societal security. In this context, "resilience" acquires a state level strategic meaning, whereby the broad societal exposures to the external environment are seen with potentially powerful political repercussions. Both concepts in combination have become increasingly important for the discussion on the societal security in Finland.[29]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: HYBRID INFLUENCE AND POWER POLITICISATION OF FINNISH SOCIETAL SECURITY

When approaching hybrid influencing and threats, it is useful to remember that the concept is intimately linked with the debates on the changing nature of war. The concept is generally regarded as having been coined by Frank Hoffman in 2007. That said, the ideas behind the term are not new. The blending of identity politics, ambiguities between war and peace, and information campaigning have been discussed for years,[30] although the information technology revolution and the burgeoning impact of social media on societal debates have led to new tactics in the field.

The mixing of military means with old and new asymmetrical tools, to achieve geopolitical objectives has been noticed in Finland. In 2017, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) was established in Helsinki.[31] It serves as a hub of expertise and facilitates the capability development of the participating countries and organisation. This expert network clearly indicates the importance of the concept for Finland and its prominence in the Finnish debates, also on societal security. The concept is used to refer to peacetime hostile operations meant to undermine the key characteristics of the protection of the Finnish society, defence of the state, and the security status of Finland.

The Security Strategy for Society 2017 adopts a broader view in its references to hybrid security phenomenon. The narrow view would define the concept in terms of hybrid warfare practices where non-military tactics and traditional military means are combined in an agile way to achieve strategic goals that usually fall short of actual military victory.[32] The constricted definition considers that a military component is always present in the hybrid operations, and that other asymmetric means are used to enhance the reaching of the goals of the overall operations. This option is also present in the Finnish strategy. However, adaptation of the broader view emphasises that psychological, economical and other means of "soft" influencing can have operational

uses, also during peacetime and in the absence of a recognisable military component.[33]

The YTS states that a central focal point is the flexibility in unpredictable situations and preparedness to respond to hybrid influence and cyber threats in their various forms and to enhance the needed capabilities. The onus is on the broadness and unpredictability of the hybrid challenge, and on the flexibility needed for adequate preparedness. The idea presented by the YTS connects a broad understanding of the hybrid influence with resilience as the ability to withstand the psychological and material effects of crises in a flexible and prepared manner.[34] In YTS, the term hybrid influence refers to successive or simultaneous use of economic, political, or military means through different vectors, such as, technology or social media; the broad definition also includes socio-psychological operations – e.g. disinformation campaigns – that aim to lower the cohesion of the civil society by heightening the intra-societal enmities.

In the Finnish discussion, the concept "hybrid influence" has been criticised as overly broad and unduly securitising, that is, creating a space for security-driven practices that are in danger of displacing the normal running of politics, with a new culture of secrecy that might eventually lead to a sense of alienation between the traditional authorities responsible for providing domestic order, and national security and the society itself. Another source of criticism is related more to the rights of the civil society. There are fears that the state interferes too much in the society level natural spontaneous activities, by securitising certain activities, through labelling them as illegal or normatively suspicious hybrid practices. Here, the conceptual vagueness of both resilience and hybrid operations and the political significance of reaching a wide understanding on their practical efficacy becomes evident. On the one hand, hybrid security discussions appear to correspond to the recent developments in the international environment. It describes what has been observed. It recognises a "fact" – a "practice" of Finnish state security culture that has long historical roots, as described above.

On the other hand, there is a clear societal apprehension towards overly broad definitions or understandings of the hybrid concept, as

it casts suspicions on activities and debates that are part of a well-functioning and developed liberal society. In many ways, the YTS can be interpreted as a strategic communication tool to bridge these gaps, to serve as a communication tool between different stakeholders responsible for providing societal security in a more complex and open world. In this sense, it is meant to present an all-encompassing perspective of both the state and societal level actors. This comprehensiveness has its limits, as some of the actors might be more concerned about the possible consequences of over-securitisation of the broad definition of hybrid influence. So far, it seems that the concept of socio-psychological resilience – with roots in the traditions of a spiritual defence approach and policies aiming for high social cohesion and welfare – might well serve an overarching security mentality that alleviates the concerns of taking the hybrid concept "too far".

ENDNOTES

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[3] Cabinet of Finland, *Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia,* op. cit., 3

[4] Working under the Ministry of Defence, the Security Committee works as "*[…] a permanent and broad-based cooperation body for proactive preparedness [that is] tasked to assist the Government and ministries*". See: The Secuirty Committee, https://www.turvallisuuskomitea.fi/index.php/en/security-committee

[5] Cabinet of Finland, *Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia,* op. cit., 9–11

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[7] Ibid., 5

[8] Cabinet of Finland, *Yhteiskunnan turvallisuusstrategia,* op. cit., 5

[9] Kimmo Rentola, "From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953–58", *Cold War History* 1, no. 1, 2000, 75–102

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[17] Tapio Juntunen, Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen, "Resilience, security and the politics of processes", *Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses* 2, no. 3, 2014, 195–209

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SAFETY AND SECURITY – WHAT'S IN A WORD? SOCIETAL SECURITY IN ICELAND

SILJA BÁRA ÓMARSDÓTTIR

Security is a fairly low-profile issue in Iceland. As a small and unarmed state, the population has limited exposure to militarised conflict and is fairly confident there are limited prospects of a terrorist attack within its shores. To make things more complicated, the word öryggi means both safety and security and, in general, the public appears to feel safe. Discussions of security are minimal and tend to arise only when military exercises are conducted in the country. As a founding member of NATO, Iceland benefits from the alliance's collective defence, and relations with NATO are managed by a small group of people in the executive branch. In addition to NATO membership, Iceland has a bilateral defence agreement with the United States (US), which until 2006 operated a military base in Iceland.

After the departure of the US forces from Iceland, the country has, for the first time, begun assessing risks and threats for itself. This process was established with the appointment of a Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) in 2007 and can be considered to have finished with the passing of the National Security Policy in April 2016 and the establishment of a National Security Council that same year. In 2007 and 2008, the government focused on military defences, in particular by signing MOUs with other NATO countries about military exercises and cooperation, and the establishment of sporadic air policing exercises in Iceland. The financial crash of 2008 altered this focus, as exemplified by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Gísladóttir's comment that Iceland needed to prioritise other types of defences.[1] In the months before the financial crash, acts on civil protection and defence had been passed, each representing a different aspect of Iceland's security

concerns. While the military aspect faded in the wake of the crash, it has recently become more prominent, in particular with regards to Iceland's financial contributions to NATO.

Official debates on security in Iceland have recently been turning more towards military security, and the US military has demonstrated renewed interest in the country.[2] Nonetheless, the focus of security narratives has, since 2008, by and large been of a societal nature. Most research is conducted by graduate students, who have recently explored food security,[3] health security,[4] infrastructures, such as electricity,[5] cyber security,[6] economic security,[7] and tourism,[8] to name but a few. Additionally, a 2011 study of the administration of security in Iceland demonstrated how diffuse the issue is in the organisational structure. In all, nine ministries were involved in the provision of security, in addition to public agencies and the volunteer sector.[9] While some changes have been made to the structure of ministries and agencies since this study was conducted, there is no reason to expect that any fewer agencies are involved in the provision and administration of security in Iceland.

Despite the increased emphasis on military security in the official rhetoric, societal security may be placed higher on the agenda in Iceland than in even the neighbouring Nordic countries. This is perhaps due to the fact that the country has no military, and therefore the population's ideas of safety and security are merged, or possibly because unarmed states, such as Iceland, speak differently than militarised states. In this sense, the Icelandic security discourse tends to focus more on civil protection, and within that frame of reference, the idea of resilience is quite prominent.

In a recent study of security perceptions in Iceland, various issues emerged that fall into the category of societal security, such as the economy, the welfare system and services, gender-based violence, surveillance and data or cyber security, as well as the protection of the public against the state and police, rather than by them.[10] It is notable that the official strategy, while taking many of these concerns into account, does not reflect the same concern with many of these issues. Also, the groups concerned with the "softer" issues concerning societal

security do not have status to securitise them, to the same extent as the authorities do with politico-military security. Two notable exceptions are natural disasters, which the Icelandic Search and Rescue (ICE-SAR) teams, composed of volunteers, responds to, and infrastructures, which were securitised by the Federation of Industries in a report published in the autumn of 2017.

The body of this paper will be based on an analysis of official debates on security, analysing the societal security elements in three separate policy processes: the 2009 Risk Assessment Report; the work of a parliamentary committee appointed in 2011 to draft a national security policy; and, finally, the debate and approval of the 2016 National Security Policy. It also draws on the Policy on Civil Protection and the Security of the State 2015–2017, where societal security is defined as focusing on the security of individuals and social groups, identities, values, and infrastructures.[11] Finally, the paper considers security policies within specific sectors and input from other actors who attempt to securitise the issues they prioritise, and findings from the previously mentioned study on security perceptions in Iceland.

ICELAND'S SECURITY DISCOURSES AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVES

As an unarmed state, it has been a struggle for Iceland to define security and establish a coherent strategic narrative. This process started taking shape with the appointment of a Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) in 2007, entrusted with assessing the risks Iceland faced after the departure of the US military from Iceland in 2006. The RAC's report, issued in early 2009, intentionally took a broad view of security, addressing global, societal and military aspects of security. This meant that it extended its analysis to issues such as the economy – understandably, as the report was finalised just after the crash of the Icelandic financial system – epidemics, cyber security, food security, and the security of infrastructures.[12] All of these factors could be placed under the umbrella of societal security, although it would also be possible to

isolate the economy and analyse it as economic security specifically. Authorities intended the report to be the first step towards the formulation of an Icelandic security policy, but as its release coincided with the financial collapse in Iceland, this was not prioritised until some years later. In 2011, a cross-political parliamentary committee was appointed to suggest a National Security Policy, which was finally presented to parliament in 2015 and passed in 2016. In the intervening years, repeated discussions have resulted in what may be considered strategic narratives on four broad themes: finance and economy, health and welfare, nature and environment, and, finally, infrastructures and internet or cyber security.

Finance and economy are prevalent in the discussion about security in Iceland, not surprisingly, since the country found itself threatened by a rapid economic collapse and isolated from its traditional allies and supporters in its wake. Individuals felt the impact directly through a worsening exchange rate, increased unemployment, and ballooning inflation rates. They therefore expect the government to create financial stability, and identify that as security.[13] In official documents, economic security is approached from the state perspective. The 2009 Risk Assessment Report, for example, discussed the causes of the financial crash and its impact on the financial system in detail. It noted that increased regulation and international obligations might assist in bringing about financial stability in the long term. This theme is present throughout the formulation of the national security policy. When the committee was first established to draft it, it was noted that economic shocks were a national security issue for Iceland.[14] In debating the restructuring of the banking system, this perspective generally fades into the background. For the general population, however, financial stability remains a significant issue, ranking as the third most significant threat to the state and most significant threat to the security of individuals in a large-scale survey conducted in 2016.[15]

Health and welfare are not listed in official documents as a security concern. This did, however, emerge as quite a strong theme in the focus group interviews mentioned previously. The participants in those groups identified threats to the healthcare and welfare systems

as potential threats to the security of Iceland and its citizens.[16] This presents itself mostly in the shape of fear of inadequate funding and the departure of well-trained staff to work in the private sector or abroad. The government is perceived as consistently failing to prioritise the needs of the citizens. This narrative appears in public discourse rather than in debates on security, and is exemplified by a recent initiative challenging the government to adequately fund the national healthcare system. This collection of signatures became the largest in Icelandic history, demonstrating that this issue appeals to the general public.[17] The Risk Assessment Report from 2009 addressed health and epidemics in the framework of security, but focused on the way in which the nation's health might be affected by migration, urbanisation, poverty, globalisation, and the cross-national transport of food and other goods.[18]

This perspective is usually not addressed in mainstream politics, but current Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir noted, in her New Year's address as an opposition MP in 2014, that increasing inequality was a threat to peace and security, in Iceland as much as around the world. In her comments on the prime minister's speech in the autumn of 2014, she also framed the funding of healthcare as a security issue,[19] a perspective not raised in the debates on the national security policy at all. Other politicians also framed related issues in terms of societal security, including Progressive Party MP and then Minister of Social Affairs Harðardóttir, who in an op-ed referred to the elimination of interpersonal violence as a way to increase security within society.[20] Harðardóttir also proposed a parliamentary resolution on family policy, where child welfare and housing were put into a security perspective. The resolution was not passed,[21] suggesting that authorities generally do not treat health and welfare services as a security issue.

Nature and environment are an omnipresent risk factor in Icelandic society, and it is clear that both the public and decision-makers are concerned with the dangers that natural hazards and environmental risks can pose. In a large-scale survey conducted in late 2016, natural disasters and environmental threats were considered the two biggest risks to Iceland's security, with nearly 47% of respondents ranking both

types as the most significant ones. When asked about risks to their own individual security, the two types of threats ranked number 2 and 3, after financial insecurity, and nearly 35% ranked these at the top. In focus group interviews, the threats identified ranged from climate change to avalanches, eruptions, floods, and inclement weather.[22]

Natural and environmental risks and threats also received extensive coverage in the National Security Policymaking process, as MPs suggested that security spanned environmental threats, pollution, natural disasters and more. While MPs, by and large, agreed on the broad approach to security in the process, one did note that since this wide perspective was applied, security, as it was defined, fell under the purview of at least eight ministries. This, she stated, meant that the policy would have to address how civilian agencies would be equipped to respond to security threats.[23] The threats were nonetheless focused on the state, and were emphasised far less in the actual policy proposals than in the debates.

The security of infrastructures was not a great concern among the public participating in the focus groups, but it has been a consistent concern of the authorities dating back to the Risk Assessment Report in 2009. In the report, various aspects of infrastructure security were listed, starting with cyber security. Concerns about attacks and accidents were raised, including the fact that Iceland relied on a single cable connection in each direction across the sea (FARICE to Europe and Cantat to North America) so it would be easy to sever the country's connection with the outside world. No malign intent was needed for this to happen: rats in Scotland gnawed on the FARICE cable and severed it twice in 2005, and a work crew accidentally severed it at least once.[24] The public concern with internet security was more prominently placed on fears of surveillance and hacking, equally so by the state and private actors.[25] The Risk Assessment Committee recommended that a computer security and incident response team be set up to coordinate action against cyber threats.[26] This was followed up in a plan on communications for 2011–2014 and a policy was passed in 2015.[27] In the early stages of that plan, then Minister of the Interior Jónasson noted that cyber security should be considered as an aspect of

national security.[28] The parliamentary committee established in 2011 also focused on cyber security, with then Minister for Foreign Affairs Skarphéðinsson arguing that nations and organisations were at risk of attack, and needed communication infrastructures in order to be able to respond.[29] In the national security policy, passed in 2016, cyber threats were categorised as an actual risk to Iceland's security. They were classified as a category 1 risk, meaning that cyber security should be prioritised with regard to both financing and preparedness.[30]

Infrastructures received far more attention in the 2009 Risk Assessment Report than in debates around the formulation and passing of the National Security Policy. In the 2009 report, it was noted that increased capabilities were needed for both civilian and military purposes.[31] The security of the roads was given attention, noting that the greatest risks to them were due to natural disasters. Infrastructures are owned and operated by public and private actors alike, which necessitated coordination.[32] This theme received minimal attention in the debates around the National Security Policy, but has since been picked up by civil society, in particular the SI – Federation of Industries, which issued a report in the autumn of 2017[33] and pushed the issue onto the agenda of the electoral campaign taking place at the time. One aspect that often emerges is the location of the domestic airport. The city of Reykjavík has long planned to move the airport, but municipalities in the countryside argue that this would take away their access to the national hospital, which is located nearby. While the debate has not been explicitly securitised, some securitising moves can certainly be seen in it.[34]

Other issues are often brought up as needing to be thought of in terms of security. Among these are, gender-based violence, the impact of migration and multiculturalism, as well as organised crime. This last issue is also the one where most linkages can be seen to regional and European counterparts, through information systems and police cooperation. While debates often flare up around isolated incidents such as border controls,[35] they generally do not reach the level of securitisation, possibly as they do not have strong enough advocates to marshal resources around them. Furthermore, it appears that most

issues are discussed in isolation, presenting them as "soft security" concerns and without a focus on system-wide resilience. In a 2005 report, the civil protection unit assessed the resilience of Icelandic society, but with a focus on discrete sectors of society.[36] In recent reports, resilience has started to show up as a goal of security-focused organisations, but again mostly within specific sectors of society.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

Societal security is a fairly recent term in Icelandic political discourse. The term itself, *samfélagslegt öryggi* or *samfélagsöryggi*, refers to the security of a community or society. The word is transparent enough to be intuitively understood by most native speakers, and is often associated with the maintenance of social welfare and stability. Linking it to the wider security discourse becomes more complicated, as there is no tradition of security, and the word öryggi is a synonym for both safety and security. The complications entailed in bringing this concept into use in Iceland become clear in the first policy of the Civil Protection and Security Council, which states that it seeks to address risk, preparedness and response to various issues that can threaten societal security or security of civilians, and goes on to conflate the two as public safety (*almannaöryggi*). Public safety is then defined as addressing the security of individuals and groups, as well as values and infrastructures.[37]

Looking at the development of societal security in Iceland, it can be observed that the idea of resilience started to gain ground in the early 21st century. It was applied in a large scale study of the capital region's resilience in 2005, in which the civil protection unit of the police presented models of how various types of shocks could affect the area, ranging from chemical waste accidents, eruptions, epidemics, riots or acts of terrorism, and malfunction of infrastructures. Having presented the models, the authors called on the relevant authorities in each case to ensure preparedness.[38] No specific understanding of societal security appears to have been put forth in this report, and the resilience concept does not appear to have taken hold in national discourse.

In 2008, Bailes and Gylfason conducted an elite survey of the possibility of "importing" the societal security concept to Iceland, suggesting that in the other Nordic countries this concept has enabled the coordination of policy and action on non-military emergencies. Their findings are that while such coordination would be welcomed, the country's risk/threat profile is quite distinct and any policy would have to be adapted to the local situation. They further point out that the public is generally resistant to preparedness and planning, and that in such a small community, acceptable responses and solutions can often be improvised. Finally, they suggest that using the concept of societal security would enable Icelanders to create a neutral ground on which to debate security-related issues, sidestepping the contentious past related to the US military's presence in the country and its role in Iceland's security.[39]

Bailes and Gylfason's paper was published shortly after the passing of the Civil Protection Act, which was a necessary update of a much older act on the same issue. The act presented a much wider approach to security than that of the Defence Act passed at the same time[40] and has become the foundation for recent developments. The Civil Protection Act emphasised the need for strengthened resilience, and assigns municipalities the responsibility for assessing at regular intervals. In a 2011 report from the national police commissioner's office on civil protection, resilience is defined as the ability of the people, the municipality and the general authorities to respond to unexpected, and often dangerous, events without disturbing or disrupting their operations.[41]

The model for societal security in Iceland can clearly be framed in terms of resilience. There is a strong tendency to assess risks, rather than threats, and while Bailes and Gylfason's comment on Icelanders' resistance to planning and preparedness certainly has some value today, it is clear that government agencies are increasingly preparing longer term plans for their relevant issue areas, preparing for contingencies. The frame of reference is to ensure the safety of the population and the state in the event of natural disasters, much more so than trying to defend them from any potential threats. The term societal security reflects this approach better than a discourse of national security would.

STAKEHOLDERS

The stakeholders involved in shaping the understanding of societal security in Iceland are by and large public authorities and agencies. They range from state and municipal authorities to industry organisations and civilian NGOs. The Civil Protection and Security Council, set up by the Civil Protection Act in 2008, demonstrates the disparate oversight of security in Iceland, but the council is composed of ministers covering civil protection, pollution, health, energy, defence and foreign affairs, the permanent secretaries of state of those ministries, as well as the national police commissioner, directors of twelve public agencies, as well as representatives of ICE-SAR, the Red Cross, emergency response, and municipalities.[42] Public authorities interact with interest groups, such as the Federation of Industries, and social partners, such as the Red Cross and ICE-SAR, which are involved in responding to natural disasters. Various other pressure groups emerge around specific issues at any given time. One example of this is an initiative led by founder and CEO of DeCode, a company dedicated to genetic research, to gather signatures challenging the government to adequately fund the national healthcare system, as he considered it insufficiently funded and inadequate to meet the needs of the nation.[43] Few actors have similar weight to securitise the issues they fight for, with perhaps the exception of the SI – Federation of Industries discussed in more detail below.

Icelandic municipalities are important actors in the provision of societal security. The Ministry of Education has collaborated with the Association of Municipalities to address the security and welfare of children by preparing for accidents and traumatic events that may occur. This has been done for pre-schools and elementary schools, both of which are governed by municipalities. Each handbook lists ten items; four can be framed in terms of security: cyber security, safety in the classroom, safety when travelling to school, and civil protection.[44] Municipalities generally play a large role in the provision of societal security. They are, by and large, responsible for infrastructures, ranging from roads to healthcare. Additionally, each municipality has a responsibility to plan for civil protection, although coordination is in

the hands of the national police commissioner's office. Yet, the framing of these issues is rarely in terms of security. A notable exception is that of the city of Reykjavík, Iceland's largest municipality. There, the security of women and girls against sexual violence has been addressed specifically by the mayor, Dagur B. Eggertsson, who on the occasion of Reykjavík joining UN Women's *Safe Cities Global Initiative*, stated that private and public spaces should be made safe for women.[45]

Other stakeholders include non-state actors from industries, as well as non-governmental organisations. In particular, *SI – the Federation of Industries* should be mentioned as a stakeholder. In October 2017, as parliamentary elections approached in Iceland, SI released an extensive report on the status of Iceland's infrastructures, attempting to emulate similar reports published in Denmark and Norway, which have shaped social debates on the prioritisation related to the state of infrastructures and the need for renewal. The report assesses the state of various infrastructures, ranging from airports, roads, and ports to electricity, water and waste, to energy production and transport, as well as buildings owned by public authorities. In addition to ranking their current status, the report indicates whether the state of infrastructures is likely to improve, remain the same, or deteriorate in the future, and assesses the cost of accumulated need for maintenance. Particularly noticeable was the poor status of roads and domestic airports at 2-2.5/5, which means that they are in poor shape and their operations are at risk, but that with adequate investment they might meet demands in ten years' time.[46] It was clear that SI's report caught the attention of the political parties, almost all of which placed infrastructure repairs high on their agendas. SI is a well-funded and organised interest group, with strong access to authorities. It emphasises productivity and innovation in the economy, as well as technical education.[47] The focus on physical infrastructures, such as roads, harbours, and airports, also makes SI's arguments well received by decision-makers in rural areas, which are frequently isolated.

Finally, special mention must be made of non-governmental organisations and their contribution to societal security in Iceland. The two most relevant organisations are without a doubt the Icelandic

Search and Rescue teams (ICE-SAR) and the Icelandic Red Cross and its regional branches. They both contribute to the definition and provision of societal security. The ICE-SAR is a voluntary organisation, which receives some funding by the state, but largely funds itself with voluntary donations and fundraising efforts. It is staffed by volunteers, who respond to natural disasters and emergencies, often putting themselves in hazardous situations to assist others. The ICE-SAR operates a well-organised network of groups which coordinate across regions to assist one another when emergencies extend over a period of time. ICE-SAR has enormous social capital in Iceland, as the premier first responder in times of crisis. The Red Cross focuses on caring for those affected by catastrophes, as well as on the social integration of immigrants, protection of asylum seekers, and other vulnerable groups in society, so as to prevent isolation and promoting social cohesion. Both ICE-SAR and the Red Cross, as well as smaller organisations which focus on more delimited issues, rely on public funding, fundraising, as well as donations to continue their operations. Neither has the funding to invest into research and analysis to the same extent as SI and similar groups, and thus may not be able to directly influence policy in the same way.

Each of these stakeholders is engaged to some extent in the development of political actions and outcomes. The Red Cross works with the government and municipal authorities in the settlement of refugees, and ICE-SAR is mobilised in the case of emergencies. Both participate in simulations and exercises of crisis response, as well as in responses to natural disasters with rescue and first aid. Other actors who do not have a specific role in emergency response are engaged with policy through advice and comments on proposed legislation, by participating in committees and through direct and indirect debates in the media or the publishing of reports, as in the case of *SI* mentioned here. The small size of the country makes it clear to the authorities that they need to rely on input from various actors. This is clear in the constitution of the new National Security Council, which includes a representative of ICE-SAR, in addition to members of the cabinet and directors of relevant agencies.

CONCLUSIONS

Societal security has been addressed in each of the three main policy steps taken by the Parliament of Iceland since 2009, when the Risk Assessment Committee submitted its report, and until 2016, when a National Security Policy was finally approved by parliament. A distinct trend can be observed throughout the process, as the Risk Assessment Committee's report took an intentionally broad view on security, covering issues ranging from trafficking and epidemics, to cyber security, the security of infrastructures, and the economy, in addition to the traditional approach to politico-military security and natural and environmental risks and threats. Icelandic authorities, therefore, generally take a broad perspective on security, emphasising civil protection and the maintenance of infrastructures. Resilience started to gain ground in the early 21st century and was specifically referenced in the 2008 Civil Protection Act. Since then it has been utilised in risk reviews by the police and municipal authorities. Nonetheless, it appears that the state system is still fragmented and focused on responding to specific threats rather than on building resilient systems, perhaps because as soon as the idea of "security" is introduced, policy formulation veers abruptly toward a more traditional military approach.

Consultations for legislative processes are generally open to all, and parliamentary committees frequently call on those who submit written reports. The ability to influence the security agenda is therefore fairly open, if individuals and organisations are aware of the work taking place. However, it is clear that some organisations are better funded and equipped to put issues on the agenda, and policymaking may therefore reflect the structural imbalance in the system. This is apparent in the shaping of the National Security Policy, where proposals sent from the parliament to the executive branch were returned with significantly changed priorities. Expertise from sector-specific research organisations is not commonly spread across sectors and expertise in the parliamentary process is haphazardly sought from the research community. Furthermore, while agencies may dedicate some of their funds to research, there is no funding allocated to research security.

While a recent report on the future of the Icelandic Foreign Service suggests that a research centre dedicated to security should be set up, the focus is on national, rather than societal security.[48]

Iceland is in a unique position to be a leader in developing knowledge on societal security. Many agencies already have significant capacity in the field and research on their specific sectors. The Civil Protection and Security Council might be a useful vehicle to coordinate cooperation between the public sector and academia, thereby fostering opportunities for research and further dissemination of the knowledge already in existence. Increased knowledge might also contribute to the building of societal, rather than sector-specific, resilience.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY AND SAFETY IN NORWAY: THE DUALITY OF *SAMFUNNSSIKKERHET*

CLAUDIA MORSUT

The end of the Cold War changed the picture of threats and risks in Norway, with a gradual shift from the traditional total defence approach (in place since 1946), where the society's role was to support the Armed Forces during a crisis (mainly a war), to a focus on an increasingly wide range of threats and risks that could jeopardise the stability of the Norwegian society. Nowadays, Norway has a comprehensive/holistic approach in prevention, preparedness, contingency planning, and crisis operations, where support and cooperation between Armed Forces and the society are mutual. The general perspective adopted in Norway is that crises should be prevented, while crises that have arisen should be handled in the best possible way. In other words, when a crisis occurs, interruptions in important social functions, and major accidents, should not cause serious social losses and damages, both material and immaterial.

It is important to underline that the English terms "security" and "safety" are usually translated using the Norwegian term *samfunnssikkerhet*.[1] The first part of this chapter briefly illustrates the origins of the term and its development in the research field. The second part focuses on the official public discourse by reflecting on the main policy documents dealing with *samfunnssikkerhet*. The last part offers an overview of the main Norwegian stakeholders. The conclusion offers some findings and raises some future research proposals.

APPROACH OF NORWEGIAN RESEARCH
TO *SAMFUNNSSIKKERHET*

Research on *samfunnssikkerhet* is relatively recent in Norway. Since
the 1980s, the Research Council of Norway has supported research
programmes (like HSE Petroleum, RISIT, ICT SoS, PETROMAKS,
PETROSAM) that have mainly looked at safety challenges related to
work environments and technological developments in the petroleum
sector. In addition, since the mid-1980s, higher education programmes
have mainly been offered in petroleum safety (the Norwegian University
in Science and Technology – NTNU) and fire safety engineering (the
former Stord/Haugesund University College). In 1999, the Stavanger
University College (now University of Stavanger) started an MA
programme in *samfunnssikkerhet* with a focus on public planning
and management, where, for the first time the term was introduced,
but without a clear definition.[2] The need to have research programmes
and an academic offer with a focus on threats and risks to society, not
only related to safety at work or technology, was signalled by a group
of Norwegian researchers in 2005, in a document that called for a new
research programme in *samfunnssikkerhet* called SAMRISK.[3] The
researchers pointed out that societal security/safety and risk should
be studied and analysed together, since threats, dangers, societal
vulnerability and risk management are all part of the same complex
panorama. They declared the urgency to grasp this complexity, to ensure
security/safety and preparedness across sectors and areas of activity.
In addition, they underlined that, because of global changes following
the Cold War, societal security/safety could no longer be seen within a
national framework. The consequences of globalisation, deregulation,
privatisation and technological development should be central in a new
research programme, since risk assessment and decision-making under
uncertain conditions have become key themes in the political agenda
at all levels, both nationally and internationally. The Research Council
of Norway launched the SAMRISK programme in November 2006 for
a duration of five years. In June 2011, an internal evaluation pointed
out that the programme was successful in delivering new knowledge

on the security/safety challenges in Norway, but, at the same time, new issues needed to be explored.[4] The terrorist attacks on 22nd July 2011 presented a new challenge for the Norwegian society, and in the next phase of the programme (SAMRISK II 2014–2019) new priorities were listed: extremism, cyber security, society's robustness, cultural issues, organisation and management of security.[5] More specifically, the programme called for more research on critical infrastructures, complex crises and international coordination, terrorism, failure of social security networks, organised crime, natural catastrophes and climate change, man-made disasters and international threats to health (like pandemics).

The background document behind the establishment of the SAMRISK programme was a summary of a seminar organised by the former Stavanger University College in October 2004.[6] Norwegian researchers, civil protection officers and electrical services experts gathered together to discuss the concept *samfunnssikkerhet*. The seminar revolved around the definition provided by the Norwegian Government's White Paper No. 17 (2001–2002) (see part 2): *"The society's ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic requirements, in a variety of stress situations."*[7]

The document stated that it is easier to define what is not included in the Norwegian term *samfunnssikkerhet*: national defence, sustainable development, damages to daily life, common diseases, isolated accidents, common crime, although there are some overlapping issues. In addition, the document pointed out that the definition's broadness gave rise to the need for a more precise definition. An attempt to describe the key terms of the definition more accurately is contained in the document as follows:

- Ability (*evne*): it does not mean only the society's daily management, but also the management of extraordinary events by institutions and society as such;
- Maintain (*opprettholde*): to be resilient against negative events;
- Critical social functions (*viktige samfunnsfunksjoner*): they are both the institutions and the systems which keep a society going;

- Protecting the life and health of citizens and meeting their basic requirements (*borgerens liv, helse og grunnleggende behov*): institutions should cope with negative events by guaranteeing protection to their citizens.

The authors of the background document further discussed the term in a paper published in an English journal in 2007, by using most of the findings of the seminar. In the paper, *sammfunnsikkerhet* was translated as societal safety and defined according to the White Paper No. 17.[8] In order to contextualise the definition, three criteria were discussed. According to the authors, at least one should be present in processes or events that could pose a threat to society. These are:

- Extraordinary stresses and losses: major events that go beyond the ability of the affected local community to manage the consequences, since they are impossible to handle with established systems and common routines;
- Complexity and mutual dependence: events in technological and social systems with complicated links and strong mutual dependence;
- Trust in vital social functions: events that undermine trust in the institutions that should protect and prevent.

An expert in Nordic languages, Finn-Erik Vinje, raised some critical observations, by claiming that the actual English words "safety" and "security", according to previous policy documents[9] and studies[10] to the White Paper No. 17, described two aspects of the Norwegian word *sikkerhet*: safety relates to unwanted events, caused without intention (natural disasters, accidents in the work environment); while security deals with unwanted events, intentionally caused (like terrorism, sabotage, and vandalism).[11] However, according to Vinje, *sikkerhet* includes all kinds of events, both resulting from unintentional and intentional actions. Thus, he proposed, to keep the distinction between unintentional and intentional, to use the term *trygghet* (to be safe) and *sikring* (protection). He, nevertheless, concluded that this way of thinking had not found support in academic writings so far.[12] The research developed in the following years on *samfunnssikkerhet* focused mainly on the way the term was used in policy documents;[13] on

the ambiguities and controversies raised by the term in the Norwegian political context and in the international academic context;[14] on the organisational challenges in Norway as a consequence of a raised complexity in the security/safety environment;[15] on issues of safety in the petroleum sector.[16]

The most recent attempt to reflect on the term *samfunnssikkerhet* was made by Høyland, who underlined the differences between societal safety (according to the White Paper No. 17 and the research provided by scholars) and societal security (according to the Copenhagen School),[17] though admitting a certain degree of overlapping between the two definitions:

Table 1. Societal safety vs. societal security

Societal safety - Norway*	Societal security – Copenhagen School**
"The society's ability	"The ability of a society
to maintain critical social functions to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic requirement	to persist in its essential character
in a variety of stress situations"	under changing conditions and possible actual threats"

* Justis- og politidepartementet, Samfunnssikkerhet. Veien til [..] op. cit., 4
** Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, et al., "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe", Pinter, 1993, 23

Source: Compiled by author according to Høyland's paper and Weaver et al.'s book

In his study, he proposed a model of societal safety and societal security dimensions and principles and called for further research on both terms. As for societal security, he considered that the term covers issues such as cyber security, identity perception and political communication, while societal safety deals more with regulation, auditing and governance.

MAIN PUBLIC RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN NORWAY

While in the 1980s, the research focus on *samfunnssikkerhet* was mainly technical issues with a few research centres (Stavanger and Trondheim), nowadays the research has expanded to all the possible threats to the Norwegian society and several studies at bachelors, masters and doctoral level offer subjects related to aspects of *samfunnssikkerhet* (such as, for example, crisis management, risk analysis, risk communication). The presentation of the main centres of research and education in Norway does not claim to be exhaustive, but rather to show the extent of the research agenda in *samfunnssikkerhet*, which includes Artic security, 22/7, cyber security, Nordic security and defence cooperation, energy security and impact on Russia, radicalisation and violent extremism, migration, critical infrastructure security, terrorism and organised crime, crisis management, risk analysis together with the long-lasting research in safety related to work environment and petroleum.

Since 2009, the Centre for Risk Management and Societal Safety (SEROS) at the University of Stavanger includes researchers from social sciences and engineering and offers a broad portfolio in terms of academic offers (bachelors, masters and doctoral studies) and research and development projects. Risk analysis, crisis management and safety research are central both from social sciences and technical viewpoints. Once a year in January, SEROS organises a conference on security/safety issues, in collaboration with local and national stakeholders.[18] The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim has the main research focus on critical infrastructures (electric power, water supply, transport, and petroleum), critical societal functions (banking and finance, food supply, emergency and rescue services, defence, and environment) and human factors in safety. NTNU also offers an MA on these topics. Once a year, NTNU organises a conference about the challenges on security in central Norway. NTNU cooperates with SINTEF, an independent research organisation established in 1950. SINTEF research focuses on risk and vulnerability analysis, evaluation of technical, human and

organisational factors related to security and safety issues, development of protection equipment, and ICT security.[19] NTNU, SINTEF and the University of Oslo joined their forces in 2007 to establish the Gemini centre in Reliability and Safety Studies, which covers topics such as risk perception, organisational safety, vulnerability of critical infrastructures, risk-based safety management.[20] The Artic University of Norway (UiT) conducts research and development activities in safety, mainly on the development of technology and preparedness in the Arctic and offers studies at bachelors and masters level.[21] The Rokkan Centre in Bergen is one of the six departments of Uni Research, which is a multidisciplinary research institute funded in 1986. *Samfunnssikkerhet* is not specifically mentioned among the areas of research, but is treated more as a transversal issue, included in a range of social sciences topics (from welfare to social care, from media to language studies, from system to organisational studies).[22] Since 2011, the Centre for Integrated Emergency Management (CIEM) at the University of Agder deals with emergency management issues, resilience and IT support to solve security challenges.[23] The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo has intensively driven research on terrorism, security policy, and changes in threats and defence at national and international level in the last 40 years.[24] The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in Lillestrøm is central for research on military security. The centre was the first to discuss the links between total defence and *samfunnssikkerhet* concepts, and since 1994 has conducted research on civilian preparedness and societal vulnerability.[25] Since 1959, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) has focused on security with a transversal topic inside its broad research and education portfolio (peace studies, conflict resolution, migration, law, ethics, governance, just to mention a few). The research group on security addresses several aspects of security (from societal security to peace-building, from crisis management to resilience, from financial security to terrorism).[26] The University of Oslo hosts the Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX), which studies right-wing extremism in its several aspects (such as violence, hate, ideology, organisation), a topic that has been relatively neglected in societal security.[27]

In addition to these actors, there are several private companies in Norway (such as Proactima, Safetec, OFFB, RESQ), which offer services – courses, training risk and preparedness analyses, preparedness planning – to their customers (for example: oil companies, municipalities, regions, and banks) on *samfunnssikkerhet*.

OFFICIAL POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON SAMFUNNSSIKKERHET IN NORWAY

In this second part, three types of official policy documents on *samfunnssikkerhet* are presented. The White Papers (*Meld. St.*) are the Norwegian government's documents to the parliament (*Storting*), which illustrate issues in a field or describe a particular future policy. They are not binding documents, but they usually represent the basis for proposals subsequently discussed in the parliament and that can become Norwegian law. The propositions to the parliament (*St. prp.*) are the Norwegian government's requests to the parliament to take a decision about a new legislation or amendments to an existing legislation, the budget or issues which the parliament has to vote upon. The Official Norwegian Reports (*Norges offentlige utredningen – NOU*) are the result of working groups - established inside the various ministries, including the Prime Minister's Office – which discuss and then report to the ministry on a certain topic deemed relevant for the Norwegian society. These policy documents have been analysed according to two dimensions: how *samfunnssikkerhet* is understood and the main goals to be achieved for the benefit of the Norwegian society in terms of security/safety.

As mentioned above, the term *samfunnssikkerhet* stems from the White Paper No. 17 (2001-2002).[28] In this document, the term is widely applied and includes all challenges (various forms of stress): from natural events to major crises that represent a threat to life, health, environment and material values, including security challenges that threaten the nation's independence and existence. There are clear references to events, both national and international, which show how

the term *samfunnssikkerhet* includes both security and safety aspects: the shipwreck of the MS-Sleipner cruise ship in November 1999, the collision of two trains near Åsta in January 2002, the train fire at Lillestrøm station in April 2000, the foot and mouth disease outbreak in Europe in 2000, the Kursk submarine disaster in August 2000 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The background of this White Paper rests in two NOUs. NOU 2000:24[29] does not contain a precise definition of *samfunnssikkerhet* but describes the breadth of challenges (like natural disasters, accidents, technical failures, and terrorism) that pose a threat to the Norwegian society. The document calls for more consistent and collaborative research on security across disciplines, since the interaction between individuals, technology and organisations is considered crucial to security. NOU 2001:31[30] assesses the resources at the disposal of the Norwegian state (locally, regionally and nationally) in case of crises and makes suggestions on how to organise them to cope better with new and future threats.

The main message in the White Paper No. 39 (2003–2004) is that*"Central to today's societal security work is the protection of civilians and vital societal interests in a time when a military threat is not prominent."*[31] This White Paper points out that times have changed and that the Armed Forces should provide assistance and support to the Norwegian society in times of peace, when the society, to a large extent, is exposed to threats and incidents induced by the climate change and by technological development. New security challenges and new types of armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War have led to an increased emphasis on societal security. The task of the government is to prevent unwanted events and minimise the consequences if an event occurs. The Proposition to the Parliament No. 42 (2003–2004)[32] provides a slightly different definition of *samfunnssikkerhet*. Firstly, the document clarifies that state security, which refers to the defence of Norway's territorial integrity and political sovereignty, and which is primarily the responsibility of the Armed Forces, is not part of *samfunnssikkerhet*. Subsequently, the document describes *samfunnssikkerhet* as *"safeguarding civilian security and ensuring key social functions and important infrastructures against attacks and other damage in situations*

where the state's existence as such is not threatened."[33] Finally, it includes human security as an important part of *samfunnssikkerhet*, which, thus, revolves around the protection of individuals' rights, where, in particular, the right to life and personal safety are central. However, the document admits that the distinction between state security, societal security and human security is increasingly blurred. In the growing complexity of our societies, it is not always easy to draw a line to separate a crisis that is, for example, purely military responsibility from one that is under the civilian actors' responsibility. In this sense, the Armed Forces need to undergo changes that take into consideration this challenge and one of the tasks of the Armed Forces should become the safeguarding of societal and human security.

NOU 2006:6[34] offers a thorough mapping of the critical infrastructures[35] that are vital for the proper functioning of the Norwegian state and society, with a special consideration to the critical infrastructures which are not owned or controlled by the state and to the implications in terms of protecting these through the state's own capabilities. However, the most interesting part of this document is not so much the number of measures listed to protect critical infrastructures, but rather the attempt to define *samfunnssikkerhet*. The document spells out, for the first time, that the term is unclear especially in its English translation and seeks to offer news insights: *samfunnssikkerhet* can be described according to three approaches: political, broad, and narrow. The political approach rests in the definition from the White Paper No. 17 (2001–2002). The broad approach includes extraordinary, every day and minor events that, if not treated properly, may cause harm to the society. These three types of events have in common the ability of the society to minimise them through preventive measures. The narrow approach focuses only on extraordinary events, which require the use of resources beyond the ordinary. This looks like quite an unusual attempt to clarify the term, especially since the document states that *samfunnssikkerhet* includes stresses that affect the nation's internal security and vital national interests, the society's sense of security, critical infrastructures and critical social functions, without making a distinction on the size of the

events. The document, however, pushes towards Vinje's suggestion (see above) to find suitable lexical solutions in the Norwegian language by using the term "protection" to describe unwanted intended actions and "safety" for unwanted unintended actions. In the White Paper No. 22 (2007–2008),[36] the Norwegian government describes the guidelines to reinforce *samfunnssikkerhet* by strengthening the Ministry of Justice's coordination role, by legislating on the municipal emergency preparedness, by modernising the civil protection, by increasing the presence of volunteers in the various rescue services and by following up security measures for critical infrastructures. The government's main task is to prevent crises. However, if they occur, all the actors in charge of security, from local to national level, must respond quickly and efficiently by mobilising resources and by following a clear chain of command and responsibility. The document draws attention to the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice's arrangements for mutual civil-military support, both nationally and abroad, as underlined in the Proposition to the Parliament No. 42. The document calls for a strengthening of the international security cooperation both at EU level (civil protection mechanism and EU programme for the protection of critical infrastructures) and United Nation level. In this document, *samfunnssikkerhet* is used widely to cover all kinds of threats to life, health, environment and material values, but also to refer to security challenges against the nation's independence or existence. Thus, in this document, national security is placed under the umbrella of societal security. The Proposition to the Parliament No. 48 (2007–2008)[37] underlines that the Norwegian defence should be able to safeguard the security of the state and the society. The document's emphasis on the need to use military force (in cooperation with other measures) for societal security confirms what was established in the previous proposition, by introducing the concept of a comprehensive approach, where military and civilian instruments are connected to each other for an optimal use of resources to protect the Norwegian society from harm. The document then claims that it is essential to understand the roles, functions, capacities that the military and the civilian areas possess to properly respond to security challenges. The

contributions of the various actors dealing with security in Norway need to mutually reinforce one another to respond to security challenges. The main argument in this document is that in the design of the Norwegian security policy, it is important to understand that the concept of security has become more inclusive and broader, due to the variety and complexity of threats and security challenges. However, the document also seeks to underline that, despite this broadening and complexity, the main objective of Norwegian defence is the maintenance of the integrity, sovereignty and existence of the Norwegian state. The White Paper No. 29 (2011–2012)[38] was published a few months after the tragic terrorist attacks of 22nd July 2011, and is clearly influenced by that event in the urgency expressed in proposing various measures to strengthen the work of the main actors involved in societal security and preparedness at national and local level. The attacks in July 2011 put the preparedness of the Norwegian society under pressure and this document sought to review the whole crisis management system to prevent similar events in future. According to the Norwegian government, these various measures will guarantee security for the Norwegian population in terms of life, health and values; three societal aspects that have been deeply shaken by the attacks of July 2011. The measures described in the document deal with unwanted events in terms of effective prevention, effective preparedness and operational ability/capacity to respond, effective ability to quickly restore social functions and effective learning. *Samfunnssikkerhet* is here described as *"the protection of the society against events that threaten fundamental values and functions and put life and health at risk. Such events may be triggered by nature, technical or human errors or deliberate actions."*[39] This definition recalls the one from the White Paper No. 17, but is enriched by *deliberate actions*, which are clearly a reference to the attacks in July 2011. Throughout the entire document, there is stronger focus on the importance of being prepared against risks and threats. For example, the Norwegian government gives a clear signal in this sense by changing the name of the Ministry of Justice and the Police into the Ministry of Justice and Preparedness (since January 2012) with four new tasks: reduce societal vulnerability, strengthen interactions

in preparedness and crisis management; improve management and management culture; and knowledge-based prevention. Furthermore, to the principles of societal security and preparedness listed in the White Paper No. 17 (responsibility, subsidiarity, equality), the government added the principle of cooperation, where the actors responsible for societal security and preparedness, from local to national level, need to ensure the best possible cooperation.

The most recent White Paper on societal security is the White Paper No. 10 (2016–2017).[40] It is quite peculiar that in the English version of the document the term *samfunnssikkerhet* is translated as *public security*. This raises a question of consistency with the previous documents. Public security is described as the *"society's ability to protect itself against, and manage, incidents that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger. Such incidents may be caused by nature, by technical or human error, or by intentional acts."*[41]

Table 2. White Paper No. 17 vs White Paper No. 10 definition

Societal safety	*Public security*
The society's ability	The society's ability
to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic requirement	to protect itself, and manage, incidents that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger
in a variety of stress situations	Such incidents may be caused by nature, by technical or human error, or by intentional acts

Source: Compiled by author according to White Paper No. 17 and White Paper No. 10

The main difference between the two definitions is the shift from the society as an object to be protected, to the empowerment of the society, which, aware of its fundamental values, seeks to protect itself. It is interesting, indeed, the focus on *"resilience of essential societal functions,"*[42] an expression recurrent in this document, but absent in the others, is briefly presented above. These societal functions are even clearly listed for a total of fourteen, from ICT security in the civil sector

to power supply, from transport to financial stability, from health and care services to governance and crisis management. For each societal function one ministry has been designated as having primary responsibility, with cooperation and coordination tasks. Thus, the state's main role is to give the Norwegian society the best instruments to protect itself and bounce back, while it must learn to live and deal with risks. This document introduces a new perspective compared to the previous ones. The White Paper presents the government's policy on public security (*samfunnsikkerhet*) efforts and constitutes the government's public security strategy in a four-year perspective. Eight core areas are listed as highly significant for public security. Four represent specific threats and risks (digital vulnerabilities and ICT security, natural hazards, serious crime, contagious diseases and hazardous substances). These threats and risks are cross-sectoral and placed inside a global perspective, where Norway is part of a global system that influences and is influenced. The four other areas are concrete tasks to improve public security: ability to manage contingences; civil-military cooperation and total defence; attitudes, culture and leadership for effective public security; learning from exercises, incidents and crisis. This White Paper rests on two NOUs; (NOU 2015:13[43] and NOU 2016:19[44]). The first NOU focuses on the positive and negative aspects of living in a highly digitalised society. The main negative aspect analysed is digital vulnerability in several sectors, such as, communication, petroleum, health care, water and energy supply, and financial services. The document proposes regulatory, structural, organisational, and technological measures to decrease this vulnerability in each sector, for example, the harmonisation of relevant regulations, the establishment of a framework for the overall assessment of digital value chains, and the implementation of similar routines in the digitalisation of public services. *Samfunnsikkerhet* is not explicitly defined in this document, but it is often mentioned together with vulnerability, since the two concepts go hand in hand: the decrease of vulnerability increases societal security. NOU 2016:19 deals with preventive national security and describes measures to protect basic national functions against threats and risks such as terrorist acts, espionage, sabotage and other

serious crimes. This document admits that preventive national security is a new term that includes state and societal security. State security deals with the existence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state and its protection is mainly pursued by the armed forces. The societal security definition is taken from the White Paper No.29, 2011–2012.

MAIN STAKEHOLDERS IN *SAMFUNNSSIKKERHET*

Since the term *samfunnssikkerhet* includes security and safety aspects, the overview to be offered here should include all the public and private actors that are responsible for guaranteeing *samfunnssikkerhet* in Norway, from local to national level, private, voluntary[45] and public, in many sectors (petroleum, critical infrastructures, HSE, defence, search and rescue and so on). However, the author has chosen to mainly offer a general picture at policy-making and private levels.

MAIN PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Norway follows four principles in *samfunnssikkerhet*: 1) responsibility: the responsible organisation in normal situations is also responsible when a crisis occurs; 2) similarity: during crises, the responsible organisation should maintain its day-to-day characteristics; 3) subsidiarity: crises should be handled at the lowest possible level; 4) cooperation: the responsible authorities must ensure the best possible cooperation with relevant actors and agencies in prevention, preparedness and, in general, in crisis management.

At national level, the Ministry of Justice and Preparedness is the main body responsible for *samfunnssikkerhet*. The ministry lays down the requirements for the work in this field. This implies that the ministry assesses the status of *samfunnssikkerhet* in Norway, prepares national strategies and plans, ensures that cross-sectoral issues are properly handled, offers guidance to other ministries, coordinates the work at international level (UN, EU and NATO), and ensures

the advancement of knowledge by supporting research.[46] The main directorates with responsibility for emergency services under this ministry are the Police Directorate (POD), the Directorate for Civil Protection and Preparedness (DSB) and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (HRS). DSB was established in 2003, through the merging of the former Directorate of Civil Protection and the Directorate of Fire and Electrical Safety. Its main task is to provide an overview of risk and vulnerability in the Norwegian society. It covers preparedness and emergency planning at national, regional and local level. Fire safety, electrical safety, handling and transport of hazardous substances, product and consumer safety fall under its competences. The Norwegian Civil Defence, the Emergency Planning College (NUSB), the Norwegian Fire Academy and the Civil Defence Academy are under the DSB's responsibility.[47] The HRS has the overall operational responsibility during search and rescue operations in the sea, in the air and on land. There is a JRCC Northern Norway (Bodø) and the HRS Southern Norway (Stavanger) and 28 sub centres.[48] Other ministries contribute depending on the kind of crisis. At regional level, the county governors play an important role in guaranteeing the following up of the decisions taken at national level, representing the bridge between national and local level. They coordinate the work of the various municipalities through guidelines, courses, exercises, supervision activities mainly aimed at providing crisis and contingency plans, which follow the national framework. In addition, they coordinate the crisis response in case of cross-municipality crises. According to the civil protection act municipalities have certain obligations and tasks to fulfil such evacuation plans, risk analysis and planning, exercises within the geographical area of responsibility and cooperation with neighbouring municipalities and the county governor.[49]

Figure 1 and Table 3. Organisational chart summarising relevant public actors within samfunnssikkerhet[50]

Regjeringen

SMK — HOD — JD — FD — UD

Hdir — Htil — POD — DSB — PST — DNK — HRS — NSM

Politidistrikter — Fylkesmenn

425 kommuner

Regjeringen: Government	Fylkesmenn: County Presidents Kommuner: Municipalities
Comprehensive responsibility for *samfunnssikkerhet* and preparedness	
JD: Ministry of Justice and Preparedness	
Directorates with responsibility for emergency services	
POD: Police Directorate (police districts and emergency centres)	
DSB: Directorate for Civil Protection and Preparedness (fire, rescue, and emergency services)	
Hdir: Directorate for Health (emergency medical centres)	
Responsibility for cooperation in rescue services	
HRS: two operational centres Sola and Bodø	
Other actors with central emergency responsibility	
DNK: Emergency Communication Directorate	
PST: Police Security Service	
NSM: National Security Authority	
Members of the Crisis Council	
SMK: Office of the Prime Minister	
UD: Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
JD: Ministry of Justice and Preparedness	
HOD: Ministry of Health and Care	
FD: Ministry of Defence	

Source: Riksrevisjonen, *Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av Justis- og beredskapsdepartementets* [..], op. cit., 71. Author's translation

MAIN PRIVATE COMPANIES

Big private companies like the ones in the petroleum sector (Statoil, Shell, ENI, ConocoPhilis and so on) are responsible for preparedness, planning and response within their field and geographical area. These companies have their own safety and preparedness organisations, like the Industrial Protection System and the Norwegian Industrial Safety Organisation. The first one is the company's own preparedness system for unwanted events and must be able to cope with the crisis until any emergency services arrive at the site. The type of business and its size (petroleum, chemicals, transport, fishery and so on) determines the kind of industrial protection. The latter is in charge of supervising the company's own preparedness system and reports annually to the Directorate for Civil Protection and Preparedness (DSB).[51]

INTERACTIONS

In Norway, there is a strong degree of acceptance among all the actors responsible for the preservation and management of *samfunnssikkerhet* that cooperation, planning and organisation are key factors to successfully protecting the Norwegian society from a wide range of threats, internally and externally. In addition, the volunteers' participation and contribution, especially in search and rescue activities, is highly regarded as an element to make the Norwegian society aware that security is a responsibility not only demanded from professional actors. The primary responsibility for all the levels (state, regional and municipal) of planning and intervention rests on the public institutions, while the capacities are distributed between public, private and voluntary organisations. Research offers a tremendous contribution in the advance of knowledge and expertise that can then inform policy-makers in taking political decisions, and safety and security actors. Norwegian researchers usually participate in reference groups and councils established by the public authorities each time they need guidance and inputs that are then included in laws, propositions

and instructions. The role of research has increasingly switched to keeping the focus on what is really jeopardising *samfunnssikkerhet* in Norway, which may not always be what the policy-makers expect.

CONCLUSIONS

The definition *samfunnsikkerhet* stems from a policy document, the White Paper No. 17, and has been used by the Norwegian academia since then. Thus, the definition is *political*, in the sense that it was not the result of an academic reflection or debate (as it was with the Copenhagen School) about societal issues related to safety/security, but rather it was launched by a governmental authority to respond to specific events that happened nationally and internationally. The term has been widely applied by Norwegian research in the petroleum sector and in debating threats, risks and crises related to man-made and natural hazards, in an increasingly inclusive fashion. One may wonder whether the time has come to thoroughly discuss, and, eventually, challenge, epistemologically and ontologically, this *political* definition.

In addition, the Norwegian term includes safety and security aspects. It has been treated by researchers and, increasingly, by national authorities, as a broad definition that does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional events, between crises consciously caused   and crises beyond human control. This vagueness is reflected in the number of actors involved in *samfunnssikkerhet* in Norway: this chapter only offers a partial overview, since, for example, the military and defence sector has not been mentioned. Vinje's interesting attempt to find more precise and circumstantial terms seems to be the only reflection on this matter, while Høyland's analysis shows the degree of overlapping between societal safety and societal security, according to the Copenhagen School. More research is, thus, needed to understand this one term's application in several areas dealing with security and safety than an international reader would expect.

The concise description of the content of the main policy documents illustrates the challenge of finding an unambiguous definition of

samfunnssikkerhet. To some extent, the term has become more inclusive and thus more blurred, especially from an academic point of view. It is clear that this enrichment has been very much event driven: these documents are a political response at the highest level (the state) to an increase of new threats and challenges. The national authorities have realised that Norway is not isolated from the rest of the world and this increases the chances to constantly meet new threats against which the state needs to be prepared to respond. At the same time, it is important to reflect on which ministry is the author of the policy documents. Those provided by the Ministry of Justice present a wider spectrum of threats than the ones from the Ministry of Defence, which does not consider national security as part of societal security.

The duality of *samfunnssikkerhet* opens up interesting research questions as to its engagement (are all intentional and unintentional events a *societal security* issue?); its understanding in the international context (*samfunnssikkerhet* vs the Copenhagen School's definition?); its governance (since *samfunnssikkerhet* is so broad, what does this mean in terms of governance at national, regional and local level?).

ENDNOTES

[1] For this reason, throughout the chapter, the author maintained the original term, wherever possible

[2] Terje Aven, Marit Boyesen et al., "Samfunnssikkerhet" [Societal security], Universitetsforlaget, 4th edition, 2011

[3] Norges Forskningsråd, "Samfunnssikkerhet og risikoforskning (SAMRISK). Innstilling fra en utredningsgruppe nedsatt av Norges forskningsråd" [Societal security and risk research (SAMRISK). Recommendation from a research group set up by the Research Council of Norway], 2005

[4] Research Council of Norway, "What we know about societal security. Results from the Research Programme on Societal Security and Risk – SAMRISK", 2006

[5] Norges Forskningsråd, *Programplan 2013–2018. Program for samfunnssikkerhet* (SAMRISK II)" [Programme's plan 2013–2018. Programme for societal security (SAMRISK II)], 2014

[6] Bjørn Ivar Kruke, Odd Einar Olsen, et al., "Samfunnssikkerhet – forsøk på en begrepsfesting" [Societal Security – attempt of conceptualisation], Rogalandsforskning RF 2005/034

[7] Justis- og politidepartementet, *Samfunnssikkerhet. Veien til et mindre sårbart samfunn* [Societal Security. The road to a less vulnerable society], St. meld. nr. 17, 2001–2002.

The Norwegian wording is: "*Den evne samfunnet som sådan har til å opprettholde viktige samfunnsfunksjoner og ivareta borgernes liv, helse og grunnleggende behov under ulike former for påkjenninger,*" translated by Bjørn Ivar Kruke, Odd Einar Olsen, Jan Hovden in "Societal Safety: Concept, Borders and Dilemmas," *Journal of Contingences and Crisis Management* Vol. 15, No. 2, 2007, 71

8 Bjørn Ivar Kruke, Odd Einar Olsen, Jan Hovden, "Societal Safety: Concept, Borders and Dilemmas," *Journal of Contingences and Crisis Management* Vol. 15, No. 2, 2007, 69-79

9 Statens forvaltningstjeneste, Informasjonsforvaltning, *Et sårbart samfunn. Utfordringer for sikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet i samfunnet*, [A vulnerable society. Challenges for security and preparedness efforts in the society] Norges offentlige utredninger NOU 2000:24; *Lov 20. mars 1998 nr. 10 om forebyggende sikkerhetstjeneste (sikkerhetsloven)* [Law 20 March 1998 No. 10 on preventive security service (security law)]

10 Jan Hovden, "Sikkerhetsforskning. En utredning for Norges forskningsråd", [Security Research. An investigation for the Research Council of Norway] NTNU, 1998; Bjørn Ivar Kruke, Odd Einar Olsen, et al., "Samfunnssikkerhet - forsøk på [..]", op. cit.

11 Finn-Erik Vinje, "Sikkerhet - Safety/Security. En begrepsutredning" [Sikkerhet – Safety/Security. A conceptual investigation], in Departementenes servicesenter Informasjonsforvaltning, "Når sikkerheten er viktigst. Beskyttelse av landets kritiske infrastrukturer og kritiske samfunnsfunksjoner", Norges offentlige utredninger NOU 2006:6, 226-230

12 The Norwegian Standard in 2012 admits that the English terms security and safety have been widely used (often inconveniently) and thus prefers to use the term protection for intentional unwanted events, instead of security. See: *Samfunnssikkerhet – Beskyttelse mot tilsiktede uønskede handlinger – Terminologi,* [Societal Security - Protection against intentional unwanted events - Terminology], Norsk Standard NS 5830:2012

13 See, for example: Peter J. Burgess and Sissel Haugdal Jore, "The Influence of Globalization on Societal Security: The Norwegian Context", Policy Brief 4, PRIO, 2008; Peter J. Burgess and Naima Mouhleb, "Societal Security Definitions and Scope for the Norwegian Setting", Policy Brief 2, PRIO, 2007; Peter J. Burgess and Naima Mouhleb, "Presentation of the State of Societal Security in Norway", Policy Brief 9, PRIO, 2007

14 See, for example: Anne Lise Fimreite, Peter Lango, et al., *"Organisering, samfunnssikkerhet og krisehåndtering"* [Organisation, societal security and crisis management], Universitetsforlaget, 2011; Per Lægreid, Synnøve Serigstad, "Framing the Field of Homeland Security: The Case of Norway", *Journal of Management Studies* 43, no. 6, 2006, 1395-1413

15 See, for example: Peter Lango, Per Lægreid, et al., "Organizing for internal security and safety in Norway", *Risk Management Trends*, ed. by Giancarlo Nota, Intech, 2011, 167-188; Ole Andreas H. Engen, Bjørn Ivar Kruke, et al., "Perspektiver på samfunnssikkerhet" [Perspectives on societal security], Cappelen Damm, 2016

16 See, for example: Ole Andreas Engen, Preben H. Lindøe et al., "Power, Trust and Robustness – The politicization of HSE in the Norwegian Petroleum Regime," *Policy and Practice in Health and Safety* Vol. 15, No. 2, 145-159; Ole Andreas Engen and Preben H. Lindøe, "The Nordic model of offshore oil regulation: managing crises through a proactive regulator", *Policy Shock*, *recalibrating risk and regulation after*

oil spills, nuclear accidents, and financial crises, ed. by Edward J. Balleisen et al., Cambridge University Press, 2017, 181-203

[17] Sindre Høyland, "Reviewing the state of knowledge on the societal safety and societal security concepts - an initial modelling effort", *Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems*, ed. by Luca Podofillini, Bruno Sudret, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2015, 785-792; Sindre Høyland, "Identifying scientific principles for the concepts of societal safety and societal security", *Safety and Reliability of Complex Engineered Systems*, ed. by Luca Podofillini, Bruno Sudret, et al., Taylor & Francis Group, 2015, 793 – 799

[18] UiS, *About SEROS*, http://www.uis.no/research-and-phd-studies/research-centres/seros/

[19] NTNU, *About NTNU*, https://www.ntnu.edu/

[20] NTNU, *About ROSS*, https://www.ntnu.edu/ross

[21] UiT, *Societal Security, Safety, Engineering, Environment and Emergency preparedness*, https://en.uit.no/forskning/forskningsgrupper/gruppe?p_document_id=418243.

[22] Uniresearch, *About Rokkan Centre*, http://uni.no/en/uni-rokkansenteret/

[23] CIEM, *About CIEM*, http://ciem.uia.no/

[24] NUPI, *About NUPI*, http://www.nupi.no/Vaar-forskning

[25] FFI, *About FFI*, https://www.ffi.no/en/Sider/default.aspx

[26] PRIO, *About PRIO*, https://www.prio.org/Research/Group/?x=6

[27] University of Oslo, Faculty of Social Sciences, *About C-REX*, www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/

[28] Justis- og politidepartementet, *Samfunnssikkerhet. Veien til [..]*, op. cit.

[29] Statens forvaltningstjenestek Informasjonsforvaltning, *Et sårbart samfunn. Utfordringer [..]*, op. cit.

[30] Statens forvaltningstjeneste, Informasjonsforvaltning, *Når ulykken er ute. Om organiseringen av operative rednings- og beredskapsressurser* [When an accident occurs. On the organisation of operative rescue and preparedness resources], Norges offentlige utredninger NOU 2001, 31

[31] Justis- og politidepartementet, *Samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-militært samarbeid* [Societal security and civil-military cooperation], St.meld. nr. 39, 2003-2004, 7. Author's own translation

[32] Det kongelige Forsvarsdepartement, *Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005-2008* [The further modernisation of the Armed Forces in the period 2005-2008], St.prp. nr. 42, 2003–2004

[33] Ibid., 19. The wording in Norwegian is: "*Samfunnssikkerhet dreier seg om å ivareta sivilbefolkningens trygghet og sikre sentrale samfunnsfunksjoner og viktig infrastruktur mot angrep og annen skade i situasjoner der statens eksistens som sådan ikke er truet*". Author's translation

[34] Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning*, Når sikkerheten er viktigst. Beskyttelse av landets kritiske infrastrukturer og kritiske samfunnsfunksjoner* [When security is the most important. Protection of the country's critical infrastructures and critical social functions], Norges offentlige utredninger NOU 2006:6

[35] Ibid., 16. The document defines critical infrastructure as "*the facilities and systems absolutely necessary to maintain the society's critical functions, which cover the basic needs of society and the population sense of safety*". Author's own translation

[36] Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning, *Samfunnssikkerhet. Samvirke og samordning* [Societal Security. Cooperation and coordination], St.meld. nr. 22, 2007–2008

37 Departementenes servicesenter, Informasjonsforvaltning, *Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* [A defence protection for Norway's security, interests and values], St.prp. nr. 48, 2007-2008

38 Departementenes servicesenter, *Samfunnssikkerhet* [Societal security], Meld. St. 29, 2011–2012

39 Departementenes servicesenter, *Samfunnssikkerhet [..]*, op. cit., 9. The Norwegian wording is: "*Samfunnssikkerhet innebefatter vern av samfunnet mot hendelser som truer grunnleggende verdier og funksjoner og setter liv og helse i fare. Slike hendelser kan være utløst av naturen, være et utslag av tekniske eller menneskelige feil eller av bevisste handlinger*"

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SWEDISH SOCIETAL SECURITY – THE BATTLE OF THE NARRATIVE

KRISTINA SYK AND CARL RÅDESTAD

There are as many definitions of societal security as there are threats facing the modern state today. And the meaning of societal security, and ultimately the political implications of security policies, is a direct result of the most dominant narratives and arenas in which different actors vest their interests and political ambitions in order to influence the outcome of political and societal reforms.

The issue of societal security in the Swedish context today is the convergence of two parallel and currently coexisting administrative structures of defence and security: the traditional notion of total defence and the emergency preparedness perspective during peacetime, that originated during the 1990s. The intersection of these two strategic visions and securitisations regarding which perspective best visualises what is deemed worthy of protection in society, has also been accompanied by new ways of thinking about security from the perspective of the individual; that of human security. In this battle of societal security narratives – where a traditional total defence narrative of societal security focuses on the protection of our borders and the integrity of the nation state, the emergency preparedness narrative focuses on societal functions and critical infrastructure, and where the human security perspective highlights the self-experienced feeling of security by the individual – a multitude of actors compete on different arenas of securitisation.

What follows is an attempt to identify the most relevant aspects of the Swedish case with regards to historical background, particular characteristics and arenas where the dominant narratives and their respective stakeholders engage with each other. In conclusion, it will be argued that the storyline up until today leads us to both a current clash

and convergence of these parallel, but from a broader societal security perspective, also highly intertwined, narratives.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Sweden has for over more than two centuries been spared from war and its devastating effects. Despite Swedish (officially stated but often debated) neutrality, the Swedish economy and agricultural production, as well as the provision of vital supplies were directly affected by the first and second world wars, without being involved in any military operations. During the course of the 20th century, the Swedish political authorities have continuously promoted a non-alignment strategy in the event of war.

Nowadays, Sweden's ambition is to solve national and international security issues in a state of cooperation and solidarity with other countries. This ambition has manifested itself in the Swedish EU-membership, the partnership-agreement with NATO, as well as multiple declarations of solidarity signed by Sweden. This orientation is due to the fact that Sweden – together with many other countries – is today increasingly dependent on the rest of the world. The international stance of Sweden's security policy, and its ambition to coordinate its efforts with other countries, is apparent in the – from a threat-based perspective – fairly broadly focused national security strategy put forth by the government in January 2017.

It is also important to mention that a number of important incidents during the last decades has had considerable effect, not only on international, but also on Swedish national security strategies and policy orientations. Among these incidents are the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, which became the start of the end of the old defence system in Sweden, decreasing focus on the threat of armed conflict on national (or regional) soil. The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 had significant international ramifications for security policies; in Sweden, it resulted in joining the military operations in Afghanistan that lasted over a decade, which in turn put increasing focus on

international cooperation and international military operations, and less focus on domestic national security. Another important incident that had a profound impact, and increased focus on the development of Swedish peacetime crisis management and its structures, was the tsunami in south-east Asia in 2004; several hundred Swedish citizens lost their lives and the Swedish government and crisis management organisation received fierce criticism for its inability to respond rapidly.

The shift from focus on national security and antagonistic threats to international military operations and domestic peacetime crisis was a major one, and in 20 years the narrative had changed.

MODELS OF GOVERNANCE

Our understanding of societal security depends on how the policy-field is organised, as it affects the different ways in which issues are envisioned, handled and managed in politics. The Swedish political and administrative system is often described as consensus-driven and dualistic with a relatively autonomous bureaucracy. The Swedish political system is also defined by strong and autonomous governmental agencies which grants relatively little influence on political departments and ministerial oversight.

Since the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden has undergone administrative reforms which has decentralised the administrative structure and adopted strategies of managerialisation. These reforms were supposed to increase the efficiency within agencies and reduce the cost in public administration.[1] In the early 1990s, marketisation – an extensive period of privatisation – emphasised a market-based model for governance in order to further reduce government spending. This new public management orientation drew its influence from models of efficiency and resource maximisation that, during the end of the 1990s and the following decade, received substantial criticism.[2] These administrative reforms led to a political system where many of the traditional social services previously provided by the state were situated within the private sector. In terms of the decommissioning of the total defence

during the 1990s, it is particularly interesting to emphasise the new political map of social services and public administration in which the issue of societal security has been placed.

One could also argue that the scope of privatisation and administrative reforms has changed the internal structures and behaviour of government agencies. It is possible to see tendencies of isolationism in terms of the relationship between governmental agencies, where agencies decreasingly identify themselves as a part of the state as a whole, but rather as organisations in their own right. An analogy of watertight bulkheads in Swedish public administration is not entirely out of order. This also extends to public servants who in many cases see themselves as employed by their respective agencies, not the state.

In reality, Sweden has adopted a system of political consensus and cooperation influenced by network-oriented ideals and "drain-pipe" perspectives within the agencies. Handling security issues that affect the entire society in a well-coordinated way becomes challenging in the environment. Furthermore, the law of ministerial rule[3] – an administrative remnant from the days of Axel Oxenstierna in the 1600s – reproduces the territorial thinking of public agencies at higher political levels of authority, which makes it difficult to control the development of societal security policies. The strong and independent government agency culture also affects the political level and ministerial work, frequently resulting in difficulties in coordinating, and quite simply, getting along politically over ministry lines.

Beyond the organisational difficulties of the Swedish political system, there is constant competition for different ways to politicise, or rather securitise issues and effectively drive the formulation of policy goals in terms of societal security. This competition between different narratives of societal security produces different perspectives on what is deemed to be worth protecting, and in effect how we define societal security.[4]

Figure 1. The dominant narratives of societal security in Sweden

NARRATIVES

What follows is an attempt to describe the most dominant narratives connected to societal security and how they are interconnected. The description is divided into three separate narratives that envision different representations of societal security in Sweden; that of total defence, emergency preparedness and human security. Each of these "lenses" represents – and illustrates – specific stories of how we are to understand societal security.

TOTAL DEFENCE

Experiences from the first world war showed that modern warfare was total in its scope and effects. That is to say it afflicted the entire society and therefore it demanded a defence strategy that incorporated every aspect of societal life – a total defence. This all-encompassing strategy of defence was to guarantee the survival of the country during states of emergency and total war.

The mobilisation of resources for a total defence also demanded the deep involvement of civil society and private citizens, rooted in a strong popular resistance and manifested will to defend Sweden in the event of an attack.

Through rigorous planning, training and regular exercises that coordinated the efforts of military and civilian resources and personnel, all key actors – private and public – were involved in the organisational structure of the total defence. This involvement of every layer of society was supposed to guarantee societal security even in the event of total war and an existential threat towards Sweden.

The total defence was comprised of military defence, economic defence, civilian defence and psychological defence. In addition to these security dimensions, a comprehensive network of volunteer organisations also existed. By the end of the 1980s, the total defence was restructured in order to incorporate a number of important societal (civilian) functions. In order to plan accordingly and to distribute resources to each of these societal functions, a central agency was put in charge. The central planning was coordinated by the National Board of Civil Emergency Preparedness (Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap).

For centuries, war was conceptualised as a state matter. The state has always had the responsibility for defence capabilities and military preparations. Planning and the distribution of resources have mainly focused on the state as the main actor in the security system. But the concept of a total defence has unavoidably involved other actors in society. The total defence includes all social services that are needed in order for Swedish society to function/stay afloat. It is also important to note that the Swedish total defence narrative of societal security is not

an exclusive militaristic perspective as it involves all layers of the entire society.

Within this narrative, the administration of security issues has traditionally been defined by top-down structures of political decision-making and a state-centred approach to societal security based on war-time scenarios and antagonistic threats.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The political reorganisation of emergency preparedness, and security, that began in the 1990s, has brought about a substantial change from a military outlook at national level, to a decentralised and networked form of domestic security management. In 2002, SEMA, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, was installed, replacing the National Board of Civil Emergency Preparedness and leaving the civilian defence and its planning for wartime behind.

This new focus on domestic security and non-military threats led to a substantial reorganisation within public administration, with one of the main new orientations being to provide coordination in the now dispersed field of security, in which many vital systems stood in need of protection. Since the main problem in this regard was that substantial constitutional obstacles (described partly in section 3 above) hindered deeper collaboration between public/public and public/private actors, organisational principles were developed in order to resolve the resulting administrative quandary. These were: the principle of responsibility – whoever is responsible for operations under normal conditions should have equivalent responsibility during crisis situations; the principle of similarity – the organisation of any function in crisis situations should remain as similar as possible to its normal status; and the principle of subsidiarity – crisis and security challenges should be managed at the lowest possible level. The new organisational structure that these principles made possible was intended to adapt the Swedish context to a broad variety of new types of threats within the field of security, and to improve the coordination of multiple actors from different sectors

in periods of crisis.[5] Sweden was to be prepared for the so-called black swans, not knowing what the next crisis would be (although most were sure it would not be a military one) and therefore accepting and adopting the often quite generalising theories of societal resilience – preparedness for whatever might come.

The governmental agency currently tasked with coordinating the activities of public and private actors, within this new organisational and administrative setting of security issues, is the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).[6] Created in 2009, it assumed the responsibility of facilitating and enabling coordination in six main areas of focus; financial security, dangerous substances, geographical area responsibility, protection and rescue and service, technical infrastructure and basic transports to meet society's needs.[7] An important instrument in assessing the potential risks and measures for security is the annual risk and vulnerability analyses (RSA) orchestrated and evaluated by MSB. These RSA-analyses are then handed in to the government to enable political insight into the work of governmental agencies, and creates a base for political decision-making.[8] These risk-based analyses done by actors themselves, among other factors, in turn changed the previous top-down processes of total defence, into a more bottom-up, or rather circular process of governance in Swedish societal security.

In terms of societal security, the emergency preparedness narrative focuses on social services and utilities that are important for the functioning of society, or rather the conception of "what should exist and function in society in order to protect important values".[9] It is characterised by a circular, or rather horizontal administrative configuration, where the focus is on the continuance of sectoral structures of decision-making and responsibility, as well as vital societal functions during crisis. Its focus is on a broad variety of peacetime disturbances and non-military threats.

HUMAN SECURITY

Within the discourse of societal security, the academic literature has traditionally been concerned with mechanical notions of resilience, based on the societal capacity to withstand stress to vital infrastructure and societal systems.[10] Little attention has been directed towards the connection between humans and their respective social communities in terms of security, crisis management and resilience. But Sweden has, during the last decade, adopted a more citizen-oriented perspective based on more decentralised governance models. This has been evident in citizen-targeted campaigns designed to reallocate the responsibility for societal safety from the centralised government to that of local networks and citizens.[11]

An emerging narrative of societal security is that of human security. It is best described as a discursive connection between schools of human development and human rights, that involves the notions of individual capability and the individuality of rights, as well as the perception of threats within society.[12] The aim of a human security narrative of societal security is to connect the protection of individuals from risks to that of empowering people to be able to handle crisis situations in a more effective way.

The human security narrative of societal security implies that security for individuals is managed in dynamic and multifaceted networks that include both public and private actors in civil society. The role of the state in this type of configuration would be to support people's ability to act both individually and collectively, which demands that individuals be viewed as ends in themselves, with the capacity to act and function as agents, not merely as typical security objects.[13]

This narrative is characterised by a bottom-up perspective based on political visions of responsibility and accountability, where the individual is as central as the state and civil society for societal security.

ARENAS AND MEETING-POINTS

A narrative of social security is not created in a vacuum. It is brought forth by actors and stakeholders, who act in accordance with political agendas with the intention of developing the field of security within different levels of society. These actors originate from both political, public and private arenas (business world and civil society). Important actors from the first category are mainly scientists and representatives from the research community. One important group from the latter category is journalists and activists.

The aforementioned actors have different motives for their commitment and their actions. The discussions take place in different arenas and meeting-points. What follows is an attempt to synoptically describe these arenas and the main actors engaged within them. The arenas brought up here are: the scientific discussions, discussions at political and managerial level, as well as the discussions in the mass media. Lastly, a number of events and meeting-points are mentioned that allow all of these different arenas to converge and melt together in an attempt to reach common ground for a narrative of societal security in Sweden.

SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY

As in most countries, there is an ongoing discussion about societal security within the Swedish research community, that is to say, the academic institutions within Sweden, such as universities and other relevant institutions conducting research on the topic. This discussion, or rather discourse, is usually conducted within the institutions of political science, sociology and cultural sciences. These institutions are represented by multiple universities together with specific research centres focused on societal security, for example the Mid Sweden University, Karlstad University and Lund University.

Separate research institutes, such as, the Swedish National Defence College (FHS) and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), also

contribute to the scientific discussion by conducting research, analysis and inquiries. Apart from these two institutions, the Royal Swedish Academy for War Sciences has also made valuable contributions.

- Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

The research institute for total defence is one of Europe's leading research institutes within the fields of defence and security. The agency is under the jurisdiction of the defence department and receives its funding from there. Its main area of expertise is research, development of methodological and technical innovations and strategic analysis. It manages and has managed many projects concerned with vulnerability and security within the Swedish society, and its main focus is technical infrastructure.

- Swedish National Defence College (FHS)

The defence college's task is to contribute to national and international security through research and education. Research is conducted within both military and civil disciplines, of which the results are spread to the rest of society and abroad to other countries.

Within the school are two research centres focusing on issues pertaining to societal security: Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training (CRISMART) and Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS). Both of these centres receive orders from the cabinet office to develop research, analysis, training and exercises. CRISMART also administrates a knowledge bank of hundreds of national and international crises, that has been researched and analysed.

On January 1st 2018, an entirely new centre will open its doors at FHS; the Centre for Total Defence and Societal Security. It is yet to be seen what kind of actor and force this centre will be in the narratives of societal security, but its aim seems to be an all-encompassing and broad view of societal security, where the narratives of total defence and peacetime emergency management can coexist. Added to that, the head of the department of security, strategy and leadership at FHS (that the new centre is a part of), Dr. Robert Egnell, has also become quite known for adding the human security perspective to the field (for instance, by initiating the web magazine Human Security, *Mänsklig Säkerhet*).

As mentioned above, these research institutions are quite reliant on funding, which implies that the research is influenced by the client's requests.

- Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)

MSB funds research concerned with societal research. Orders are placed on both FOI and FHS, as well as relevant universities with the required competence.

The scientific discussion in Sweden has, during recent years, largely been about vulnerabilities and the ability to handle crisis situations in society. At present, an increased emphasis on research and scientific studies can be seen, regarding total defence and society during increased levels of readiness.

DISCUSSIONS AT POLITICAL AND CENTRAL AGENCY LEVEL

The starting point for discussions at political and central agency level is often an event that has transpired and challenged the power of action and ability to make well-balanced decisions. Examples of these events are, acts of terror and large-scale natural disasters. In Sweden, major events have always been followed by an extensive governmental investigation. It is not uncommon for major events to lead to complete organisational restructuring at central governmental level, partly described above.

However, over time, there have also been continuous discussions and debates about societal security in the political and central agency arena. Two actors that are central for the creation of narratives and policies within the field are the Committee on Defence and the Civil Contingencies Agency.

- The Committee on Defence

A form of political dialogue less influenced by major events and disasters is the Committee on Defence. This is appointed every four years with the task of preparing and laying a parliamentary foundation for upcoming defence resolutions. The defence advisory committees are comprised of all political parties represented in the Swedish

parliament. Within the political mandate of the committees there are ongoing discussions regarding the development of vulnerabilities in the Swedish society, and how societal security might be strengthened.

The committees have an advisory role but their assessments and recommendations usually have a significant impact on parliamentary decisions and the government. The central government's decisions will then form the basis for strategic planning and managerial efforts among relevant governmental agencies. The decisions inform how much and in what way specific resources will be distributed, as well as potential changes in legislation, regulations and organisation.

- The civil contingencies agency (MSB)

As previously mentioned, the civil contingencies agency has an exceptional position within Swedish security politics. As an agency, it is tasked with the role of coordinating and developing Swedish emergency preparedness. In order to evaluate potential security weaknesses in the Swedish society, the MSB conducts annual risk and vulnerability analyses. These analyses are made in cooperation with other agencies at local, regional and central level. One of the main purposes is to lay a solid foundational knowledge of prevention, management and recuperation from crises and major events in society. The result of this conceptual mapping of resources and knowledge also contributes to evaluations of Sweden's capacity to suppress antagonistic threats towards the national security.

DISCUSSIONS IN THE MASS MEDIA

As stated earlier, the political discussions regarding societal security are often triggered by major events and disasters. This is even more apparent in discussions in the mass media. In the major Swedish news outlets, for example *Dagens Nyheter* or *Svenska Dagbladet*, as well as radio and television, there is continuous discussion regarding the security of society and its citizens. Furthermore, a parallel, not only but mainly informal, discussion occurrs simultaneously in social media, alternative media outlets, twitter and private blogs. Quite a large

number of people with high profiles and central positions in the societal security field in Sweden, including politicians and public servants with responsibilities within societal security, are relatively active in social media. The level of influence from this should not be underestimated when reflecting on driving forces in policy and decision-making, at least not in the Swedish case.

More continuous discussions, less influenced by political events and disasters, also take place in periodical journals and magazines, for example "Our Defence" (*Vårt Försvar*) published by the Swedish Defence Association, "Proceedings and Journal" (*Handlingar och Tidsskrift*) published by the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and MSBs magazine "Twentyfour7" (*Tjugofyra7*).

COMMON ARENAS AND MEETING-POINTS

There are several events in Sweden that enable actors in the aforementioned arenas to meet and exchange knowledge and information, as well as discuss and debate important issues. The most renowned meeting-point is the national conference in Sälen held every year in January. This specific event has been arranged by the organisation "Society and Defence" (*Folk och Försvar*) since the 1950s. Over a couple of days, government officials, journalists, researchers and representatives from civil society and political youth organisations meet and discuss a wide variety of security issues. Swedish cabinet ministers and the Swedish commander of the armed forces always participates and international experts are often invited to speak and participate. The event is often subject to extensive media coverage.

Another important political event is organised in Gotland every summer in the month of July. During Almedalen week in Visby, the issue of societal security is one of many topics that make up an extensive programme. The actors are more or less the same that participate at the national conference in Sälen, as it often involves participants from all levels of political society and attracts the interest of the mass media.

During the most recent years, MSB has been the host for another important conference in Kista, Stockholm, called Meeting-point Societal Security. It takes place in the month of November.

CONCLUSION

The Swedish narrative about societal security was dominated by a total defence mindset up until the fall of the Berlin wall. After this event, the narrative of emergency preparedness was developed, to some extent at the expense of the total defence. During the last 20 years, another narrative of human security has developed. Today it is possible to ascertain a revival of the total defence which implies that all three narratives run parallel with each other. The biggest challenge is to find relevant arenas of discussion in which all of these three dominant narratives can converge and contribute to a more nuanced understanding of societal security. What sets Sweden apart from other countries in the Baltic Sea region and northern Europe is that Sweden has experienced peace for more than 200 years.

Furthermore, Sweden's decentralised model of governance, the culture of consensus-based decision-making and its independent agencies have made it more difficult to achieve political intentions – or rather, have made it difficult to reach political agreement strong enough to clearly prioritise and allocate resources. A number of common meeting-points and arenas have evolved, facilitating discussions regarding societal security. The annual national conference in Sälen is most likely a unique opportunity to gather all the important actors and narratives in one single arena for discussion. The best way to describe the discussion of societal security today is the effort to converge these three narratives, in order to create a common picture that links together the stories of the total defence, emergency preparedness and human security. All of these narratives originate from the overarching structure of societal security, but they have told different stories of what societal security is supposed to look like, and how we can best achieve it. These narratives represent different conceptual worlds, or rather glasses, through which we understand the

world around us. It could be argued that, even though the Swedish case has undergone changes over time in terms of perspectives on societal security – or, as mentioned earlier, conceptual glasses – the lens has never changed as we have been speaking continuously about societal security since the 1930s.

However, due to the complicated relationship between the government and responsible agencies – a direct result of constitutional laws regarding ministerial rule and principles of substantial agency autonomy – it could be said that an administrative ping-pong match takes place, where the exercise of public authority originates from the responsible agencies and moves up through the political system to influence policy decisions. An example of this is that the government, in 2014, decided to divide the coordination of responsibility of societal security at ministerial level, between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice, leaving the military matters to the former and the civilian crisis management to the latter. This was partly due to the differences of perspectives and narratives that exist between the main government agencies and actors in these two fields. This decision has, accordingly, been both criticised for making it even harder to coordinate societal security matters and celebrated by others who claim that this division makes it more apparent that societal security is not only a matter for military defence.

The parallel narratives of total defence, emergency preparedness and human security concerning social security could most aptly be described as parallel storylines of societal security. Each story has its own set of actors that represent the specific storyline and they engage with each other differently in arenas of discussion. The biggest challenge for the societal security debate today in Sweden is to avoid writing each of these stories on their own, discursively separating them from each other. Surely each storyline represents a viable way of conceptualising societal security in terms of perspectives, priorities and political vision.

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ESTONIA'S APPROACH TO SOCIETAL SECURITY

IVO JUURVEE

While the term *societal security* is rarely used in Estonian,[1] has not taken roots in Estonia's public discussions, nor been defined in legislation, after more than a decade of discussions among decision-makers and the public, a comparatively similar concept and term – *society's resilience* – has made its way into the document adopted by parliament.

Translating the English word *resilience* to Estonian – as well as into many other languages – is a complicated task. There are a wide variety of Estonian words covering some aspects of resilience, such as endurance, elasticity, sustainability, ability to resist etc., however, none of them means exactly the same as resilience. The problem was solved by creating a completely new word. This was done in the Estonian Language Institute's competition for new words in 2014, and the winner was the term *kerksus*.[2] Many new words are invented this way, however, most of them are rarely or never used. The case for *kerksus* was different, however, as three years later it was not only immortalised, but also received a legal definition from the Estonian parliament. On 31st May, 2017, the parliament adopted the new version of the *Estonian National Security Concept*[3] that used the word *kerksus* thirteen times[4] and gave it the following definition: "*A society's resilience is its ability to recover quickly from the impact of negative phenomena, and restore its strength, flexibility and success.*"[5]

The National Security Concept (NSC) is the central document for Estonian defence planning. Previous versions of the document were adapted by parliament in 2001[6], 2004[7] and 2010.[8] Taking into account the predecessor of these documents – General Directions of the Estonian State Defence Policy of 1996[9] – the current NSC 2017 is the fifth document of its kind. Altogether, these documents provide

the essence of the official narratives on security (i.e. securitisation) and their dynamics. These documents are shaped by three issues:

- External events (such as Russia's military action in Chechnya in 1994-1996 and 1999-2005, in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014, or the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and the subsequent "war on terror");
- Estonian foreign/security political choices (such as aspirations in becoming a full member of the EU and NATO prior to 2004); and,
- Internal politics and domestic events (such as the riots in Tallinn in 2007).

The NSC is a cornerstone for defence planning and the term *kerksus* came into play only in May 2017, therefore, most of the lower level acts for implementing the general guidelines of parliament are still in different stages and not approved as this article goes to print. The article gives an overview as at February 2017, however, some drafts of the concepts to be adopted in the near future were developed simultaneously.[10]

NARRATIVES ON SOCIETAL SECURITY AND THEIR DYNAMICS

Since regaining independence in 1991, national security has been high on the priority agenda in Estonia. Its loss of independence in 1939-1940, when the country's will to resist was broken by only the threat of using military force by the Soviet Union, and not the force itself – now commonly referred to as "silent submission" – has caused heated debates, not only among historians but also among the wider public.[11] The question *what if we had resisted?* has been discussed not only in the media, but also in historical fiction.[12] The need for involving the society as a whole for defence issues, underlined already in the Estonian Constitution passed by a referendum in 1992, in Chapter II, Fundamental rights, freedoms and duties § 54 states that it is the duty of each citizen of Estonia to be loyal to the constitutional order and to defend the independence of Estonia.[13] According to this, defence

should concern the society as a whole however, initially, this statement remained comparatively declarative.

For more than a decade, since the re-establishment of independence, military defence remained the main, if not the only, securitised domain in public discourse. Risks other than military – risks of foreign political pressure and economic risks – were only mentioned in the NSC of 2001 for the first time. In subchapter New security risks, the document states: "*Estonian internal security is influenced by large scale economic and social changes. Fast development brings the risk of increasing social gaps in society. This raises social problems like crime and drug addiction.*"[14] This could be seen as the start of securitisation of social aspects and at that point came from the top-down, i.e. from a document prepared by defence planners and adopted by parliament, not as a result of wider public debate.

The same year, the term *psychological defence* emerged for the first time in Estonian legal language. In the document Estonian Military Defence Strategy, adopted by the government in February 2001, its tasks were defined as: "*formation of the mentality of citizens of an independent democratic country, stimulation of the citizens' will to resist and its maintenance in times of crisis and war.*" The Ministry of Education was named as overall coordinator of the field.[15] The term *psychological defence* itself became a topic in public debate only a decade later.

The NSC of 2004, adopted only after Estonia became a full member of NATO and the EU, comes much closer to the issue that we would today consider to be in the domain of societal security. In the document, one of the five guidelines to which Estonia adheres in its security policy, is "to enhance social, economic, and environmental stability." The NSC of 2004 addresses a wide array of issues not directly connected to military defence, including crisis management and fighting corruption. It also addresses social issues, stating: "*To enhance the nation's social safety, it is essential to solve labour market problems, establish a sustainable social security system that covers risk groups, and educate and train a sufficiently large qualified work force to ensure the continuation of economic growth.*"[16]

Although in the early phase, securitisation of these subjects came from the state rather than from public debate, it is possible to gain some knowledge of public perceptions from the opinion polls. Estonian public opinion on national security issues has been systematically measured at least twice a year since January 2000; the latest data available is from the poll conducted in October 2017.[17] In the early 2000s, the threat of foreign military aggression was considered low, according to public opinion (as it was in official documents), however, there were some concerns about growing instability in the world and terrorism.

Major changes in public discourse took place in 2007–2008 and these were soon reflected in official strategies. If, so far, the securitisation of issues had taken place in a top-down manner, then at the end of the decade, a bottom-up approach took precedence. There were two reasons for security becoming a focal issue in public debates in the press: the mass riots in Tallinn, in April 2007, and Russian aggression against Georgia, in August 2008.

The Tallinn riots were preceded by a campaign for many years on Russia's state-controlled TV that was accompanied by various other informational activities. The continual sawing of discord into Estonian society culminated in mass riots, causing substantial material damage on 26th–27th April in Tallinn and north-east Estonia, and was followed by cyber-attacks within several days.[18] This brought integration issues of the Russian-speaking population into Estonian society to the forefront of public discussions and it became a security issue. The other aspects of internal security were also highlighted.

Russian aggression against Georgia in August 2008 came as an unpleasant surprise for the Estonian public, as it did to the world in general. It instantly raised public concerns about military security: according to a public opinion poll carried out in January 2008, 48% of the Estonian population believed that the threat of armed conflict in the world was rising; in August this number had risen to 65% and only 7% believed that the world would become more secure in the future.[19]

These two events provided a lot of food for thought, not only for the society in general, but also for defence planners. Subsequent strategic documents would indicate that some lessons had been learned.

THE STATE'S ACTIONS IN ENHANCING SOCIETY'S RESILIENCE SINCE 2010

The NSC of 2010, adopted by parliament in May 2010, introduced a change in security policy, although the roots can be traced back to earlier documents. It stated that: "*Estonia's security policy is based on a broad concept of security, entailing all trends affecting security and essential areas required for ensuring security.*" The analysis of the security environment had changed substantially since adoption of the previous NSC and becoming a NATO member in 2004. According to the NSC of 2010, Estonia as a democratic, open society, could be affected by the spread of extremist, hostile or hate-based ideologies. Such tendencies might weaken social cohesion, reduce tolerance and cause social tension. According to a document in the environment of open and free media, the "attacks against cohesion of Estonian society necessitate greater attention to the sense of cohesion and psychological defence." Uneven regional development and poorly adapting social groups could affect internal stability. The strengthening of civil society and the continuity in integration processes were seen as reinforcing factors of Estonia's security. The answer to such threats had to be broad and the document defined six pillars of defence that would be implemented comprehensively, and were more or less the same as those in force now: military defence, civil contribution to military defence, international activity, ensuring of internal security, securing the resilience of critical services, and psychological defence.[20] From the point of view of this research paper, psychological defence is the most important, as it deals directly with society's resilience, or *kerksus*, as it is now referred to.

The document stated that psychological defence emanates from constitutional values, and serves to enforce Estonia's security, thus defining the foundations and general objective. NSC 2010 also gave a more precise definition: "*Psychological defence is the development, preservation and protection of common values associated with social cohesion and the sense of security.*" The aim of psychological defence was envisaged as safeguarding the security of the state and society, enhancing the sense of security, averting crisis and increasing trust

amongst the society and towards the actions taken by the state. Psychological defence had to facilitate the strengthening of the *nation's self-confidence and the will to defend Estonia*. Psychological defence and the recognition of constitutional values were to strengthen the resilience to avert anti-Estonian subversive activity. Additionally, the document foresaw the development of psychological defence in co-operation with *all members of civil society*. NSC 2010 also named harmonised regional development and integration as fields of internal security.[21]

Although adopted at the highest possible level – parliament – NSC 2010 still did not provide the public service and society in general with the precise instructions for building up psychological defences. Such guidelines were provided by the government of the republic in a document adopted on the last day of the year; the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and valid since 1st January 2011.[22] The document anticipated three main activities in the field:

- Identifying hostile influences and protecting against them;
- Raising the endurance of public broadcasting services if the relevant networks are attacked;
- Enhancing the public will to engage in defence and the popularisation of security-related thinking.[23]

NDS 2011 also pointed out that aspects of psychological defence should be taken into account when developing the following fields:

- Notifying the population of the risks and developing its knowledge and skills for crisis situations;
- Solving emergency situations and informing the population of such situations;
- Improving Estonia's international image.

The document also defined the responsibilities and stakeholders for planning of the field. The Government Office became the coordinator and contributors were the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education and Research, the Ministry of the Interior, the Rescue Board, the Defence Forces and national security institutions.[24] The latter would probably have to contribute to identifying hostile foreign influences.

While the list in general makes sense, oddly enough the Ministry of Social Affairs was not included.

The document underlined: "*the integrity of government communication*[25] *is an essential precondition for maintaining efficient psychological defence.*" And last, but not least, the document stated: "*Society (the public) shall be involved in the development of psychological defence.*"[26]

Indeed, the public discussions on psychological defence started in March, as a reaction to the article "People and nations have a right for informational self-determination", by member of the Estonian Academy of Sciences and Minister of Defence, Jaak Aaviksoo.[27] The subsequent debate in the press was rather heated and, although it soon lost its momentum, it cannot yet be considered to be over. An academic study of the discussion was conducted several years later in 2015, using in-depth interviews with civil servants, journalists and opinion-leaders, some of whom had actively expressed their opinions in the press. It concluded that, in general, there was an agreement that the concept of psychological defence is needed, and its main idea is to protect the mentality and values of Estonia's society against hostile information-based (influence) operations. It should be carried out by professional communication methods while reinforcing the community's value system. On the other hand, the concept of psychological defence was not unambiguously understood by Estonian security policy-makers.[28]

The next phase of public discussion on societal resilience in Estonia followed the Russian military action in Ukraine, in 2014. Although some new terms such as *hybrid warfare* appeared in discourse, it did not provide securitisation of new fields that would concern this research paper. On the contrary, the arguments that were pointed out in 2007–2010 were repeated and dealt with in more depth. While dealing with the topic in 2014, the adviser of the Government Office pointed out that, for civil servants' psychological defence means a knowledge of current informational threats, while writing planning documents on exercises and engaging in public affairs and keeping in mind the preamble of the Constitution. He also underlined the contribution of each citizen, because anybody can be exposed to direct or indirect

hostile influencing, and such influencing has to be recognised in order to avoid becoming a *useful idiot* spreading panic or disinformation.[29]

The European refugee crisis starting from 2015, has influenced public discourse in Estonia, and contributed to securitisation of manifestations of intolerance. Such debates found their way to doctrinal documents with a speed that had previously been unseen. The new version of the NSC adopted in 2017 does not change the essence of the previous NSC 2010: the comprehensive approach to security remains central. However, it successfully describes the main current challenges for societal security. Uneven regional development, social inequality, poverty, poorly adapted segments of society or manifestations of intolerance were seen as factors that could affect the stability of the state. The polarisation of society due to adversarial opinions and understandings were pointed out as a situation that increases uncertainty and decreases society's resilience.[30] The document has a special chapter (3.8) dedicated to resilience and cohesion of society, which provides a new definition for psychological defence, and brings in and defines a new term - strategic communication (see textbox 1).

Textbox 1. Chapter 3.8 of NSC 2017 Resilience and Cohesion of Society (adopted by parliament on 31st May 2017)

The more united a society and the more common values it shares, the less it can be influenced and the less susceptible it is to security threats. The more that residents trust the state, the more resilient it is. Trust increases when the state takes responsibility for the well-being of its people and prepares for coping with security threats and risks. Strategic communication is important in determining society's values and facilitating people's readiness to contribute to it.

The cohesion of society is improved by tolerant, caring and inclusive understandings, the strong integration of different segments of society, and uniform regional development. The resilience of society develops through the joint influence of

credible civil protection, people's psychological strength, and a safe social and physical living environment. All these areas need constant attention and development; for some, global processes must be understood, while society has to adapt and adjust to them; some fields have a broader influence in the region.

National security is influenced by economic, social and environmental factors across Estonia. Life must be habitable and safe throughout Estonia. Unfavourable demographic processes and the excessive accumulation of major socioeconomic, security and safety risks in certain regions must be avoided or prevented. To guarantee uniform regional development and an even population distribution, the government develops the infrastructure; supports the improvement of the performance of local governments; promotes civil society and voluntary action; and ensures public safety, the availability and quality of education, healthcare and other public services, as well as the comprehensive management of regional policy. Regional characteristics will be considered in providing state services. State agencies and local governments must cooperate more effectively to cope with society-related security risks.

Cohesive society is less vulnerable and less open to the influences from outside. Improving integration of society will reinforce unity and cohesion. The purpose of integration in Estonia is to shape a culturally versatile society that has a strong identity and shares common values. The state will continue activities that facilitate the adjustment and integration of different groups in society, to develop and improve the people's willingness and opportunities to participate actively in societal life. Integration is more effective through uniform regional development, equal access to high-quality education, promotion of instruction in the national language, making various types of support services available, and the adaptation of new migrants into the society. The activity and cooperation of civil society,

local governments and state agencies helps to shape a favourable environment for adjustment and integration. Excessively divergent views and unbalanced criticism of diversity damages the cohesion and resilience of society. The state must focus more on the equal treatment of the most vulnerable segments in society, protecting their fundamental rights and creating a liveable environment for them.

The cohesion and integration, as well as the resilience, of society can be reinforced if the population is better, and more reliably, informed. Strategic communication involves planning the state's political, economic and defence-related statements and activities, preparing a comprehensive informative whole on the basis of these, and transmitting it to the population. It is based on the nation's values expressed in a democratic, versatile and deep dialogue, which the government will follow in serving the society. The main objective of strategic communication—the resilience and better cohesion of society—cannot be achieved by political declarations alone; it comes about due to the combined influence of many factors. As a result, the living environment will grow more stable and secure, and the vulnerability of society (due also to security threats) will decrease.

Psychological defence is about informing society and raising awareness about information-related activities aimed at harming Estonia's constitutional order, society's values and virtues. Psychological defence is needed to neutralise attacks by terrorist organisations, as well as assaults proceeding from the military doctrine of certain states, with the help of efforts to influence the society under attack with cognitive methods. Appropriate measures must be drawn up for this. The purpose of psychological defence is to prevent crises in Estonia, facilitate security awareness in society and neutralise information attacks that provoke violence in the population by manipulation and the provision of false information, or that promote crisis management

with resources that are not compatible with constitutional order. The best tool of psychological defence is to inform the public of attacks, manipulation and false information and guarantee access to multifaceted information for all segments of society. Psychological defence is developed in cooperation with civil society.

Strategic communication and psychological defence complement one another. While the notification methods of psychological defence are mostly reactive, strategic communication must be able to reach society as well as foreign target groups, which play an important part in conflict management in the context of the greater information noise generated during a conflict. To achieve this, networks of people and the media must provide their support.*

* Riigikantselei, Estonian National Security Concept 2017, 19–20, https://riigikantselei.ee/ sites/default/files/content-editors/Failid/national_security_concept_2017.pdf

STAKEHOLDERS IN SOCIETY'S RESILIENCE AND COMMUNICATING WITH THEM

The stakeholders in societal security and society's resilience were not foreseen by parliament. However, among 20 main tasks, the NSC 2017 foresees several directed for achieving society's resilience: on the basis of these tasks, lower rank conceptions had to be developed and stakeholders involved. Strategic communication was seen as a tool to "strengthen the cohesion of society." Various measures for increasing the endurance of vital services were listed for improving society's resilience. And finally, a goal was set of resolving "security issues using a community-based approach[31] by involving civil society networks and volunteers, which improves the resilience of society and strengthens the deterrence."[32]

To get an insight into the stakeholders and their involvement, the *Civil Protection Concept* (CPC)[33] and much less solidly conceptualised communication disciplines – that have to contribute to society's resilience and are also central in NSC 2017 chapter 3.8 – must be analysed.

The CPC was adopted by the government in February 2018, and foresees a wide variety of involved partners (see figure 1). It also emphasises the importance of "underlining the possibilities of stakeholders to contribute to civil protection." The document mentions the "approach involving the whole society" and communities, entrepreneurs, municipalities and state institutions as stakeholders (the latter two also receiving recommendations and tasks). However, the more precise ways in which these entities are going to be involved are not put forward in the document. In the CPC it is mentioned that the Civil Protection Communication Strategy has been developed;[34] that document, which probably also deals with involvement of stakeholders, is not publicly available.

Figure 1. Partners involved in civil protection according to CPC

Source: CPC, author's translation

There is more clarity on stakeholders and their involvement concerning the communication disciplines put forward in chapter 3.8 of the NSC 2017. Currently, there are three communication disciplines officially defined – government communication, strategic communication and psychological defence. The first is the umbrella term covering all communication activities of the state and the latter two are more specifically defined in NSC 2017 (See figure 2 and textbox 1).

Figure 2. Communication disciplines used by state in Estonia

Source: Compiled by author according to documents and interview with Mr. Jaško

Coordination, planning and direction of strategic communication is the responsibility of the Government Office. It also participates in execution of strategic communication with the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior as the main contributors. However, the list of contributors and stakeholders is much longer, including other ministries and boards, media, NGOs, academia and think-tanks, voluntary organisations, private business and municipalities. (See figure 3)[35]

Figure 3. Stakeholders in society's resilience

ACADEMIA AND THINK-TANKS

MEDIA

MINISTRIES AND BOARDS

NGOs

GOVERNMENT OFFICE
(MAIN COORDINATOR)

MUNICIPALITIES

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

DEFENCE FORCES

PRIVATE BUSINESS

Etc., etc., etc.

Source: Compiled by author according to documents and input from the interview

NSC 2017 states that "networks of civilian volunteers and the private-public partnerships also play an important role."[36] The work on including different stakeholders has been carried out for a number of years already. Inclusion of different stakeholders and facilitation of public debate has been conducted by openness to the press, a number of conferences dedicated to the topic and different courses - government communication academy courses (government public affairs personnel as the main target audience), psychological defence courses (opinion leaders and journalists as the main target audience) and Estonian national defence courses.[37]

The latter has been the most durable and important format. It is based on the Finnish model, where similar courses have been conducted since 1961, and has been regularly carried out in Estonia twice a year, since November 1999. The presenters are top leaders starting from the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and various other ministers and commanders of the defence forces. The Chatham House

rule is applied, that facilitates free and honest discussions. The target audience is mixed, consisting of public servants and officers on one hand, and opinion leaders (media, culture, church, etc.) and private entrepreneurs and NGOs on the other. To date, already more than 1800 people have graduated the courses since 1999, and they are still very popular. In recent years, the same courses have been conducted in the Russian language. The Estonian national defence courses have certainly contributed a lot to the understanding of the security environment, threats and the organisation of Estonian defence/security in the society.[38]

CONCLUSIONS

Although society's resilience – *kerksus* – is a new term in the Estonian legal language, the issues have been present in the narratives of public discussions and documents dealing with national security for a number of years. Retrospectively, it could be argued that Estonian defence planners have been quite far-sighted and learned quickly from the events taking place abroad. While in the 1990s, military defence was the main, if not the only, securitised issue, the number of such topics has mushroomed, especially during the last decade. There is no common model for securitisation – both top-down and bottom-up models have worked in different periods.

The most important events triggering increased attention on society's resilience have been the riots in Tallinn in 2007, and Russian military actions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014. These events have influenced both the public discussion and strategy documents.

Currently, the main coordinating body for the different aspects of society's resilience is the Government Office, however, the number of involved stakeholders is large and their nature differs greatly. The involvement of stakeholders is not hierarchical, the level of success of involvement remains to be seen in the future. However, the different courses provided for opinion leaders have contributed to raising the quality of public discussions and therefore involving most parts of society.

This paper reflects the situation at the beginning of 2018, however, at the time of writing the drafting of new concepts is still in progress, therefore, some changes may be made following their adoption.

ENDNOTES

1 Main exception would be using it once in the title of a collection of articles: "Eesti edu hind: Eesti sotsiaalne julgeolek ja rahva turvalisus" [Estonia's Price for Success: Societal Security and Public Safety], ed. by Eduard Raska, Tiina Raitviir, Eesti entsoklüpeediakirjastus, 2005

2 Osalusveeb, "Seletuskiri "Eesti julgeolekupoliitika aluste" juurde" [An Explanatory Note to the Document Estonian National Security Concept], https://www.osale.ee/konsultatsioonid/files/consult/292_JPA%20seletuskiri_03_01_2017.docx

3 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused heakskiitmine* [Adoption of the Estonian National Security Concept], 31.05.2017, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/306062017002

4 Riigiteataja, *Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused* [Estonian National Security Concept], 31.05.2017, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/aktilisa/3060/6201/7002/395XIII_RK_o_Lsa.pdf#

5 Riigikantselei, *Estonian National Security Concept* 2017, 4, https://riigikantselei.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/Failid/national_security_concept_2017.pdf

6 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti Vabariigi julgeolekupoliitika heakskiitmine.* [Adoption of the Estonian National Security Concept] 06.03.2001, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/72805

7 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti Vabariigi julgeolekupoliitika alused* [Estonian National Security Concept], 16.06.2004, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/773389

8 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused* [Estonian National Security Concept], 12.05.2010, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/aktilisa/0000/1331/4462/13316508.pdf#. The unofficial English translation of the document is available: Euroepan Defence Agency, *National Secuirty Concept of Estonia*, 2010, https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/estonia---national-security-concept-of-estonia-2010.pdf

9 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti riigi kaitsepoliitika põhisuundade heakskiitmine* [Adoption of the General Directions of the Estonian State Defence Policy], 7.05.1996, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/13009161

10 In Estonia these documents are usually classified as "For official use only", until the draft is approved. Therefore, none of the drafts could be used for this study. However, they provided some background knowledge.

11 The term was coined by the historian Magnus Ilmjärv who used it as a title of his detailed PhD thesis dealing with political events leading to the loss of independence - Magnus Ilmjärv, *"Silent Submission: Formation of Foreign Policy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1920–1940",* Almqvist & Wiksell, 2004. The Estonian version was published the same year. No other history book caused such a heated and long-lasting debate in Estonian press.

12 Hanno Ojalo, "1939: Kui me valinuks sõja…" [1939: If We Had Chosen the War…], Grenader, 2010; Mart Laar, "Sügissõda 1939" [Autumn War of 1939], OÜ Head Read, 2014

13 Riigi Teataja, *The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia*, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide

14 Riigi Teataja, "*Eesti Vabariigi julgeolekupoliitika [..]*", 2001, op. cit.

15 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti sõjalise kaitse strateegia kinnitamine* [Approval of the Estonian Military Defense Strategy], 28.02.2001, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/84779

16 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti Vabariigi julgeolekupoliitika alused,"* 2017, op. cit.

17 Results are available on the website of the Estonian Ministry of Defence: for reports of the polls since February 2001 in Estonian, see: Kaitseministeerium, *Avalik arvamus riigikaitsest*, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/et/eesmargid-tegevused/avalik-arvamus-riigikaitsest; for reports of the polls since 2012 in Englsish, see: Kaitseministeerium, *National Defence and Society*, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/national-defence-and-society

18 Internal Security Service of Estonia, "Annual Review 2007", 2008

19 Kaitseministeerium, *Avalik arvamus ja riigikaitse* [Public Opinion and Defence], August 2008, http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/avalik_arvamus_ja_riigikaitse_august_2008.pdf

20 Riigi Teataja, *Eesti julgeolekupoliitika alused*, 2010, op. cit.

21 Ibid.

22 Riigi Teataja, *Riigikaitse strateegia heakskiitmine*, 31.12.2010, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/305012011007

23 Vabariigi Valitsus, *Riigikaitse strateegia*, 31.12.2010, https://www.valitsus.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/arengukavad/riigikaitse_strateegia.pdf. For official translation in English, see: Kaitseministeerium, *National Defence Strategy,* http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/elfinder/article_files/national_defence_strategy.pdf

24 Vabariigi Valitsus, *Riigikaitse strateegia*, 2010, op. cit.

25 Government communication in a wider sense: all the communication activities of state institutions and its aim is to "to provide citizens with information about government actions, policies and objectives as well as justifying them". See in detail: Vabariigi Valitsus, "Government Communication Handbook", 2017, https://www.valitsus.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/failid/government_communication_handbook_eng_13.09.2017.pdf

26 Vabariigi Valitsus, *Riigikaitse strateegia*, 2010, op. cit.

27 Jaak Aaviksoo, "Inimestel ja rahvastel on informatsioonilise enesemääramise õigus" [People and peoples have the right to self-determination], *Diplomaatia*, March 2011, https://www.diplomaatia.ee/artikkel/infokonfliktid-ja-enesekaitse/

28 Taavi Narits, "Psühholoogiline kaitse eesti julgeolekupoliitika kujundajate käsitluses," [Understanding of Psychological Defence by Security Policymakers], Sisekaitseakadeemia, 2015, https://digiriiul.sisekaitse.ee/bitstream/handle/123456789/20/2015_Narits%20.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y – in Estonian

29 Uku Arold, "Eesti psühholoogilise kaitse kasvamislugu," *Postimees*, 24.09.2014, https://riigikaitse.postimees.ee/2931583/eesti-psuhhoologilise-kaitse-kasvamislugu

30 Riigikantselei, *Estonian National Security Concept* 2017, op. cit., 6

31 The community-based approach is a concept envisaging the cooperation of the people, non-governmental organisations, local governments and private sector in order to determine the problems, plan for joint preventive action and minimise the impact of threats. Regional characteristics and needs are considered in the community-based approach.

32 Riigikantselei, *Estonian National Security Concept* 2017, op. cit., 7–8

33 Riigikantselei, *Elanikkonnkaitse kontseptsioon* [Civil Protection Conception], 15.02.2018, https://riigikantselei.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/organisatsioon/failid/rakkeryhmad/elanikkonnakaitse_kontseptsioon_15.02.2018.pdf

[34] Ibid.

[35] Author's interview with Mr. Martin Jaško, Advisor on Strategic Communication at Government Office, 27.11.2017

[36] Riigikantselei, *Estonian National Security Concept* 2017, op. cit., 6

[37] Author's interview with Mr. Martin Jaško, Advisor on Strategic Communication at Government Office, 27.11.2017

[38] Author's interview with Mr. Madis Mikko, the main organiser of Estonian National Defence Courses, 11.12.2017

SOCIETAL SECURITY IN LATVIA: NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES?

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As an analytical concept, societal security is rather new to Latvian policy-makers. In fact, it is so new there is not even a clear and ambiguous translation of "societal security" into Latvian: it is often rendered as *sabiedrības drošība* – a term traditionally used for denoting public security (border controls, police operations against drug trafficking etc.) – which does not necessarily correspond to how societal security is seen elsewhere. There is only one book these authors are aware of that explicitly deals with societal security in Latvia.[1] In policy documents, it is difficult to identify clear references to societal security due to the aforementioned translation issue and overall insufficient attention to the matter. (Resilience, or "noturība" in Latvian, did make it into public discourse as a result of recent EU and NATO focus on this concept, but resilience is an all-encompassing term that entails both non-military *and* military aspects.[2]) However, the broad understanding that society itself is something to be protected and can be a source of (in)security is not new to Latvia. We could even argue that it is cemented in the very foundations of the state – Latvia is a *nation-state*, a state created for protecting and furthering the interests of the nation (society), not the other way around. As Latvia's Satversme [Constitution] says: "*The State of Latvia, proclaimed on 18th November 1918, has been established by uniting historical Latvian lands and on the basis of the unwavering will of the Latvian nation to have its own State and its inalienable right of self-determination in order to guarantee the existence and development of the Latvian nation, its language and culture throughout the centuries, to ensure freedom and promote welfare of the people of Latvia and each individual.*"[3]

This article will start by briefly describing the fundamentals of Latvia's security views and the place of society therein. It will also discuss the three main societal security narratives – interethnic relations, media environment and economic security – as well as the main stakeholders dealing with these issues and institutional structure. The article will conclude by examining how the various stakeholders influence the public debate and governmental policies. While thoughts on societal security in Latvia are relatively advanced at both governmental and non-governmental levels, the decoupling of societal security from external threats (at least to a certain extent) could stimulate a discussion on new societal security issues to be addressed, as well as new solutions to existing problems.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand how societal security is seen in Latvia, it is useful to put it in the context of the broader national security vision. Here, it is important to recognise that, following the complete restoration of independence, Latvia's foreign and security policy has been driven by two conflicting imperatives – the modern and the postmodern one.[4] The first vision is driven by Latvia's tragic historical experiences of being invaded and occupied for half of its independent existence, and by its precarious location on the border with Russia. As such, it is first and foremost focused on the preservation and strengthening of the state through territorial defence and NATO membership. The nation has been very much present in this paradigm (as Gražina Miniotaitė notes, citizenship policies in the early 1990s became part of the "modern" strategy by adopting restrictive legislation "with the aim of restoring the inter-war ethnic composition of the states"[5]). However, in this quest for national security, sovereignty and strong state institutions – especially security-related – were prioritised over the society itself. Latvia's "modern" national security strategy, tied to EU and NATO membership and warding off Russian influence, has been considered self-explanatory and undoubtable, and alternatives were virtually never discussed.

At the same time, somewhat paradoxically, requirements for membership in the EU and NATO dictated the second, "postmodern" approach prevalent in these organisations at the time and were tied to diverse non-military, often transnational security aspects such as human rights, societal values and the environment. This paradigm is not centred on territoriality and, in fact, is linked to a more diluted and less securitised vision of sovereignty. In Gražina Miniotaitė's words: "*The sovereignty [modern] discourse conceives the nation and the state as real ontological essences, while the integration [postmodern] discourse grants no pre-discursive existence to the nation and treats the state as merely instrumental in respect of human rights.*"[6] Furthermore, the "postmodern" approach is less prone to defining the nation along ethnic lines, adopting a more inclusive vision instead.

In 2018, Latvian security views sit somewhat uneasily between the two camps. On the one hand, the "postmodern" paradigm has taken hold. Latvian policy-makers increasingly realise the dangers stemming, not only from ethnic tensions and Russian propaganda but also, for instance, economic and social disparities. While individual-level, human security is a more popular concept than societal security,[7] the society is also conceptualised as a security object. The 2016 State Defence Concept points out: "*[..] security challenges are posed by the consequences of the economic crisis which can still be felt in the society. Social inequality as well as a decreasing number of inhabitants caused by the crisis increase Latvia's internal and external vulnerability to external threats.*"[8] At the same time, the crisis in Ukraine has reinvigorated "modern" concerns about sovereignty and territorial security, and "modern" thinking has made it to the top of the western security agenda, arguably for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Žaneta Ozoliņa writes that: "*Societal security has become a part of the political, military, and economic security agenda.*"[9] This duality directly affects the way in which societal security is conceptualised in Latvia.

MAIN SOCIETAL SECURITY NARRATIVES

Before turning to the main societal security narratives existing in Latvia, it is important to note the high degree of politicisation, and securitisation, of the issue. Interviewing policy-makers dealing with societal security and national security more broadly was not an easy task. In particular, attempts to probe into who deals with interethnic relations as a security issue, and how, were met with evasive answers indicating that the interviewer was overstepping some perceived boundaries. This is yet another indication of societal security being subsumed under broader national/state security concerns and not just being an autonomous policy area.

Arguably, interethnic relations have been considered to be the main societal security issue by the majority of Latvian policy-makers, as well as the general public. Among different stakeholders, there is no single interpretation of this issue, its reasons or desired outcomes that would guarantee "security." The ambiguity stems from the abovementioned tension between the more "modern" and ethnic nation-oriented security narrative, and the more "postmodern" and integrationist one. Thus, some actors believe that a "secure" society would be tightly integrated on the basis of the Latvian language and culture, because it would prevent Russia from exploiting the interethnic cleavage. (It should be noted that in the Latvian language and public discourse, the word "Latvian" denotes ethnicity, not civic identity; in turn, also in this article, "non-Latvians" indicates representatives of other ethnic groups.) In this view, the local non-Latvian population, which mainly immigrated during the Soviet occupation,[10] is an existing or a potential "fifth column" which can easily be exploited by the Kremlin to achieve its goals – basically, to weaken the Latvian state, the guarantee of the existence of the ethnically Latvian nation. As such, the "fifth column" is not to be trusted unless it proves its loyalty. These proofs of integration include, notably, adopting the Latvian language, the officially endorsed view of Latvian history, as well as supporting its foreign policy orientation. Notably, Latvia's 2011 and 2015 National Security Strategies also stress the importance of the "Latvian language as the

state language and element unifying the society", a unified information space that would foster "a sense of belonging to Latvia,"[11] as well as Latvia's western and democratic identity.[12]

As could be expected, these ideas are not necessarily shared by many ethnically non-Latvian inhabitants and are actively opposed by Russian and local pro-Russian media and politicians. Pro-Russian players, but also a part of the Latvian society and political circles, believe that "security" is achievable through a more inclusive approach, embracing not only the Latvian, but also the non-Latvian, component of the population and downscaling mutual accusations and historical grievances. They are also more sceptical of Latvia's foreign policy stance, describing it as unnecessarily anti-Russian.

There have been several focal points around which the interethnic narrative has centred. While this debate has continued since the 1990s, here we will focus on more recent events – the referendum on Russian as a second state language and the new preamble of the Latvian Constitution. These were by no means the only significant events; for instance, the asylum policy emerged as a new strand in the debate after the EU faced an unprecedented influx of refugees in 2015. However, they are not analysed in detail here due to space limitations.

The referendum on declaring the Russian language as a state language took place on February 18th, 2018. This highly polarising event marked a high point in the recent history of political participation in Latvia: 71.13% of voters took part, more than in the recent parliamentary elections or other referenda.[13] Preceding and subsequent to the actual vote, it was hotly debated in parliament, at the OSCE, in the press (even in *Playboy*[14]), and at a variety of events, and, inevitably, caused some tension within the society, with Latvians and non-Latvians becoming more apprehensive about their relations with each other. The issue was originally raised as a petition to parliament, initiated by the notorious pro-Russian activist Vladimirs Lindermans, and gathered signatures of more than 10% of all registered voters as a necessary first step before going to the referendum itself. According to Lindermans, this was actually a counter-proposal, in response to the initiative in 2010, by right-wing political force National Alliance, to use only Latvian as the language of

instruction in all state schools. (That initiative did not, however, gather the required number of signatures.) As a result, Russian as the second state language was supported by 24.88% of voters and opposed by 74.8%. According to Alexei Gusev's calculations, "the number of those who supported the Russian language was approximately equal to the number of Russophone citizens who were eligible to vote."[15] In a poll, one month after the referendum, almost two-thirds responded that it had not affected their daily life, but one-third believed it had; only 5% had no opinion.[16]

The prominent "for" campaigners included more than just Linderman's movement "For the native language." (Notably, the movement was later investigated by the Latvian Security Police and accused of receiving money from Russia, as well as in-kind information support from such mass media as the Russia-owned First Baltic Channel.[17]) The most prominent politician of Latvia's largest Russophone-supporting party Harmony, Riga's mayor, Nils Ušakovs, also signed in support of organising the referendum, a step which was later described as a grave political mistake, which provided other parties with the pretext for not including Harmony in the coalition.[18] According to Ušakovs himself, and also in the opinion of other experts, the vote was, in fact, more a protest vote *against* Latvia's ethnic policy than *for* Russian as a second state language: "*Myself personally and my party stand for only one official language in Latvia – Latvian. And, as a pragmatic politician, I understand that the referendum will hardly be successful. But I must be with the thousands of inhabitants of the Republic of Latvia who want to preserve their dignity.*"[19]

A large part of the Latvian population and mainstream Latvian political parties, however, did not quite see the referendum as a protest vote or a "quest for dignity," but rather as a determined attempt to challenge the status of the Latvian language and, by consequence, to endanger the survival of the Latvian nation. Some interpreted it as a considerable sign of bad will by the non-Latvian population. According to Raivis Dzintars, then co-chair of the right-wing party VL!TB/LNNK (the abbreviation stands for All for Latvia! For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvia's National Independence Movement): "*[..] part*

of Latvia's inhabitants are altogether oriented in a different way to how they should be in our view – in relation to the basic values of the state of Latvia, to the common values of the population" (note the interesting use of "common" values which, in the same sentence, prove not to be so "common" after all). Dzintars continued: "*Those who have signed for the second official language are Latvia's citizens; many of them are young people, who, after coming out of a school financed by the Latvian state, stand against this state* [authors' italics']."[20] More centrist politicians were also somewhat more moderate in their reactions. The highest officials were quoted, saying that the referendum was a "provocation" (Solvita Āboltiņa, speaker of parliament), by "marginal groups" (Valdis Dombrovskis, prime minister); ex-president Valdis Zatlers blamed the divided media environment, which, in his words, does not reflect the high level of cohesion in other spheres of society.[21] Nonetheless, in both cases we see a narrative of threat to the Latvian nation and Latvian state. For more extreme right-wing forces, the threat is more diffuse and emanates from a wide stratum of society, while more moderate political forces securitise certain external players who, nonetheless, have the power to shape the processes within the society in a harmful manner.

As a response to the language referendum, the new preamble of the Latvian Satversme (Constitution) was developed and, after heated public debates, adopted by the Saeima (parliament) of Latvia, in 2014. The preamble states that: "*The State of Latvia, proclaimed on 18th November 1918, has been established by uniting historical Latvian lands and on the basis of the unwavering will of the Latvian nation to have its own State and its inalienable right of self-determination in order to guarantee the existence and development of the Latvian nation, its language and culture throughout the centuries, to ensure freedom and promote welfare of the people of Latvia and each individual. [..] Latvia as a democratic, socially responsible and national state is based on the rule of law and on respect for human dignity and freedom; it recognises and protects fundamental human rights and respects ethnic minorities. The people of Latvia protect their sovereignty, national independence, territory, territorial integrity and democratic system of government of*

the State of Latvia. Since ancient times, the identity of Latvia in the European cultural space has been shaped by Latvian and Liv traditions, Latvian folk wisdom, the Latvian language, universal human and Christian values. Loyalty to Latvia, the Latvian language as the only official language, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, honesty, work ethics and family are the foundations of a cohesive society."[22]

We see here an attempt to reassert the strong link between the Latvian nation and the Latvian state, which, predictably, did not sit well with some groups of the population (not only Russophones). The process of adopting the new preamble was securitised – to a surprising extent. Latvian public television channel LTV reported that the text was drafted in secrecy, in a Riga hotel, without involving the Harmony party (citing Harmony itself). The main role was played by the prominent constitutional lawyer Egils Levits, the Chair of the President's Constitutional Law Commission, who, in an interview with LTV, asserted his right to consult or not consult whomever he pleases.[23] The proponents of the new preamble argued that the work on this initiative, "judging from the strength of invested thought and moral strength is, in fact, the modern equivalent to the previous century's military battles for Latvia's independence and against its enemies."[24] The opponents stressed that the preamble enshrined the "Latvia for Latvians" approach, reinforcing the ethnic division. (Additionally, they criticised the mention of Christian values.) In the words of political scientist Iveta Kažoka, the preamble was originally motivated by fear and the decision-makers' mistrust of the population, not forward-looking views.[25] As a result, it is clear that there has been no consensus on either the definition or solutions for this particular societal security challenge.

Media environment is the second major societal security narrative. While it is very closely related to the issue of interethnic relations and foreign influence, as the main concern relates to the use of media (especially by Russia) in order to foment ethnic conflict and undermine Latvia's statehood and security of the Latvian nation, the issue also has some distinctive traits that allow it to be singled out for academic purposes. Indeed, Latvia has become a European leader in search of

ways to counter Russian propaganda. As Mārtiņš Daugulis wrote, in 2017: "*all involved players and institutions have settled on the same page concerning the significance of strategic communication*"[26] – the idea that the government and international institutions should not leave the interpretation of their decisions to biased pro-Russian media, but should instead reach out to the society in a proactive manner. Other measures include, strengthening the independent media environment that would provide healthy alternatives to Russian propaganda, as well as promotion of media literacy and knowledge on how to distinguish "fake news" from real news. The primary achievement has been the establishment of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom). In addition, Latvia has its own expert in the EU East Stratcom Task Force – Latvian NGO, the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME) – which provides training to journalists in Latvia and beyond; Latvian investigative journalism non-profit organisation Re:Baltica has exposed the influence of Russia's money in the Baltic States, and several Latvian think tanks regularly produce research on strategic communication and related issues.

Behind all this activism, however, there is a fair amount of soul-searching. The main differences in opinion concern the ways in which the ethnic division and linguistically (and politically) divided media environment is dealt with. Right-wing political forces and experts that are worried about the threat Russophones pose to the Latvian nation and the Latvian state believe that a "single national information space" is needed, meaning that communication in public media should only take place in Latvian. In addition, they tend to highlight technical issues, e.g. the fact that Latvian public media are technically incapable of broadcasting in the entire territory of Latvia, and therefore areas bordering with Russia and Belarus can only access the public media of these countries, or the need to improve the knowledge of the Latvian language in the society, so that everyone can access information in Latvian.[27] The 2015 National Security Concept also laments the fact that Russian TV channels constitute a major part of the packages offered by TV providers.[28] In turn, in 2014, the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) came forward with the idea of establishing a

state-funded, Russian language TV channel for the three Baltic States, in order to provide impartial information and promote democratic values.[29] The proposed rationale was essentially the same as the one promoted by right-wing parties: to bring Russophones into the Latvian information space. As Ainārs Dimants, then the chairman of NEPLP, argued, it would be a strategic communication measure for promoting societal cohesion and countering "national security threats in Russia's information war."[30] Although this idea was supported by the prime minister and several other officials,[31] as of early 2018, no state funding has been granted. A similarly heated discussion was raised around the temporary prohibition of the Russian state TV channel RTR: while some believed this was the only possible way to protect Latvia's media environment from unwelcome foreign influences, others argued that Latvia should focus on developing its own media environment, instead of silencing the alternatives.[32] Similarly, as with the first aspect of societal security, we see a lack of consensus. Even if all players are indeed in favour of developing strategic communication, there is no unanimity on either its content or mode of operation.

Economic security is the final key narrative to be mentioned here. While it may appear to lie within the realm of human (individual), not societal (collective) security, in practice, the debate on economic disparities and overall economic development often refers to society as a whole. It has also been named by policy-makers as a major component of societal cohesion.[33] Again, this narrative is closely tied to the issue of interethnic relations and Russia's influence. The 2015 National Security Strategy recognises that "certain foreign countries" can use economic measures (in addition to political, humanitarian and informational ones) to "influence the unity of Latvia's society, the state's foreign policy orientation and domestic political stability."[34] It also notes that a part of Russia's strategy is the "gradual weakening of the state in the aspect of domestic politics, fostering growth of dissatisfaction and protest potential in the society, in order to cause explicit action against the existing state government and violent riots."[35] Here we must remember that portraying Latvia as a "failed" or "bankrupt" state has been a longstanding strategy of Russian and pro-Russian media. For many

years, they have consistently pointed out (and exaggerated) Latvia's social and economic problems, such as closed Soviet era factories, unemployment and emigration, which allegedly have been ignored or even aggravated by Latvia's western partners – in contrast to the Soviet Union which allegedly had Latvia's best interests at heart and promoted universal well-being.[36]

While Russia certainly exaggerates, this is no reason to discount the real problems that Latvia is facing. Even coalition politicians have admitted that economic reasoning played a role in, for instance, the language referendum.[37] Latvia's transition to a free market economy in the 1990s was comparatively challenging for the society and the economy, and, as Gunārs Valdmanis argues: "*as the overall proportion of the Russian-speaking minority was high in many of the declining industries, it resulted in an overall higher level of unemployment and risk of social exclusion among the Russian-speaking minority.*"[38] Latvia's transportation and transit sector predominantly employs Russophones – a potential security issue considering the high politisation of the transit sector and its dependency on Russia and Belarus – and Russophones are more likely than Latvians to participate in the "shadow economy."[39] Latvia's Gini coefficient (measuring inequality) and relative income poverty are among the highest in the OECD,[40] while the tradition of social solidarity is quite weak, with only approximately 13% belonging to trade unions (compared to approx. 25%, the OECD average).[41] Latgale, in particular, is a recurrent element of the debate. The Latgale region, bordering Russia and Belarus, has a disproportionate percentage of Russophones and a lower level of socioeconomic development compared to the rest of the country, and there is a broad consensus that it needs more investment[42] – although in practice, implementation of this idea has stalled. In addition, corruption, shadow economy and money laundering have been flagged as vulnerabilities that allow Russia to influence Latvian politics and society. Unfortunately, while there is broad consensus on the need to improve economic security, practical policies still leave much to be desired.

MAIN STAKEHOLDERS AND INSTITUTIONAL SETUP

To begin with, although national security is the primary responsibility of the state according to the 2001 Law on National Security, each citizen is also obliged to defend "the state's independence, freedom and democratic form of government."[43] This "total defence" approach has been strengthened in recent years (see next section). The division of responsibilities concerning societal security among the official bodies can best be described as a "whole-of-government" approach, with no clear focal point. Integration of the society, the most notable component of societal security in Latvia, is coordinated by the Ministry of Culture and co-implemented by other ministries and the Society Integration Foundation. In addition, there is a Citizenship, Migration and Social Cohesion Committee in parliament, and the Ombudsman has also addressed integration issues. According to an independent study in 2016, there is, in fact, a lack of internal cohesion in the field of integration policy, and the Ministry of Culture does not have sufficient powers to strengthen its coordination.[44] The 2015 National Security Concept also asks to improve coordination among institutions that are responsible for integration.[45] The ministries of Economy and Finance work on strengthening economic security, along with bodies that fight corruption and supervise the financial sector, as well as such agencies as the Latvian Security Police.[46] CERT.LV – the Information Technology Security Incident Response Institution of the Republic of Latvia, subordinate to the Ministry of Defence – is responsible for information technology safety.

However, although in principle it is a "whole-of-government" responsibility, in practice promotion of societal security is heavily concentrated in the hands of institutions dealing with foreign policy, defence and intelligence. There is a separate cyber security strategy,[47] but, as mentioned above, Latvia's cyber security is controlled by the Ministry of Defence and by no means is it a priority dimension of societal security. The 2012 Guidelines on National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy, for which the Ministry of Culture is responsible, do not explicitly deal with security, but the overall tone of the document

tends to mirror the key national security documents.[48] Although one interviewee noted that this ministry has taken on "too much responsibility,"[49] societal security concerns and proposed solutions are first and foremost described in the National Security Concept and State Defence Concept. In these documents, they are logically subordinated and linked to broader national security concerns – especially the ones posed by Russia.

According to two anonymous interviewees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is another institution that has somewhat disproportionate responsibility over societal security issues.[50] While the Law on National Security stipulates that the MFA takes part in implementing the external, not societal security policy,[51] in practice it has been very active on issues related to the media environment and intercommunal relations – both through practical policies and playing a major role in public debates. To a large extent, this is understandable, because Russian propaganda and hybrid warfare tactics are international problems that require broader international solutions. Indeed, the MFA has been very consistent in lobbying for a tougher NATO and EU policy against disinformation and such measures as a new EU Russian language TV channel,[52] and in explaining Latvia's history internationally. Being the body responsible for the sanctions regime against Russia, the MFA has cooperated with the Security Police to close down the Russian propaganda website Sputnik,[53] and Latvia's foreign minister banned three Russian pop stars from entering Latvia in 2016 (citing their support for Russia's annexation of Crimea).[54] The minister also commented on the need for Latvia to invest more in its own Russian language public media.[55] As is evident, there is a very tight connection between the domestic and the foreign policies in the MFA's work.

While there is no consensus on the role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), an anonymous interviewee has opined that the MoD also plays a more significant role than would be warranted under the circumstances, and is very attentive to societal trends and the media environment.[56] It initiated the creation of the NATO Stratcom, recently proposed amendments to the National Security Law stipulating in detail how each citizen is obliged to fight the aggressor in the case of

war or external invasion[57] (which could be seen as a logical extension of previous changes to the law – please see the next section), and has financed public discussions on cybersecurity and the fight against propaganda,[58] among other things. While the MoD clearly focuses on external security, its policies do have a marked societal component. In addition, in accordance with the 2017 National Security Concept, national security and law enforcement agencies are "directly responsible" for securing such basic values as democratic forms of governance and internal security.[59] For instance, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), one of the three Latvian security and intelligence agencies, is very influential, not only through briefing policy-makers, but also through publishing annual public reports. According to SAB's 2016 report, "Russia's influence in Latvia's information environment still constitutes one of the most important long-term threats to the security of the Latvian state," and the compatriots' policy is still the most visible instrument of Russia's influence in Latvia."[60]

A similar picture can be observed in the non-governmental sector. While societal security as such remains heavily underexplored and underdiscussed, the works that do appear are mainly published by foreign policy-oriented think tanks and researchers. The non-governmental Latvian Institute of International Affairs,[61] Centre for East European Policy Studies,[62] Centre for International Studies,[63] as well as the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia[64] and the (now inactive) Advanced Social and Political Research Institute of the University of Latvia[65] have published widely on the three main societal security narratives discussed here (ethnic inclusion, media environment and economic security). As could be expected, taking into account these institutions' international orientation, their research and analysis heavily ties societal and political/military security concerns. In fact, they tend to focus on so-called "hybrid" security and the state, not society and societal security as such. Many of these publications, somewhat akin to the right-wing of Latvia's political spectrum, tend to securitise the Russophone community as a channel of Russia's influence. For instance, Žaneta Ozoliņa starts her societal security book by asking: "*Why does*

the Russian-speaking community sympathise with policies pursued by Russia? Why is the community immune to the Latvian information space? [..] Why do the younger generations of Russian speakers, born in the EU, enjoying all the privileges of democratic values, and being fluent in the Latvian language, seem inclined to sympathise with the Stalinist regime?"[66] This direction of research has intensified after the conflict in Ukraine, with "hybrid threat" and "strategic communication" promptly becoming buzzwords. In and of itself, bringing Russia into the equation is a legitimate intellectual exercise; however, it could be complemented more widely by domestically-oriented research.

This gap in expertise and public debate is, to some extent, filled by the think tanks, Centre for Public Policy (PROVIDUS) and CERTUS, as well as NGO Latvian Centre for Human Rights (LCHR), several university-affiliated researchers and media outlets. PROVIDUS mainly focuses on domestic issues, and has published and organised debates on such issues as corruption, good governance and civic participation and integration of society.[67] In contrast to the more right-wing and Russia-oriented foreign policy think tanks, it advocates a liberal stance (for example, a more inclusionary and diversity-friendly policy towards local Russophones and refugees) and focuses on the internal dimension of societal security. The LCHR similarly promotes a more liberal view on integration.[68] CERTUS,[69] in turn, is more focused on economic security. We could also mention here Re:Baltica[70] which, in addition to exploring the diverse ways in which Russia influences Latvian society, has also focused on such aspects as demography and economic inequality. A large part of their research is actually framed as security issues. However, while being rather influential in the Latvian media landscape (especially PROVIDUS and Re:Baltica), these organisations do not seem to be substantially influencing national policies (see below).

Finally, an interesting addition to the debate about societal security in Latvia is public opinion polls. The custom has been to measure the attitudes of different linguistic groups – Latvian and Russian speakers' – to various domestic and foreign policy issues. To quote some polling results, Russian speakers have a less positive perception of Latvia's political elite,[71] are less inclined to defend Latvia with

arms,[72] are less positive about pro-western foreign policy orientation, and more inclined to cooperate with eastern countries.[73] On the other hand, the polls have also shown that Russian speakers do watch Latvian media,[74] that economic issues are a much higher priority for the society (68%) than the possibility of ethnic conflict (19% in 2016)[75] and that only 22% would be uncomfortable if a representative of a minority ethnic group took the highest elected political position in Latvia.[76] The predominant trend in both policy and scientific debates has been to focus on the differences, although a recent study concluded that, in fact, "differences in political views do not create a foundation for broad social destabilisation movements."[77]

SOCIETAL SECURITY IN GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES

According to an anonymous interviewee,[78] in recent years, as Latvia significantly improved its self-defence and deterrence capabilities, "the focus is slowly shifting to soft security."[79] The solutions chosen to minimise the threat stemming from societal division have been, first and foremost, legalistic – focused more on minimising the possible consequences than on treating the underlying problems. In addition to the abovementioned investigation into the sources of funding for the referendum, the new preamble of the Constitution (see below) and much more restrictive rules for initiating new referenda that came into force in 2015, there have been some other notable changes to national legislation. These are mainly aimed at ensuring that Latvia's society does engage in defending the state, but does not engage in any activities that might harm the state, directly or indirectly, or deepen the societal divisions. The primary reason for this was related to external concerns: Russia's hybrid warfare tactics in Ukraine, recruiting "volunteers" also from foreign countries, and, to a lesser extent, the conflict in Syria. Latvia's Security Police have identified Latvian nationals who have taken part in one or another conflict and "pose long-term risks to society and state security."[80] Since 2016, such behaviour has been criminalised and Latvian citizens can only serve in the militaries of

a few "friendly countries," including NATO and the EU,[81] so the Security Police have been able to start criminal proceedings against Syrian and Ukrainian "volunteers." In addition, since the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, state officials are no longer allowed to ban citizens from fighting the aggressor, and in case of a sudden attack, the military does not need permission to show resistance.[82] According to an anonymous policy-maker, this was done in order to avoid repetition of the 1940 situation, when the undemocratic President Kārlis Ulmanis famously ordered everyone to "stay in their places" and show no resistance in the face of Soviet occupation. The changes in the law ensure "that they cannot find a president hooked by Russia and use him,"[83] basically acting as a safety valve against the possibility that highest officials may be corrupted by Russia. This leads us to another important conclusion: not only have the solutions been legalistic, but they have also been heavily linked (we could even say, subordinated) to overall foreign policy and defence goals.

There have also been multiple unsuccessful proposals. These ranged from a call to strip the citizenship from people deriding the Latvian language and nation, to an initiative that would allow inhabitants without Latvian ethnicity (at birth) to write "Latvian" in the ethnicity section of their passport, on the condition that they have lived in Latvia for at least 15 years, know the Latvian language and belong to the Latvian culture.[84] The president's recent proposal to end the practice of conferring the status of Latvian non-citizen ("alien") on children born to non-citizens was also rejected, despite the idea being supported by 76% of Latvia's population (currently, the 50 to 80 children of non-citizens who are born every year can obtain citizenship if one of the parents submits a request, or via naturalisation, not automatically). Interestingly, both supporters and opponents of this decision justified their stance on the grounds of security. The president believed that this law would help to strengthen the state as well as patriotism in Latvia's society; VL!TB/LNNK described it as being akin to political corruption and serving Moscow's interests.[85] Ultimately, it proved somewhat difficult to convert sensitive societal security issues into legislation. (One must say that even the interpretation of the response being

"legalistic" is, of course, subjective, because some stakeholders would say that the main underlying problem is the very presence of disloyal non-Latvians and cannot be resolved with traditional integration policies and compromise without endangering the Latvian nation.)

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

A bird's eye view on the architecture of societal security in Latvia shows a high degree of consensus on the definition of societal security across governmental and non-governmental elites. Interaction between the governing coalition and various think tanks, NGOs and media tends to focus heavily on societal division along ethnic lines, as well as Russia's interference in Latvia's politics, life of the society and economy. External security – namely, the Russian factor – is omnipresent in the debates, and the society itself is seen both as a crucial factor in providing resistance to external threat[86] and (especially its Russian-speaking component) as a potential security liability in view of unwelcome external influence. The degree of consensus on the exact ways for dealing with this challenge is somewhat lower. While some political forces and experts advocate more hardliner policies, such as an assimilative integration approach towards the Russophone part of the population (such as transferring all minority education into the Latvian language) and defending the Latvian information space by banning propagandist Russian media, others favour a dual-track approach; engagement with the local Russophone population (e.g. by creating a state-funded or EU-funded Russian TV channel) while at the same time maintaining a strict policy towards Russia. In both subgroups, interaction among governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, in principle, develops synergistically; both governmental and non-governmental players come up with new initiatives, and in many cases, long-term constructive cooperation has been established. It takes place not only through formal dialogue mechanisms, such as the foreign minister's Council of Foreign Policy Experts,[87] but also through grants to research organisations (MFA, MoD and Stratcom are

among the sources of these grants) and through informal/unstructured dialogue at public events, in the media, and in private discussions. However, the degree of cooperation is heavily dependent on ideational factors. The more different a world view is promoted by a stakeholder, the less likely this stakeholder seems to be included in the official policy debate. A good example is the Latvian Centre of Human Rights, which has historically sat on the margins of the integration debate. The PROVIDUS centre, with its moderate attitude towards ethnic issues, seems to share its views with a more centrist part of the Latvian political spectrum, but not with right-wing parties. Harmony Centre, the major pro-Russia political force, is altogether ignored by the ruling coalition. While worries regarding Harmony Centre's close ties with Russia are understandable, overall, Latvia's public and policy sphere could benefit from a more daring and open debate on major societal security issues with alternative voices – even if it only serves to refine the existing policies.[88]

The externally-oriented view of societal security in Latvia is mirrored in the distribution of responsibilities among state bodies. While the Ministry of Culture is responsible for the overall integration policy, there is broad consensus that it cannot satisfactorily fulfil its coordination duties. At the same time, a major (and, in the opinion of several experts, somewhat disproportionate) role, both in political and public debate, is played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, as well as national security agencies such as the Security Police. All the main societal security challenges mentioned in this article, as well as the proposed solutions, are described in great detail in the National Security Concept and National Defence Concept. This leads us to the next conclusion: Latvia could benefit from a less security-oriented approach to societal security, instead fully implementing the "whole-of-government approach." As several anonymous interviewees also noted, the prime minister and his office could engage more in both coordination of societal security issues and agenda-setting. At the moment, there is a "fairly good understanding" of societal security challenges at the Cabinet of Ministers level, but the main agenda-setting initiatives come from such bodies as the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and the president, while the cabinet mainly plays a controlling role.[89]

As this chapter has shown, the ideas of society and state are closely interlinked in the current Latvian debate. Latvian policy-makers still have a markedly statist perspective on societal security: although the state, in their opinion, mainly exists for securing the nation, in practice the nation should increase its capacity and efforts to secure the state.[90] Decoupling of societal security from the overall debate on "national security" could not only enable debates about new solutions in the areas of ethnic division, media environment and economic security, but also help Latvian researchers and policy-makers focus on other, previously ignored or underexplored societal security issues. It could lead to exploring the challenges which exist within the society but are not necessarily relevant to national security. Environmental challenges, regional disparities in such aspects as access to medical care or generational divide could all be examples of such challenges. Since the newly identified societal security aspects may not necessarily fit the existing "national" security concepts, they may require new strategies and perhaps new posts within the state apparatus. They also call for creative and original research.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY IN LITHUANIA: WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT IT?

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The Lithuanian state and society's reaction to Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 was unequivocal. All political forces and the general public agreed that national security issues deserved much more attention than previously. Political parties soon agreed that defence funding should see a rapid increase in order to reach, or even exceed, the NATO standard of 2% of GDP. The general public reacted very positively to the decision of restoring the conscripts' army. The society has also been actively involved in various initiatives to improve its defence preparedness; many young people have joined voluntary paramilitary organisations focused on traditional as well as so-called "hybrid" (information, cyber etc.) threats. At the start of 2017, the National Security Strategy was updated and unanimously approved by all the political forces represented in the Seimas (parliament). On the other hand, the debate in Seimas on the Security Strategy, and the more general context of increased attention towards the state's and society's preparedness for defence, has revealed several new aspects and features of public discourse. Thanks to increased involvement of additional stakeholders, the public debate has started to focus on more widely understood societal security issues embracing the general viability of the Lithuanian society. Paradoxically, the increased military threat did not underestimate, but, on the contrary, highlighted already well-known threats to societal security, such as ageing populations, vast emigration, social exclusion or hostile propaganda, and pushed for reconsideration of these. In this chapter, we summarise what and how the concept of societal security functions in Lithuanian public discourse nowadays, what versions of this concept were expressed and discussed, and how all this informs the official Lithuanian national security policy.

THREE OPTIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL SECURITY

This study is in part based on the "societal security" concept formulated by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, or more precisely, on a slightly modified version because, as it is known, the content of this concept has experienced a certain evolution. Initially, this concept was essentially used by Barry Buzan in the book "People, States and Fear", published as early as 1991, while formulating the classification of threats to national security. At that time, the researcher singled out five types of threats based on five sectors – military, political, economic, ecological and societal. In this context, Buzan defined "societal threats" as threats to the national identity of society and national culture, while "societal security" was defined as: "*the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, ethnicity and customs.*"[1] However, these threats and protection from them were not interpreted as a separate and specific problem, but rather as part of a more general security problem. In other words, in this initial conception, "societal security" was perceived as a constituent part of the national security problem.

However, shortly afterwards, researchers of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies modified the concept of "societal security". As aptly noted by Iulian Chifu, as early as 1993, in the book "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe,"[2] Ole Wæver proposed a reconceptualisation of Buzan's previous theory; not of five sectors of state security, but of a duality of state and societal security. Societal security is still kept as a sector of state security, but it is also a referent object of it in its own right: "*Whereas state security is concerned about threats to its sovereignty (if the state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state), societal security is concerned about threats to a society's identity (if a society loses its identity, it will not survive as a society). Therefore, although the state is still a referent object for the military, political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors, "society" is also a referent object for the societal sector.*"[3]

No doubt this duality of state and society was a significant twist, because this meant that a road was opened for a more thorough assessment of such societal security problems as, threats to the identity of society emerging because of denationalisation, globalisation, ethnic conflicts, separatism, extremism, various types of discrimination, migration, depopulation, etc. These problems are recognised as fundamental and are equivalent to the preservation of state security and independence.

However, at the same time, attention should be paid to the fact that such duality (as well as that of any other type) causes certain confusion and uncertainty because, having raised many problems of security, simultaneously other problems arise, such as limited resources and determination of priorities. It thus raises questions about which of the named security problems is more important and should be settled immediately. Which one should be preserved and defended first: the state or society. Can the state be defended at the cost of society? Or perhaps society could be protected at the cost of the statehood? And finally, what compromises should be reached while coordinating the needs of state and societal security?

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has partly recognised this dilemma by formulating the concept of "securitisation". Theoreticians defined securitisation as a process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of "security": an extreme version of politicisation that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security.[4] But, what is more important is that this concept draws attention to the fact that issues that become securitised do not necessarily represent issues that are essential to the objective survival of a state, but rather represent issues where someone was successful in constructing an issue into an existential problem. In other words, the "securitisation" concept reflects the fact that security problems and the content of policy actually have no clear structure or hierarchy and are rather an outcome of the rivalry between different stakeholders. Therefore, the problems that arise concerning the state security in the five sectors mentioned by Buzan can be differently prioritised, depending on actual circumstances and on the assertiveness of individual stakeholders.

Or, if we accept the duality of state and societal security, named by Wæver, as a point of reference, we will be able to notice that, depending on actual circumstances and on the assertiveness of individual stakeholders, priority in certain cases is granted to problems of threats to the sovereignty (i.e. to the state); while in other cases – threats to the identity (i.e. to society). In both cases, the security policy finds itself at a certain crossroads with no road signs, because decision-makers have no clear guidelines as to what and to what extent should be, and can be, securitised. It is true that, in the first case, a slight landmark still remains because, in separate sectors, securitised problems have at least a formal subordination to the state (national) security; whereas in the second case, i.e. that of state and societal duality and equal preservation of these security policy objects, confusion is hard to overcome. Therefore, it is no wonder that the "securitisation" concept came under much criticism. Its undoubted advantage was the fact that attention was drawn to the competitive nature of the security policy; however, its serious shortcoming was the inability to formulate applicable practical conclusions that would be of interest not only to academics, but would also have an applicable value to security policy practitioners, formulating national security strategies.

In order to overcome this confusion, it is necessary either to "return" to the previous sectoral, and subordinated to the national security, "societal security" concept, or to attempt to find other options. It is in this context, we would like to draw attention to the possibility of another theoretical twist. Theoretically, it is reasonable to consider the possibility of interpreting "societal security" not as a sectoral or parallel to national security referent object, but as the most important security policy landmark having top priority, to which all the other sectors of security policy are subordinated. Following this logic, all security aspects, including defence of the state by military means or ecology, should be taken care of primarily with the aim of preserving society and creating the most favourable conditions for its development, to allow its identity to strengthen constantly and its resilience to emerging threats to grow. It is this logic that can explain, for example, why states are even determined to straighten a part of their sovereignty and

join such bodies as the EU. Although sovereignty is a very important security policy referent object, restricted thinking may mean that more favourable conditions for the development of society are guaranteed, or, in other words, a higher "societal security" level is ensured. Thus, by summarising this theoretical section, we would like to state that, in essence, as many as three interpretations of "societal security" concept are possible:

- "Societal security" as a sector of national security. In this case, societal threats are primarily perceived through the prism of the state as a whole, i.e. societal security is subordinated to state security. Theoretically (and most probably practically), a situation is even possible where state security can be guaranteed at the cost of societal security;
- Societal security is an equivalent/parallel referent object to state security for security policy developers. In this case, duality and equivalence mean that rivalry among security policy referent objects reflected by the "securitisation" concept, developed by the Copenhagen School, is under way; and
- Societal security is perceived as a dominant security policy referent object of top priority, to which all the other sectors, including national security, are subordinated. In this case, theoretically (and most probably practically) it may even be possible that societal security can be guaranteed at the cost of other sectors or, in a crucial case, even at the cost of restricting state sovereignty.

Thus, having singled out three possible theoretical interpretations of "societal security", we will further look at the concrete case of Lithuania, and try to determine which of these interpretations is most firmly established and most distinctly manifests itself in modern security policy debates, and what the further development tendencies are.

SOCIETAL SECURITY CONCEPT IN THE LITHUANIAN DISCOURSE

Identifying which "societal security" concept is dominant in the case of Lithuania is quite problematic, because this concept not only has limited use, but also has no adequate translation, conveying the essence of the concept, into the Lithuanian language. Therefore, the concept coined by researchers of the Copenhagen School, has a real need for a hard-to-find substitute and, at the same time is destined to be misinterpreted. For example, Buzan's initial conception of "societal security" practically did not enter the Lithuanian political and academic lexicon, and was not given complete consideration. Although the concept of five security aspects, proposed by Buzan, became widely popular and seemed sufficiently modern and appropriate for cataloguing diverse security challenges, the sector of "societal security" appeared to "melt" and "dissipate" among the other points of the security agenda. This was largely, though certainly not completely, determined by the fact that there is no suitable translation for this concept in the Lithuanian language. For example, the translators of the abovementioned edition of Buzan's book in Lithuanian, while choosing a Lithuanian option for the concept "societal security", decided to choose the option of "social security."[5] Although, at first glance, this choice is suitable, the fact that this concept has already been reserved for defining accessibility to the state welfare policy means (payments, allowances, insurance, etc.) unavoidably distorts and narrows the initial concept. Another example of the problematic use of the original concept "societal security" in the Lithuanian discourse could be the identification of this concept with the term "public security", i.e with protection against crime, police activities, etc.[6]

On the other hand, the concept of "societal security" in Lithuania remained unconsidered in depth, not only due to the lack of a suitable Lithuanian equivalent of the concept. Language is merely a reflection and expression of much deeper structures and patterns. Therefore, there are grounds for assuming that a relative misunderstanding of the concept "societal security" is related to the fact that in Lithuania

(and most probably in the other Baltic States), a specific conception of the relationship between the state and society has been established, the conception ensuing from the fact that societies of the Baltic States for fifty years were made to adapt to the situation of being forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union, and it was necessary to survive without being a state. The Soviet period was related not only to physical threats towards society, i.e. not only to huge losses concerning the population (exiles, repressions, a forced withdrawal from the country), but also to a subtler Soviet policy of denationalisation and Russification. Nevertheless, the societies of the Baltic States withstood this and, at the first opportunity, demonstrated their resilience; not only did they not give in to Sovietisation, but also retained sufficient force and resources to restore their independent states. But it was this fact that determined the formulation of a specific attitude of these societies towards the relationship between the state and society. The restoration of independent states was perceived as the greatest accomplishment that should also be most firmly defended.

In other words, after Lithuania restored its independence, due to specific historical circumstances, the state itself, its independence and sovereignty became the most securitised object of the security policy. Meanwhile, all the other referent objects of the security policy were subordinated to this priority. On the grounds of this approach, many strategic, political, economic and social decisions that, perhaps, did not always seem rational looking from a narrower sectoral standpoint, were made. However, these decisions were primarily determined by the top priority – the strengthening of the independence of the state. An example of such decisions in the area of policy could be the decision of the so-called "Vilnius Group", to support the decision of the USA to begin war against Saddam Husein's Iraq; whereas in the economic area, the most outstanding example could be the most contradictory history of the privatisation of the oil processing factory "Mažeikių nafta," when in 1999, the Council of the State Defence made the decision concerning the permission for the USA company "Williams" to acquire 66% of the shares of the joint-stock company "Mažeikių nafta", despite the fact that the USA company had no trustworthy guarantees for supplying raw oil.

Finally, the fact that all the other referent objects of the security policy were, and still remain, subordinated to the state priority is confirmed by the latest National Security Strategy approved by the Lithuanian Seimas at the beginning of 2017.

SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy 2017 is the fourth renewal of this document. The first strategy was adopted in 2002 and later renewed in 2005 and 2012. The fact that this document was regularly renewed by immediately reacting to the changing security environment and new challenges means it can be regarded as the indicator reflecting, sufficiently accurately and comprehensively, the evolution and status of the idea of security, as well as those of the concept of "societal security" in Lithuania.

So, what can we find in the strategy? On the one hand, as Mr. Vytautas Bakas, the Chairman of the National Security and Defence Committee, claimed in his statement to the press after the approval of the document, the main reason for the renewal of the National Security Strategy was the security situation that had changed[7]. In fact, the new strategy reflects upon, and directly identifies. conventional threats caused by Russia's policy of "redrawing borders" and the modernisation of the armed forces. Special attention is also paid to the so-called "hybrid" threats. It is underlined that, for the assurance of state security, the widespread involvement of society in the security and defence policy is very important. Finally, the politician emphasised that, "such threats as the demographic crisis, social and regional exclusion also take an important place in the strategy. Tasks are being set as to how the situation should be changed".[8] Thus, it is reasonable to say that all the most significant aspects of societal security have also been considered in the strategy. On the list of 15 points of threats, dangers and risk factors, concerning national security, one can also find, information threats jeopardising the identity of citizens (Point 6), social and regional exclusion and poverty (Point 10), demographic

crisis (Point 11) and even crisis of values (Point 15).[9] The reference to dangers and threats to the societal sector is unquestionable and even accentuated as a significant achievement. For example, during the consideration of the draft document in Seimas, member of the National Security and Defence Committee, Laurynas Kasčiūnas pointed out: "...*In truth, this document covers not only those traditional aspects of the security problem to which we are accustomed (certainly, the document pays much attention to this) but, alongside the defensibility of Lithuania, strengthening of NATO's role in the region, we talk about such matters as social exclusion and consider this as a security problem. Regional exclusion, when we turn into a one-city state and how this should be slowed down. We talk about demographic problems. Keep in mind that for the demographic balance of our society it is necessary to have 2.11 child per family, whereas today the number is 1.5, so this is already a security problem.*"[10]

On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that the compilers of the strategy do not assign any particular significance to the term societal threats, and interpret them as one of the national security sectors. Furthermore, it is evident that practically all threats for societal security, without exception, were transferred from previous strategy versions, starting from 2002. Here, we can compare the versions of 2012 and 2017 with reference to information, inequality and demographic issues and find that, in spite of more comprehensive wordings in the edition of 2017, essential content changes are difficult to discern.

In other words, it can be seen with the naked eye that the compilers of the strategy followed not the revolutionary, but the evolutionary road and, in essence, left the structure of the document unchanged and limited themselves to merely making the provisions of the version more precise, extensive and refined. Looking at the document from the perspective of "societal security", there is essentially nothing new in the new strategy, because the relationship between the state and society, as referent objects of security, remains unchanged. In the official narrative, societal security remains subordinated to the state security and so far can only find consolation in being formally mentioned, but without a clear increase in the securitisation degree.

Table 1. Threats for Societal Security in the National Security Strategies of 2012 and 2017

2012	2017
Information security	
10.4. *information attacks* – actions of state and non-state entities in the international and national information space aimed at spreading biased and misleading information, shaping negative public opinion in respect of the interests of national security of the Republic of Lithuania;	14.6. *information threats* – military propaganda spread by certain states and non-state actors, warmongering and incitement to hatred, attempts to distort history, as well as other unsubstantiated and misleading information directed against the national security interests of the Republic of Lithuania which leads to distrust of and dissatisfaction with the State of Lithuania and its institutions, democracy, national defence, seeks to widen national and cultural divides and to weaken national identity and active citizenship, attempts to discredit Lithuania's membership of NATO, NATO capabilities and the commitment to defend allies, to undermine citizens' will to defend their state; also information activities that are aimed at influencing the country's democratic or electoral processes or the party system, or that are targeted at the societies and policy-makers of other Member States of the EU and NATO, seeking unfavourable decisions for the Republic of Lithuania;
Inequality	
12.1. *uneven social and economic development* – persisting or increasing disparities in the living standards among various social groups, which may promote distrust in state institutions and the democratic political system, trigger political extremism, crime, social unrest, etc.;	14.10. *social and regional exclusion, poverty* – growth of social exclusion among the regions and the high level of poverty of certain social groups decrease the society's resilience to a negative external influence and propaganda, lead to distrust of state institutions and the political system of the Republic of Lithuania. Such trends may create a basis for the development of radical, extremist movements within the State and potentially destabilise the political system;
Demography	
12.3. *high rates of emigration* – the decrease of the total number of the population and particularly the number of working-age residents, loss of tax-payers and qualified specialists, weakening emigrants' ties with the homeland, distancing of the emigrants from the political processes taking place in Lithuania, lack of possibilities to actively participate in the political life of the country.	14.11. *demographic crisis* – a decreasing number of the Lithuanian population due to low birth rates, demographic ageing and the persistently large scale of emigration poses a threat to Lithuania's long-term social, economic and political stability and economic development. Prolonged negative demographic trends dampen Lithuania's economic potential, act as a brake on the growth of national economy and hamper the attainment of sustainable economic growth and welfare.

Source: Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, *Resolution amending the Resolution on the approval of the National Security Strategy,* 26.06.2012, https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.433830?positionInSearchResults=1&searchModelUUID=a6b3d585-fb7e-469a-a422-a0986f1468ed; Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution amending the [..]., 2017, op. cit.

This can be partly explained, not so much by the inertia of reasoning, as by what stakeholders were and are involved in the preparation of such documents. The process of the preparation of Strategy 2017 began at the end of 2015, following the order of the Prime Minister to organise a working group, and the Minister of Defence was assigned to lead it. The group included 24 representatives of the Cabinet, various ministries, law enforcement and intelligence institutions, as well as representatives of the Seimas Committees on National Security and Defence and Foreign Affairs. Although the order of the Prime Minister anticipated the possibility "for the working group to resort to experts, representatives of state and municipality institutions, establishments and organisations if the need arises"[11] formally, not a single representative of non-governmental organisations was included. As confirmed in an interview by the Defence Ministry officials that participated in the preparation of the strategy, no representatives of non-governmental organisations were resorted to in the preparation of the draft document, and the bulk of the preparation was carried out by a smaller working group consisting of 6–9 persons representing Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, the Department of State Security and the Office of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the President.[12] Thus, it is hard to even imagine who, in the smaller working group, could represent the agenda of societal security.

However, during the process of strategy preparation, one public event was organised – a seminar on defence policy at Vilnius University, that was devoted to informal exchange of opinions, but there are no grounds to unequivocally state that it had a positive impact on the structure and content of the document.[13] The same might also be said about the public consultation of the strategy. However, during the plenary sitting, the Chairman of the National Security and Defence Committee Mr. Vytautas Bakas was pleased that sufficiently wide attention had been paid to the document, as more than 200 proposals and commentaries from universities, citizens and committees were received, and more than 40 of the submitted proposals were actually approved[14]. The fact that society and, in particular politicians, were more active than ever, was confirmed at the interview given by the Defence Ministry officials that

had participated in the preparation of the National Security Strategy.[15] Looking from the perspective of "societal security", the Committees of the Seimas on Culture and State Governance and Municipalities were particularly active. They proposed to improve the wording related to societal security.[16] However, these actions associated with problems of societal security did not change the general structure of the document under preparation and, it may be said, of the entire narrative of the said document. Societal security in the official narrative is what should also be paid attention to alongside more important problems.

Therefore, it is probably difficult to expect a different definition of the security policy priorities, with reference to societal security or, even more so, the treatment of societal security, at least on a par with state security, if the most important role in this process is played by state institutions in which the key stakeholders, dealing with the implementation of the traditional national security agenda, operate. A different definition of security policy priorities concerning societal security might be expected only from alternative stakeholders that are not directly associated with the administration of the state. With reference to this, the situation in Lithuania is sufficiently dynamic, yet contradictory.

SOCIETAL SECURITY: ALTERNATIVE STAKEHOLDERS AND APPROACHES

The formations of alternative narratives of societal security are first of all encouraged by objective circumstances. Although the establishment of state independence was relatively successfully implemented and optimal international security guarantees ensured (the membership in NATO), the economic, social and ecological development of Lithuanian society was not such that would satisfy all the expectations related to the restoration of independence. It is abundantly clear that it will never be possible to satisfy all expectations, however, in the public space, increasingly heated discussions ensued on problems that, without any doubt, can be attributed to the so-called "societal security" area, as

they are the phenomena that directly threaten the stability, cohesion and identity of the Lithuanian society. The Lithuanian academic community, especially researchers who were dealing with social sciences and humanities, paying attention to societal security issues long before the fatal events in Ukraine, were natural stakeholders. To a great extent the national research programs, "Social Challenges to National Security" (2010–2013)[17] and "The State and the Nation: Heritage and Identity" (2010–2014),[18] initiated by the Research Council of Lithuania in 2010, significantly contributed to this. The program for social challenges to national security investigated the origin, contents, scope and tendencies of social phenomena, posing threats to national security. It sought to make strategic decisions and to anticipate measures and recommendations to overcome threats to societal security. The program for heritage and identity research aimed to formulate the general theoretical concept of social and cultural identity, to examine and evaluate the development of specific identity forms in the aspects of heritage, contemporary state of identity and impacts of the challenges of the modern world.

National research programs involved in researching societal security issues involving the wider academic community, to a certain extent contributed to further framing of alternative thinking on societal security. In essence, alternative approaches to societal security developed in two separate, but at the same time intertwined, directions. The first one is more socioeconomic, particularly securitising socioeconomic inequality and inviting the revision of the social policy executed by the state. The second one pays particular attention to the fact that a purposeful policy for fostering national identity is not adequately being developed in the country and this determines an unprecedented scope of emigration, as well as propaganda and an information war directed against Lithuania. Both problems are sufficiently comprehensively reflected in all the versions of the National Security Strategy, however, alternative narratives do not limit themselves to raising the problem, but seek to reconsider and reconceptualise anew the purpose and significance of the state in the context of emerging threats to "societal" security.

Figure 1. Societal security stakeholders (Lithuanian case)

governmental

external player

President's office

National Security strategy

European Commission

PM's office

Seima's committees

MOD - main coordinator

MFA

Societal security included but subordinated to state security

securitization effect

MOI

State security department

societal security

state security

limited cooperation

Journalists

National research programs

Pundits

Academic community

Individual public figures

Attempts to securitize of the societal issues: emigration, depopulation, social exclusion etc. Ideas on reconceptualization of state security thinking.

non-governmental

Source: Compiled by the author

This approach was particularly well presented by the Lithuanian philosopher Vytautas Rubavičius in the radio discussion, "Will the nation of Lithuanians live for a second centenary?", about the worsening demographic situation, the emigration of Lithuanians that has reached a threatening scale, who emphasised that these are the outcomes of the disappointment in the unsuitable governance of the state: "*Having restored independence, we have not yet established a state. We inherited an administrative territorial unit which was administered. But the governance of a state, the establishment of a state*

is not administration." According to the philosopher, a state is created not in order to effectively administrate it but so that, while acquiring a completely independent life, the nation could survive and live according to its understanding.[19]

In other words, what Rubavičius states is already, in essence, nothing else but the recognition of societal security as the main referent object of the security policy. In this case, the state is not an unconditional security value. Society needs not just any state but a state that is qualitative, a state that is capable of solving problems of its survival and successful development, the problems that have lately become particularly acute.

However, this idea voiced by a well-known philosopher does not mean a significant turn in the predominant reasoning in Lithuania concerning societal security. So far, there are no grounds to claim that problems of societal security in Lithuania are becoming equivalent, in terms of significance, to state security problems. This example only indicates that narratives interpreting problems of societal security in a different way are nevertheless functioning. Yet, until now, they remain poorly consolidated and there are no influential stakeholders behind them. Generally, they are developed by individual pundits, socially active persons or commentators for whom it is complicated to securitise "societal security" problems, at least to such a degree that they could start being perceived as a referent object at least equivalent to state security.

On the other hand, it seems that the actualisation of the topics of societal security, or more so, the distinctly greater securisation, is only a question of time, because the problems are sufficiently pressing and there are increasingly more discussions about them in public. It is also important that the process involves new, more influential stakeholders, including the European Commission that started the supervision of the social and economic policy of Member States and should be singled out.

For example, in the European Commission Staff Working Document "2017 European Semester: Country Report – Lithuania", particular attention was paid to the fact that the situation in Lithuania, looking from the perspective of societal security is exceptionally dramatic:

- *"Lithuania's population has been declining since the early 1990s at an accelerating pace. For the past 10 years, it declined on average by 1.3% annually and the rate of decline is projected to accelerate even further in the years to come. The main drivers of the country's population decline are high net emigration and negative natural growth, which is exacerbated by the population's poor health;*
- *Inequality is high and increasing. Inequality between incomes in Lithuania is one of the highest in the EU, and has been increasing since 2012. This results from high employment gaps between low-skilled and high-skilled workers, strong wage dispersion, the limited progressivity of the tax system and weak social safety nets. The tax benefit system in Lithuania is less effective at reducing inequality than in other EU countries. Furthermore, high income inequality is considered to be detrimental to economic growth and macro-economic stability. In Lithuania, it could also be contributing to high emigration.*
- *Lithuania's education system outcomes are worsening and the system is inefficient. Lithuania's education system has struggled to adapt to rapidly decreasing numbers of pupils and students and hence its education system is overstaffed and burdened with maintaining an infrastructure that is too large for its needs."*[20]

In a sense, the European Commission was not saying anything new, because these problems are known, widely explored and considered. Nevertheless, the voiced critical observations from such an authoritative external observer as the European Commission certainly contribute to the actualisation of these problems and encourage the further development of alternative societal security narratives.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of how societal security is perceived in Lithuania was executed on the basis of the idea that, depending on how the most important referent objects of the security policy are defined, three different concepts of societal security are, in essence, possible: 1) societal security as a sector of state security, 2) societal security as an equivalent/parallel to the state security referent object and 3) societal security as a dominating and security policy referent object with top priority.

In Lithuania, the most evident is the "official" societal security narrative, which is reflected in the National Security Strategy. The analysis of its content shows that problems related to societal security issues are perceived and known. They are reflected in all the versions of the National Security Strategy, including the latest one. It should be pointed out that the latest version presents a more comprehensive and detailed description of threats to societal security and means to overcome them. However, in estimating their place in the general perspective of the document, one can see that they remain consistently subordinated to the more general state security.

Since the Ministry of Defence plays the main role in the preparation of the National Security Strategy, it is natural that the greatest attention is devoted to the preparation to deal with conventional and actualised, by the Ukrainian crisis, "hybrid" threats. Meanwhile, society is considered not as an exceptionally important or even less so as an independent referent object of the security policy, but rather instrumentally as a supplementary resource in solving state security problems. Respectively, the "resilience" of society is primarily perceived as its readiness for the defence of the state, while threats to societal security are considered not as challenges of primary importance, but as actions which might weaken society as a resource of state security.

Although alternative social security narratives that attempt to securitise society and turn it into a referent object, at least on a par with state security, continue to function, they find it difficult to pave the way. They remain poorly consolidated and there are no influential stakeholders behind them. Generally, they are developed by individual scientists, public figures, socially active persons or commentators, for whom it is complicated to at least securitise societal security problems. External stakeholders, such as the European Commission, also play an important catalyst role in this context, however their influence should not be overestimated.

ENDNOTES

1   Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era", Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2nd ed., 1991, 123

2   Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, "Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe", Pinter, 1993

3   Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi et al., "Societal Security in the Trilateral Region of Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova", Editura Curtea Veche, 2008, 10

4   Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, et al., "Security: A New Framework for Analysis", Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, 25

5   Barry Buzan, "Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė. Tarptautinio saugumo studijos po Šaltojo karo" [People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era], Eugrimas, 1997, 168–169

6   Vladas Tumalavičius, "Security of society in Lithuania: concept and scientific fundamentals in its ensuring", *Sociālo zinātņu vēstnesis,* Daugavpils universitāte, 2016, 92–118

7   Lrs.lt, "Vytautas Bakas, Nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos komiteto pirmininko pranešimas: „Seimas vienbalsiai pritarė naujajai Nacionalinio saugumo strategijai"„[Statement by the Chairman of the National Security and Defense Committee „The Seimas unanimously approved the new National Security Strategy"], 17.01.2017, http://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=15908&p_k=1&p_t=168494

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NEW THREATS FOR SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE POLISH NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

MARTA KOWALSKA

The work on the construction of a modern integrated system of Poland's security began with its accession to the North Atlantic Alliance in 1999. At that time, the prevailing conviction was that membership of NATO reduced the risks associated with external aggression towards the country. This led to a reduction in defence spending and a shift in the centre of gravity in the area of security from global conflicts to possible regional conflicts. At the same time, the importance of non-military threats was emphasised. One of the main strategic goals of Poland in this area was a comprehensive approach to national security matters.

Subsequently, strategic documents in the area of security and defence were created and updated for over two decades. They were a response to the changing security environment in Poland, ie. opportunities, challenges, risks and threats, including emerging new non-military threats. Consequently, there has been a shift from a disjointed perception of security and defence issues, to an integrated approach. This means a combination of various aspects of security – military, economic, information, societal and political.[1] This goal was finally achieved along with the latest update of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, NSSRP) in 2014.

However, international events that followed – namely the Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – coupled with the increased threats to the information space and cyberspace caused the security environment of Poland to change once again. In January 2018, the National Security Bureau (Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, NSB) informed that a decision had

been made to launch work on the new National Security Strategy, implemented in cooperation with the presidential and the governmental parties.[2] In addition, on January 1st, Poland began a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.[3] According to the announcement of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *"Poland's priorities in the Council include strengthening international law (including emphasising the importance of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity), conflict prevention and promotion of mediation, as well as new threats to peace and security (including threats from non-state and hybrid entities)."*[4]

In the last four years especially, Polish public debate on issues related to national security has been dominated by non-military threats (migration, terrorism, propaganda, disinformation, cybercrimes and other threats in the information space and cyberspace, as well as hybrid threats). At the same time, the threats posed by Russia's foreign and security policy have been emphasized. For this reason, in the context of traditional military operations, cooperation with NATO was strengthened and work on the creation of the territorial defence forces commenced. At present, discussions are underway about increasing defence spending by 2030, from 2 to 2.5 percent of GDP. However, these threats are considered primarily in terms of the trans-sectoral area of information security and cyber security as well as military, political and/or economic security. The ongoing (yet limited) debate about the current non-military threats to the security of Poland and the work on the new national security strategy of the Republic of Poland have thus created conditions for changing the understanding of societal security and expanding it to the current threats.

At present, issues in the area of societal security refer primarily to national identity and/or social issues, as well as opportunities for the development of an individual and society in the context of traditional threats, such as, social inequalities, regional underdevelopment, demographic problems, and corruption. Meanwhile, the migration crisis in the EU, propaganda, disinformation and other activities in the information space and cyberspace underwent securitisation and dominated the public debate in this area. At the same time, insufficient

steps have been taken to include Polish society in the process of counteracting the threats that accompany these phenomena. This also applies to representatives of the Polish third sector.

Therefore, the Polish national security system remains state-centric. This means that national security is equated with the security of the state. However, along with changes in the security environment and the development of civil society and societal identity in Poland, there is a clear need for a debate on increasing the importance of societal security in the Polish national security system. The aim of this article is to present the theoretical aspects of the concept of societal security, together with the theory of securitisation based on the achievements of the Copenhagen school, their current public discourse in Poland, as well as the analysis of the Polish national security system, in terms of the occurrence of this concept and the related concept of resilience. The article will also identify the main Polish narratives about society and security, including those related to building state resilience together with societal resilience. In addition, the main actors of the development of the security system and their mutual relations will allow identification of the areas requiring reinforcement and preparation of recommendations for individual participants of this system, for the development of the concept of societal security in Poland, taking into account new threats.

MAIN STRATEGIC NARRATIVES IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIETAL SECURITY OF POLAND

This chapter will present the concept of societal security according to the Copenhagen school and the theoretical considerations of this concept in Polish scientific literature, as well as how the Polish research community perceives social and societal security. Subsequently, the chapter will review the Polish strategic documents related to national security, anlaysing them in terms of the occurrence of the concept of societal security. Also, the main narratives about society and new threats to societal security in Poland will be presented.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE ACADEMIC DEBATE

The starting point for the analysis of societal security in Poland is the achievements of the Copenhagen school in the context of the development of security studies. One of the first to draw attention to the overly narrow perception of security, reduced to political and military issues, was Burry Buzan. In 1983, in the book "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations," he proposed a division into five dimensions of security: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. He thus broke with his classical understanding, proving that it does not refer only to states, but also to individuals and communities of people. In addition, he criticised the restriction of security considerations only to the issue of the use of armed forces.[5] Buzan describes societal security as concerning the "*[..] maintaining, in satisfactory development conditions, traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and customs.*"[6] Societal security is closely related to social security, which concerns social hazards caused by, among others, illiteracy, discrimination, disease, poverty, crime, drugs and terrorism.[7] On the other hand, societal security itself can be threatened both by internal problems and traditional threats to national security.[8] The notion of societal security in Polish scientific literature occurs mainly in the context of theoretical considerations. On the flipside, the conceptualisation of societal security in the understanding of the state occurs primarily in the context of social security and psychosocial safety. Therefore, it constitutes an element of the social policy of the state. Admittedly there is a shortage of work in the Polish scientific community, analysing the contemporary Polish national security system through the prism of societal security, in the context of new non-military threats to society and the state as propaganda, disinformation, cyberthreats or hybrid activities.

Undoubtedly, the problem is also the Polish translation of the concept, developed by the Copenhagen school, as both *societal security* and *social security* are mistakenly translated in Polish as societal security.

However, even in the latter case, there is no unanimity on the question of defining this concept. On the one hand, societal security means: *"The state of freedom from the lack of material means of subsistence and the existence of real guarantees of full development of individuals; thus, it includes not only the state of freedom " from various social risks," but also from the threats to the development of the psychosocial unit, which may be the source of all social, political and economic conditions."*[9] On the other hand, it is: *"One of the categories of national security and means protection of the existential foundations of human life, ensuring the possibility of satisfying individual needs (material and spiritual) and fulfilling life aspirations by creating conditions for work and education, health protection and pension guarantees."*[10]

In addition, there are similar terms in specialist literature: *societal security of the state* and *societal security in the state*, both defined as *"the state of society ensuring not only the survival (of the state) of the nation, but also its development."*[11] This means that the essence of societal security in Poland is reduced to a state in which there is no threat to society. If necessary, the society can count on the financial help from the state not only for survival, but also development.

According to Polish societal security researcher, Professor Marek Leszczyński at the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce: *"Societal security covers all legal and organisational activities carried out by governmental entities (national and international), non-governmental organisations and citizens themselves, which aim at providing a certain standard of living for individuals, families and social groups and preventing their marginalisation and social exclusion. (...) The second element of societal security is the creation of developmental conditions, here in particular for active participation in generating income (participation in the labour market) as a basis for economic independence."*[12] Thus, in Polish scientific literature, societal security is treated as an integral part of national security implemented by the state and equated with the state.[13]

The concept of securitisation is an extension of the theory of security sectors. It was presented in the 1990s in the book "Security: A New Framework For Analysis" by Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de

Wilde as a "*political mechanism for building the agenda of key issues from the perspective of societal perception of security.*"[14] The question of security depends on how it is perceived by the securitising actors, who are most often "*political leaders, bureaucracy, government, lobbying groups and pressure groups.*"[15] In this way, security is not treated as an objective fact, but a specific construction resulting from societal interaction. In addition to the actor who plays a key role in the securitisation process, the securitisation object is also important. For these are "*things perceived as existentially endangered and which have a legitimate right to survive.*" The subject of security and the type of threat may vary considerably depending on the sector, ranging from the state (military security), national sovereignty or ideology (political security) or collective identities (societal security).[16]

In the context of further analysis of the Polish national security system through the prism of societal security, the concept of securitisation of new non-military threats in Poland becomes crucial. At the same time, for the purposes of the analysis, the notion of societal security will refer to the issue of national and/or societal identity as well as the possibilities of individual and societal development. In subsequent chapters, an attempt will be made to answer the questions: what aspects of social life have undergone securitisation and what place in the process does societal security take?

CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

The effect of work on the integrated national security system of the Republic of Poland, which was initiated in 2010 by Polish President Bronisław Komorowski (the so-called "strategic turnaround" doctrine), consisted primarily of the preparation of the Strategic National Security Review (SPBN). It sought to go beyond thinking about security only in defence categories. This also applies to thinking about potential threats to Poland's security. As stated in the Strategic National Security Review prepared by the National Security Bureau in 2012: "*It was the first*

undertaking of this type in Poland. It included a comprehensive assessment of the state of national security and formulated strategic conclusions regarding the desired directions and ways of the state's activities in this field and the preparation of the national security system."[17]

In the review, among others, diagnosis of the Polish state as a subject of security, national interests and strategic goals were defined. The assessment and forecast of the security environment, as well as the scenarios of shaping the security conditions, were also presented. Due to the high degree of generality of the document, only the notion of *societal potential* was indicated as one of the components of the strategic potential in the field of security.

In April 2013, the Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022 was published. This document included the societal dimension of national security. However, it referred to the construction of a civic base of the Polish armed forces and their social capital for security. It aims, firstly, to include non-governmental organisations and other societal partners in performing tasks aimed at acquiring and improving defence competences of all citizens. Secondly, it aims to develop cooperation with non-governmental organisations in the activities undertaken by public administration bodies in the field of national security. This is why, among the tasks of the Minister of National Defence related to the implementation of the strategy, one finds the shaping of a positive image and social perception of affairs regarding armed forces, defence, and tightening the cooperation with non-governmental organisations and other social entities in the promotion of defence and defence-related activities.[18] It therefore becomes clear that the societal dimension of national security has been reduced to the issue of defence.

Subsequently, in the preface of the White Book of National Security of Republic Poland of 2013, which was based on the recommendations contained in the Strategic National Security Review, one reads that: "[..] *dangerous transnational and asymmetrical threats, as well as challenges referring mainly to the societal and economic (financial, energy) security, have emerged. We experience an eruption of threats in cyberspace, which results in the necessity to introduce a new approach to national security.*"[19]

The new approach meant that the issues of national security were treated holistically. In contrast to the theory of the security sectors of the Copenhagen school, as many as 16 security sectors and trans-sectoral security areas have been distinguished. Special attention was also paid to non-military transnational and asymmetric threats, among which terrorism, cyberthreats and international organised crime were considered the most important. At the same time, it was stated that terrorist activity is being transferred to cyberspace, which will increasingly become an area of rivalry and confrontation, also between states. At that time already, although to a limited extent, threats related to information wars and the use of social networks to manipulate social awareness were noticed. In addition, the influence of the media on the shaping of attitudes and social opinions, which may pose a threat of manipulation and inducing social reactions that threaten the internal security of the state, were mentioned. This illustrates the extent of the state-centric understanding of the issue of societal and national security functions in the Polish system of state security. Ultimately, these threats are considered through the prism of threatening the functioning and the continuity of the state, and not its society.

However, the great level of detail in the White Book showed that Polish society, represented by non-governmental organisations, was included in the security system at the level of strategic tasks. Nevertheless, the inclusion is still limited, as in the document itself, apart from using the phrase "societal security" five times, does not define it. It is worth adding that the document itself has as many as 265 pages, and the list of the main conceptual categories of the document contains only national security (state security), i.e. a kind of security whose subject is a nation organised in the state. Speaking about social security, the state's policy has been enshrined in its obligations to citizens in difficult and exceptional situations, guaranteeing them assistance and securing minimum benefits. Further, we read that one of the most important tasks of the state in the societal security sector should be to strengthen the sense of social security, with no further explanation of what societal security is.

Irrespective of social issues, the text repeatedly mentions national identity and cultural heritage, both in the context of the historical

shaping of Polish national identity and the challenges associated with the spread of a global mass culture. The preservation of national identity has been indicated as one of the most important tasks of the state in the area of societal security. Thus, this means a lack of a coherent, comprehensive understanding of societal security in the national security system of Poland. Nevertheless, the social potential, which according to the document can be used primarily in educational, scientific and development initiatives for security, is a common subsystem of support for the national security system.

Published in 2014, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland is entirely based on recommendations prepared in the Strategic National Security Review and the White Book of National Security of the Republic of Poland in previous years. The strategy argues that: *"The essence of social activities in the sphere of security is to create safe conditions for a decent life of citizens and the spiritual and material development of the nation. The protection of national heritage, including the assurance of its safe development, especially in the economic, social and intellectual spheres, and the immaterial support of the national security system are key actions."*[20]

Among the social activities, protection and strengthening of national identity, education on security, media activities, counteracting threats to demographic security and ensuring social security, were mentioned. In the strategy itself, as in previous strategic documents, there is no definition of societal security. However, it can be concluded that societal security is perceived as an integral part of the national security system.

One of the choices faced by Poland in the post-Cold War period, besides the development of national security as such, concerned the national security development strategy. From among three available options – maximum internationalisation, balanced internationalisation and independence, and strategic autarky – the second option was selected. However, in response to emerging new external threats to national security, solutions characteristic of the total defence concept are gradually being introduced. It was decided to establish and extend territorial defence, ie. the territorial defence forces.[21] Civil defence has

also improved; is a system designed to protect the civilian population from the dangers of natural disasters and catastrophes. However, the strength of civil defence is questionable, as it requires appropriate qualifications and quick response to an emergency – a capability which remains underdeveloped in Poland.[22]

In the context of non-military threats, the Cybersecurity Doctrine of the Republic of Poland[23] of January 2015 and the draft of Information Security Doctrine of the Republic of Poland[24] of the same year are extremely important, from the perspective of the systematic development of societal and national security in Poland. In the press release of the National Security Bureau in July 2015, we read that, in the future, the Bureau believes that the cybersecurity doctrine of the Republic of Poland and the doctrine of information security should be integrated into a single document.[25] However, it never happened, as further work on the project itself was stopped. Due to the lack of official information on the subject from the BBN website, two interpretations are probable. First, it can be argued that the project was quickly abandoned due to the desire to censor and manipulate the society, as well as to limit freedom of speech and media independence. The second interpretation is prosaic and involves the change of the political party in power in Poland, in the autumn of the same year, which resulted in the abandonment of selected works undertaken by its predecessors. Thus, the only binding strategic document on security in cyberspace in Poland is the cybersecurity doctrine. It states that: *"It is important to conduct informational and educational activities of a preventive nature in the field of preparing citizens for their protection (including self-protection) against cyber threats."*

However, it lacks references to the issue of social identity and the impact of threats in cyberspace on it. It points out, however, that the lack of ensuring the necessary dialogue between the state and society and public consultations in the field of cyber security may cause social opposition motivated by fears of human rights violations or economic freedom. Another problem is that cyber issues have been treated in a selective way and limited to hard cyber issues. In addition, due to the discontinuance of work on the project of information

security doctrine, many aspects related to the soft aspects of the issue were omitted. These also include the protection in the information space (nowadays largely understood as cyberspace), against hostile disinformation and propaganda activities. The information security of the state is in fact the trans-sectoral area that concerns the entire society without exception because every citizen is potentially an object of attack and a resource in the system of counteracting information threats. The continuation of work on this issue creates opportunities to change the perception of security issues from the national (state) perspective to the social one and the transition to thinking about security in the social dimension.

In connection with the arming of information by the Russia for the implementation of its foreign and security police, the aspect of social life and security related to information in the information space and cyberspace has been securitised. Despite this, in Poland, there is still a lack of a coherent, comprehensive concept of the perception of both the information space and cyberspace, as well as the threats that target them. It seems, however, that at the moment, the cyber security issues constitute the most important threat to Poland's national security. During the Third European Cybersecurity Forum (CYBERSEC in Krakow in October 2017), Prime Minister Beata Szydło gave this impression. During her speech, she said that "*cyber security issues are the most important challenges for today's world*" and added that "*more and more governments and leaders see the cyber security problem as a priority.*"[26] It seems, however, that the object of securisation is state and state security, not societal security. Coherent and effective mechanisms for cooperation between the state and society in this area have also not been developed. This particular aspect of social life (cyber security and information security) will, however, allow to analyse how the concept of societal security in the face of new non-military threats could be adapted to the national security system of Poland.

The year 2015, when political changes took place in the country, seems to have marked a breakthrough in the communication of the Polish state about new threats to Poland. Since then, several narratives related to the previously mentioned areas have become recurrent, initiated by the government and reproduced by some media in Poland. It is worth recalling that the media is one of the elements of the national security system repeatedly mentioned in Polish strategic security documents. The existing situation could be explained by a very high level of social polarisation, which favours negative tendencies of putting deep problems and issues into simple schemes for specific groups of voters. This means that, currently, the initiator of any public debate about threats to Polish society is the government, able to create certain narratives in response to the social mood of the Poles. This is a one-way communication between governmental and non-governmental participants, because the latter ones are currently not empowered to engage in the creation of the Polish security system on equal terms. Among the applicable narratives in the area of security and society in Poland, the following should be mentioned:

- The migration crisis caused by the war in Syria, refugees and the threat of terrorist attacks associated with them constitute the greatest threat to national and societal security in Poland. This narrative was heavily exploited by the Polish government in 2015–2017. However, according to a recent survey on the terrorist threat in Poland[27], since 2015 the level of fear of terrorism has significantly decreased. Currently, 67% of the population is not afraid of an attack in Poland. Therefore, this narrative ceased to be valid and will not be analysed later in the article;

- Poland is currently the target of attacks by liberal circles and the international community on the part of the EU, in particular Brussels and Berlin, and, in the context of the ongoing crisis in Polish-Israeli relations, from Israel and the United States, which is creating a negative image of Poland in the international environment. This point also includes all narratives related to Polish historical policy,

in particular in the context of World War II and relations with neighbours, namely Lithuania, Ukraine and Germany;

- False information is the main threat associated with propaganda and disinformation, used as an argument in the internal political disputes to discredit the opposition;
- Russia posing a threat to the security of Poland and, more broadly, European countries.

MAIN STAKEHOLDERS IN SOCIETAL SECURITY

This chapter will present an overview of the most important ministries and state institutions responsible for issues of national security in the context of new non-military threats to societal security. Alternative participants and relationships between them will also be indicated. Eventually, a "map" of current cooperation between various participants in the field of societal security, in the face of new threats to Poland's national and societal security, will be presented.

MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES

At state level, a fairly coherent institutional structure has been created, that deals with new non-military threats. Its most important participants are: the president, the National Security Bureau, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Digitisation, the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Interior and Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government Security Centre, the Internal Security Agency and special services.

The Council of Ministers is responsible for the coordination of activities in the field of cyber security at strategic level. The Doctrine of Cyber Security foresaw the extension of the tasks and competences of the existing supra-ministerial auxiliary body of the Council of Ministers in matters of cyber security. The body has consultative and coordination competences, including those concerning the preparation

of appropriate solutions and standards, as part of the cooperation between public and private sector entities and representatives of civil society, as well as the competence to coordinate international cooperation in the area of cyber security. Ultimately, such an entity could become part of a wider supra-ministerial body for national security matters. As part of the Strategic National Security Review, the government's National Security Committee was proposed (with the government's National Security Centre serving it in the structure of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister), to deal with the supra-ministerial coordination of all national security matters.[28]

During the aforementioned CYBERSEC conference, Prime Minister Szydło announced that she would appoint a department in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister in which experts of cyberspace would work. However, in connection with the government's reorganisation announced in the following months, which finally took place at the turn of December 2017 to January 2018. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki appointed the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity, who was also appointed secretary of state in the Ministry of National Defense. This decision thus cuts the debate over the last six months about the competence of individual ministries to deal with cyber security issues. So far, the leading role in this area was led by the Ministry of Digitisation. It seems that there was an unofficial conflict between the Ministry of Digitisation and the Ministry of Defence – which the latter won victoriously. In addition, it was confirmed that the head of the Ministry of Defence, Antoni Macierewicz, in early September 2017 created the office for the Polish cybernetic army, which is to prepare personnel for military operations in cyberspace. In the meanwhile, the Ministry of Digital Affairs finalises work on the draft law on the national cyber security system, inviting consultees present on the forum of experts. Ministry of Defence's actions are the implementation of tasks indicated in the doctrine of cyber security of the Republic of Poland in this area, in other words, the need to create and strengthen military structures designed to carry out tasks in cyberspace, possessing capabilities in recognising, preventing and combating cyber threats for the Polish armed forces. From the perspective of the analysis

of the national security system, this means that new non-military threats in the cybernetic space are seen primarily as issues of military or state security, with almost complete omission of social aspects of this threat to Polish society. However, at the social level, the potential of the media, both traditional, online and social, is still not used. The same applies to the potential of civil society represented by non-governmental organisations. There are no procedures and mechanisms for cooperation and communication between the state administration, the media and NGOs, and thus with the whole society.

ALTERNATIVE STAKEHOLDERS AND APPROACHES

The concept of building resilience to threats, which has penetrated the Polish security system mainly through international structures, such as NATO or the EU,[29] is associated with building defence potential and national security. Poland also cooperates in this area with the Centre for Excellence for Counter Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE).[30] In this case, the idea of building resilience of the state and citizens appeared, however, in the provisions of the Final Declaration of the NATO Summit[31] in Warsaw, which took place on July 8th-9th, 2016. It is the responsibility of the state to build resilience of individual state structures as well as communication systems. However, it is the responsibility of the state in cooperation with representatives of civil society to build resilience at social level as well. In spite of this, apart from the defence context of Poland's national security, in addition to the international perspective through NATO or the EU, there is practically no public debate on the subject, and the society itself is not familiar with the concept of building resilience either at state or citizens' level. This indicates the separation of military and defence structures of the country from non-military and public participation in the development of the national security system. Thus, we observe a lack of information flow between the state administration and the public. The exception in this case refers to building *social immunity* in the context of the activation of Polish society in the creation of territorial units, ie. the previously mentioned territorial defence forces as another element of the military national security system.

At social level, there is actually no debate about societal resilience to external threats. An attempt to introduce this concept into the public debate was a report entitled "How to build societal resilience in the information space and cyberspace: countering propaganda and disinformation"[32] prepared by the Centre for Propaganda and Disinformation Analysis Foundation, in cooperation with representatives of academic, non-governmental and media circles. The report presented the sources of threats in the Polish information space and cyberspace, and propaganda and disinformation as a threat not only to national security, but also, and perhaps above all, to societal security. The report also diagnosed areas requiring reinforcement and recommendations for state and non-governmental representatives on how to build societal resilience in this area of cooperation. Because, so far, this is the only publication on building social immunity in a non-military context, it could be the starting point for further public debate in Poland on this subject. The observations it contains could be transferred to other aspects of social life.

Among the factors affecting the ability to build societal resilience and the possibility of developing the concept of societalsecurity in Poland, the following should be mentioned (as examples of engaging the public in the information security of the state):

- Strong polarisation and politicisation of Polish public debate, but also a lack of general debate on national and societal security and building societal resilience to contemporary threats, including threats in the information sphere. Securitisation of this area took place, however, no appropriate steps were taken to clarify the problem, eg. so far in Poland there has not been a single information/social campaign on disinformation;
- Insufficient general public awareness about threats resulting from external activities undertaken in the information space and cyberspace;
- Lack of media education and critical thinking at any of the levels of education. These functions are met, to a very limited extent, by social initiatives. An example of such activity is the Academy of Fact-Checking of the Demagogue Society;

- Lack of or insufficiently developed materials regarding the threat and sources of manipulation in the Polish information space and cyberspace, both at expert level and at the level accessible to the average recipient. There is a disproportion between the military language referring to these issues, which is incomprehensible to society, and selective treatment of the threat and reducing this problem only to false information. A lack of broader cooperation exists between academic centres, state administration and think tanks in this area;
- Lack of precise legal provisions regulating the functioning of cyberspace, as well as regulations penalising such activities. Lack of a specific place of the citizen in the system of counteracting cyber threats and those resulting from activities in the information space, and more broadly in the national security system;
- Lack of strategy developed to combat propaganda and disinformation at state level as well as relevant institutions or private and non-governmental entities;
- Insufficient cooperation between non-governmental organisations conducting projects investigating propaganda and disinformation and the Polish public administration. At present, the only example of such cooperation is the StopFake PL project, financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland;
- Acceptance by state structures of the activities of pro-Russian entities in Poland within the meaning of activities in Russian interests, which are at the same time contrary to the interests of Poland;
- Decreasing journalistic standards and media quality in Poland;
- Lack or insufficient channels of communication between the state administration and representatives of non-governmental communities, and thus the real impact of the latter on the shape of security policy.[33]

In the context of information about the work on recommendations to the new National Security Strategy, the following cooperation model has been prepared based on available information and experiences of the non-governmental environment in the area of counteracting propaganda and disinformation as a threat to the societalsecurity

of Poles. Due to the limited communication in the area of security between state institutions and the non-governmental environment, it is suggested to use a connector in the form of state think tanks, which in the system of interaction of individual societalsecurity participants in Poland have been identified as those that cooperate with representatives of non-governmental environments (Polish and foreign) and state institutions.

Figure 1. Interaction of stakeholders in the societal security of Poland

CONCLUSIONS

The contemporary Polish national security system is based on the achievements of the Copenhagen school presented at the beginning of the chapter, and the approach of integrated sectoral security, ie. the combination of various aspects of security – military, economic, information, societal and political. The evolution of this system is a derivative of the changing security environment in Poland, namely, the opportunities, challenges, risks and threats, including emerging new non-military threats. It is these threats that dominate the Polish public debate on national security.

At the same time, in Polish scientific literature, societal security is treated as an integral part of national security implemented by the state and equated with the state. The essence of societal security is reduced to a state in which there is no threat to society, and, if necessary, the society can count on financial help from the state and on, not only survival, but also for development. Such perception of societal security does not include new non-military threats such as propaganda, disinformation, cybercrime and other threats in the information space and cyberspace, as well as hybrid threats. However, societal security is perceived as an integral part of national security, and social capital performs support functions in this system.

The 21st century threats underwent the process of securitisation, but mainly in the context of military and political security. Societal security in the context of these threats seems to be overlooked. However, mostly due to the activities of the academic community, the conditions to start a public debate on societal security and building societal resilience are met. The initiators of this debate, should be state institutions at the level of the National Security Office, as a consultative body of the president or the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, especially in the face of information about the commencement of work on the new national security strategy by the National Security Bureau and the appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for Cybersecurity. There is a possibility of cooperation between the state and society in this area, and the role of the connector could be played by non-governmental organisations and state think tanks, which would also constitute an expert base for state

administration and a source for building and raising awareness of Polish society. Nevertheless, similar cooperation will be possible only if the Polish state will be interested in building societal security in Poland in the face of new threats and will allow its citizens to develop the security system as active participants of this system.

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IN SEARCH OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN BELARUS: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

ARSENY SIVITSKI

INTRODUCTION: A STATE WITHOUT A NATION?

Since the collapse of the USSR, Belarus has not been transformed into a market economy with well-developed and strong democratic institutions and civil society, in contrast to most of the eastern and central European states, including the Baltics. Today, Belarus is a country where the state still preserves and plays the leading role in determining all spheres of life of the Belarusian society. Maintaining their stability and security is considered to be an issue of great importance for the Belarusian authorities. Thus, application of the societal security concept is rather problematic in the case of Belarus, from a methodological point of view. It has neither an adequate translation into the Russian or Belarusian languages, nor any appropriate equivalents conveying the essence of the concept in the Belarusian political and academic discourse which are still based on state-centric views. Due to the dominant role of the state, Belarusian society cannot be considered as an actor and a source of policies. Therefore, societal security could be analysed as a subordinated sector of national (state) security of the Republic of Belarus. In contrast to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies' approach, which refers to a state not just as a government or a territorial entity, but rather as a community with a certain identity,[1] the Belarusian political and academic discourses focus on the protection of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, constitutional order and socioeconomic model of Belarus (socially-oriented market economy). Stability, in contrast to resilience or sustainability, has been a cornerstone of the state ideology which actually substitutes the national identity.

In 1994, Alexander Lukashenko came into power in the context of very strong, pro-Soviet sentiments within the Belarusian society. At the All-Union referendum in March 1991, 83% of Belarusians voted for preservation of the USSR.[2] Lukashenko began his own nation-building experiment with a focus on the Soviet heritage and the concept of the Belarusian unique path, opposing liberalisation, democratisation and de-Sovietisation processes in other post-Soviet states, especially in Russia and Ukraine. According to Lukashenko, after his election he was forced to take charge of the elaboration of the new system of ideology to build the foundation of Belarusian sovereignty, stressing patriotism, collectivism, social justice, the high prestige of education, and socially useful work without any financial rewards. As the US diplomats noted in their telegram, in 2005, Lukashenko's most significant victory with this ideology was his ability to convince so many Belarusians that he was the guarantor of Belarusan independence.[3] However, it seems that after two and a half decades of Lukashenko's rule, he has yet to re-convince the Belarusian society, not only of his role as a guarantor of Belarusan independence, but of the sacred value of independence and sovereign Belarus as such. For instance, in 2013, 70% of Belarusians believed that a single state with Russia would be an acceptable option for Belarus on condition that the move would contribute to the improvement of the economic situation in the country (82% of the respondents said that a union with Russia was acceptable on certain terms in 2010).[4] Even the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2014 hasn't changed the situation dramatically. In March 2015, 66.6% of Belarusians agreed that Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians are three branches of the same nation.[5] In June 2015, answering the question "If Russia tried to annex Belarus or its part with the help of armed forces, what would you do?", 18.7% of Belarusian said that they would "resist up in arms", 52.8% would "try to adapt to a new situation", and 12.1% would "greet these changes." 62.3% of Belarusians also evaluated the annexation of Crimea by Russia as "a restitution of Russian lands and re-establishment of historical justice."[6] As a result, the former slogan – "For a strong and prosperous Belarus' – was replaced by a new one – "For the future of an independent Belarus!" – during Lukashenko's pre-election campaign

in 2015. He also claimed that Belarus was not part of the so-called "Russian world", calling on other countries to respect its sovereignty and independence.[7]

In this respect, relations between the Belarusian state and society can be described through the concept of social contract defined as an implicit agreement between the state and the main social groups, in which the parties are more or less aware of the costs and benefits of their behaviour. According to Belarusian researchers, Belarusian stability is based on public consent to the state of things in the country determined by the authorities providing the minimum package of obligations promised to society. Belarus is characterised by the vertical social contract.[8] Thus, the national security system in Belarus is aimed at preserving the current *status quo* in contractual relations between the society and state, preventing any mechanisms of voluntary withdrawal of society, and considering any minor deviation as an attempt to escape from the social contract with all ensuing punitive consequences.

However, the societal security in Belarus will be defined as the soft security opposing the hard security issues, first of all represented by the sphere of national defence (military security). The most comprehensive narrative is represented by the national security concept, adopted in 2010, which is still in force. It includes the following interconnected components: political security, economic security, scientific and technological security, social security, demographic security, information security and environmental security. Every component describes the national interests in the respective sphere, threat perception matrix, including the main internal and external sources of threats to national security, threats to the national security and state policies to counter them. Usually, nobody challenges the content of this document. However, there are many questions about how it is implemented by the Belarusian authorities in practice. The results are assessed with the help of international rankings.

The reality check on whether the societal security concept is appropriate to the case of Belarus can be verified with the help of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014, which led to the unprecedented geopolitical tension between Russia and the West. Due to its

geopolitical, security and economic consequences to Belarus, this regional crisis can be considered as an existential threat to it. In this context, the maintenance of statehood and national security have suddenly become a much more prominent part of Lukashenko's governing formula. In other words, he has replaced the social contract by a security contract, guaranteeing peace and stability against a background of war in Eastern Ukraine and the evident crisis of the so-called Belarusian socioeconomic model. As protection of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, constitutional order and stability of the socioeconomic model of Belarus has been prioritised by the Belarusian state's political discourse, and transformed into matters of security, it is quite difficult to find a reference object for societal security in terms of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. All these matters usually refer to the system of ensuring the national security of Belarus, where the state plays the role of security and stability provider for the Belarusian society. This system could be called total security (as opposed to the total defence concept in Sweden), where the role of society is limited and subordinate to the state and its national interests. Its strategic task is to ensure political stability within the country. It also suggests that Belarusian society is not considered as a source of any significant internal changes. These are usually only possible as a result of external influences (of global economic crises, regional military conflicts, geopolitical confrontation, trade wars, etc.). And the main task of the Belarusian state is to manage and control carefully all these external influences in order to prevent any significant destabilisation effect on internal affairs.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TOTAL SECURITY

In practice, all components of the national security system (political, economic, scientific and technological, social security, demographic, information, environmental) are subordinated to the strategic task of ensuring political stability within the country. In this regard, such

system could be called total security, where the role of society is limited and subordinate to the state and its national interests. This is the opposite of the total defence concept developed in Sweden, for instance.[9] While total defence begins with the willingness of the population to participate in the defence of the country and society along with the government, government authorities, municipalities, private enterprises, voluntary defence organisations, and individuals that represent horizontally connected security actors, total security clearly separates the society and state in Belarus and subordinates the former to the latter. On the other hand, it demonstrates how every aspect of life of Belarusian state and society is completely securitised.

In 2010, a new national security concept was adopted in Belarus that expanded the key areas of national security, including science, technology and demography in comparison to the previous ones of 1995 and 2001. The national security concept of Belarus is still in force and provides a relatively broad vision of national security, focusing on its soft and hard aspects and does not operate with the notion of societal security. In this respect, societal security in Belarus should be considered as a part of national security as a result of securitisation of all spheres of life of Belarusian society into matters of security by the state. Therefore, it can be called total security. The national security concept defines a system of ensuring national security, which is represented by a set of interacting actors and the means they use to carry out actions to protect and realise the national interests of Belarus and ensure the security of the individual, society and the state. The goal of ensuring the national security is to achieve and maintain such a level of protection of the individual, society and the state from internal and external threats that guarantees the sustainable development of the Republic of Belarus and the realisation of its national interests. Belarus is considered as a successful, independent, sovereign European state that does not belong to any of the world's power centres, pursues a peaceful foreign policy and strives to create conditions for acquiring a neutral status. By virtue of its geographical location and openness, Belarus is fully exposed to the influence of most of the geopolitical processes taking place in the world.[10]

The national security concept operates with the following basic concepts:

- National security – the state of protection of the national interests of the Republic of Belarus from internal and external threats;
- National interests – the totality of the state's needs for the realisation of the balanced interests of the individual, society and the state, allowing to ensure constitutional rights, freedoms, high quality of citizens' life, independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and sustainable development of the Republic of Belarus;
- Source of a threat to national security – is a factor or a combination of factors that, under certain conditions, can lead to a threat to national security. Sources of threats to national security are divided into external and internal;
- Threat to national security – is a potential or actual possibility of inflicting damage to the national interests of the Republic of Belarus.

The national interests of the Republic of Belarus cover all spheres of the life of an individual, society and the state, are closely interrelated and represent conceptual reference points for their long-term development. The strategic national interests of Belarus, according to the national security concept are: ensuring independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, the inviolability of the constitutional order; sustainable economic development and high competitiveness of the Belarusian economy; achievement of a high-level and quality of life of citizens. They are secured by the following interconnected components of the national security system: political security, economic security, scientific and technological security, social security, demographic security, information security, environmental security, as well as military (hard) security which is taken out of context of this report.

The most important element of the national security system is political security. It is defined as the state of security of the political system from external and internal threats, ensuring the implementation of national interests in all areas of national security. In practice, it is aimed at ensuring stability of the sociopolitical sphere. The main national interests in the political sphere are:

- Observance of constitutional human rights and freedoms, sustainable development of a democratic, legal, socially responsible state, ensuring the effective functioning of state institutions in the public interest, effective counteraction to corruption;
- Achieving a balance of the political interests of citizens, public associations and the state, public consensus on key issues of the development of the Republic of Belarus, development of civil society, taking into account national traditions and features;
- Formation of a multipolar world and a system of international relations based on the supremacy of international law and multilateral cooperation, ensuring the participation of Belarus in resolving issues affecting its interests; improving and strengthening the mechanisms for ensuring national and collective security with the participation of Belarus at the global, regional and bilateral levels;
- Pragmatic interaction with world centres of power, based on effective multilateral and multi-vector diplomacy, strategic partnership and special relations with friendly states, equal interaction and mutual consideration of interests;
- Positioning Belarus abroad as a democratic law-governed state, responsible and predictable partner, donor of international and regional security;
- Ensuring the protection of the rights of compatriots and solidarity of the Belarusians throughout the world for the sake of a strong, prosperous Belarus.

Threats to political security include: encroachment on the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and constitutional order of the Republic of Belarus; dictating terms of political discourse that do not meet its national interests, interference from outside into domestic political processes; a sharp or large-scale decrease in the confidence of citizens in the main state institutions.

Table 1. Main threats to political security

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• Violation of constitutional human rights and freedoms, the principle of the rule of law; • use of methods in the political, economic, public and other activities that are deliberately aimed at destabilising the situation in Belarus; artificial inflaming of tension and confrontation in society, between society and the state; • formation, penetration or dissemination of the ideology of extremism, separatism, national, racial and religious intolerance, the emergence or illegal activities of organisations, groups, individuals who adhere to and disseminate these views; • disorganisation of the public administration system, creation of obstacles to the functioning of state institutions; etc.	• Presence of significant contradictions between the main subjects of world politics, manifested against the background of a decrease in the capacity of international and regional security systems and capable of complicating the situation around Belarus; • clash of geopolitical interests of leading states (groups of states) in the process of transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order; • the use by individual states or groups of states of pressure, economic and resource advantages for the promotion of their interests; • interference in international processes of actors that are not recognised subjects of international relations; • weakening of integration structures and international organisations, in which Belarus takes part.

The most important direction of the state policy of neutralising internal sources of threats to national security is preservation of the role of the state as a guarantor of personal security, the comprehensive improvement of the processes of preventing and combating crime, primarily corruption, terrorism and extremism in all their manifestations, separatism, racial and religious intolerance. Measures for protecting against external threats to national security focus on a consistent and balanced multi-vector foreign policy based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and partnership, non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states; resolute protection of national interests within the framework of international and regional organisations and associations, etc. However, in practice, Belarusian authorities have been tightening political control over the society recently, blocking any unauthorised political and civil activities. According to Democracy

Index 2017, Belarus is considered as an authoritarian state and occupies 138th position (↓11) from 168.[11]

Stability of the Belarusian socioeconomic model is ensured by economic security. It is viewed by the national security concept as the state of the economy, under which the national interests of the Republic of Belarus are guaranteed to be protected from internal and external threats. In the economic sphere, the main national interests are:

- Economic growth and increasing the competitiveness of the Belarusian economy on the basis of its structural adjustment, sustainable innovation development, investment in human capital, modernisation of economic relations, reduction of production costs, import intensity and material intensity of products;
- Preservation of the stability of the national financial and monetary systems; achievement of a sufficient level of energy security to neutralise external dependence on energy supplies; maintaining a guaranteed level of food security;
- Ensuring non-discriminatory access to world markets for goods and services, raw materials and energy resources;
- Transfer of modern technologies to the economy of the country mainly due to foreign direct investment, availability of foreign credit resources.

Threats to economic security are represented by insufficient competitiveness of the economy of Belarus; decrease in quality of life of the population; destabilisation of the national financial and monetary systems, loss of stability of the national currency. The inability to pay and service external and internal debt, as well as the impossibility of provisioning raw materials and energy resources in sufficient capacity, ensuring the planned GDP growth, are also recognised as threats to the economic security of Belarus. The list of economic threats includes: loss of external markets, including discrimination of Belarusian producers, and a lull in the transition rate of the economy to advanced technologies from other states, degradation of the technological basis of the real sector of economy; inadequate and poor quality of foreign investments.

Table 2. Main threats to economic security

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• Structural deformation of the economy, the predominance of material and energy-intensive industries, inadequate development of the service sector, low specific weight of high-tech science-intensive products and slow product renewal; • low level of self-sufficiency in raw materials and energy resources; high administrative barriers for business development, entrepreneurial activity; imbalance of economic development, expressed in the growth of aggregate consumption in excess of the real possibilities of the economy; • unfavourable conditions for attracting foreign investments and credits; low diversification of exports and imports; growth of non-payments in the economy due to a deficit of own working capital and a high proportion of loss-making business entities; etc.	• Deterioration of the terms of foreign trade, attraction of credit and investment resources due to unfavourable conjuncture of world markets; • adoption by foreign states of protectionist measures, imposing barriers and discriminatory conditions for the implementation of export-import transactions; • development of transit corridors, transportation systems of energy resources, alternative to those available in the Republic of Belarus, restriction on using the transit potential of the Republic of Belarus; • discrimination of its interests within the framework of international unions and entities.

Source: Compiled by the author

According to the national security concept, the necessary condition for neutralising internal sources of threats to national security in the economic sphere, is the maintenance of long-term macroeconomic stability through structural reorganisation of the economy of Belarus on the basis of direct foreign investments, growth of labour productivity and innovation activity of all economic entities, reducing the negative balance of foreign trade, reducing import capacity, material intensity, cost of production and improving the quality of products. Structural reorganisation of the country's economy is provided through the accelerated development of high-tech sectors with high added value, production based on local resources, and realisation of the transit potential of the country. In general, Belarusian authorities are focusing on forming an internally consistent, institutional, socially-oriented market environment, fully harmonised with the developed countries, with the

goal of becoming one of the top 30 countries in the world in terms of doing business. Protection from external threats to national security in the economic sphere is also ensured by multi-vector foreign economic policy, expansion of commodity nomenclature and export geography, diversification of imports of raw materials and energy resources.

Driven by the deep economic crisis of 2014–2016, the Belarusian authorities have developed an anti-crisis plan in cooperation with the western international financial institutions. The World Bank helped to produce a Roadmap for Structural Reforms in Belarus in 2015. However, government reform initiatives are oriented toward short-term benefits with the aim of sustaining power and preserving stability, rather than based on a long-term modernisation strategy. While the Index of Economic Freedom 2017 (104 from 180 (↑53)[12] and Doing Business 2017 (37 from 190 (↑7)[13] demonstrate the significant progress of Belarus, security services are aggravating the business environment, increasing their control over the Belarusian economy through combating corruption and tax evasion. In 2014–2017, the KGB, Ministry of Interior and Investigative Committee blocked any significant attempts to promote structural reforms, as well as initiating investigations against prominent Belarusian businessmen (for optimisation of taxation schemes) considering them as "cash cows" required to provide the Belarusian state with financial assistance in hard times. In the paying taxes ranking of 2017, Belarus was in 99th position, from 189 (↓36) countries.[14]

The next element of the national security system is scientific and technological security. The national security concept views it as the state of domestic scientific, technological and educational potential, which provides the opportunity to realise the national interests of Belarus in the scientific and technological sphere. The main national interests in the scientific and technological sphere are:

- Formation of a knowledge-based economy, ensuring the development of science and technology as the basis for sustainable innovative development of the Republic of Belarus;
- Creation of new industries, sectors of the economy based on advanced technologies, intensive technological renovation of the

basic sectors of the economy and the introduction of advanced technologies in all spheres of the life of society;

- Expansion of the presence of Belarus in the global market of intellectual products, science-intensive goods and services, mutually beneficial international scientific and technological cooperation and attraction of world-class technologies to the country's economy.

The main threats to scientific and technological security represent the lag in the transition rate of the economy to advanced technologies from other states, degradation of the technological basis of the real sector of the economy; reduction of scientific, technological and educational potential to a level not capable of providing innovative development.

Table 3. Main threats to scientific and technological security

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• Science intensity of GDP is below the critical level necessary for the reproduction of the scientific and technological potential; low innovative activity and receptivity of the Belarusian economy; • ineffectiveness of the national innovation system, including legislation, the infrastructure of technology transfer from science to production, the material and technical base of scientific institutions, financing system, branch science; etc.	• Restriction of access for Belarusian researchers and business entities to the latest technologies, world-level R&D results; • policies of foreign countries and companies, which stimulate the emigration of highly-qualified scientists and specialists from the Republic of Belarus.

Source: Compiled by the author

The most important direction of neutralising internal sources of threats to national security in the scientific and technological sphere is the completion of the creation of an effective national innovation system and the implementation of a new technological strategy for the development of the economy of Belarus. The production sphere is oriented towards the creation of joint companies for the production of high-tech and complex technical products, the development of the sector of science-intensive services. The export of capital (technology) to the countries of the third world, the creation of assembly plants for Belarusian technologies abroad should be an effective factor in solving

the tasks. However, Belarus stayed in the 88th (↓9) position from 127 countries in the Global Innovation Index 2017.[15] In 2016, Belarus spent only 0,5% of GDP for research and development which demonstrates that it is not the priority for the state. Therefore, the Belarusian authorities are relying on investments and technological transfer from abroad. To facilitate this process, special economic zones with fringe benefits have been developed – the "Great stone" China-Belarus industrial park and High-Tech Park.

Social security has been always a cornerstone of the Belarusian socioeconomic model. It is perceived as the state of protection of life, health and welfare of citizens, the national and moral values of society from internal and external threats. In the social sphere, the main national interests are:

- Satisfaction of the basic social needs of citizens, minimisation of negative consequences of social differentiation and social tension in society;
- Maintenance of public safety and safety of vital activity of the population, decrease in the level of criminality and criminalisation of a society;
- Ensuring employment of able-bodied citizens and a decent level of work remuneration;
- Development of the intellectual, spiritual and moral potential of society, preservation and enhancement of its cultural heritage, strengthening the spirit of patriotism;
- Ensuring the harmonious development of interethnic and inter-confessional relations.

Main threats are represented by the growth of criminal and other unlawful attacks against persons and property, cases of corruption; manifestations of socio-political, religious, ethnic extremism and racial hostility on the territory of Belarus; loss by a significant part of citizens of traditional moral values and landmarks, attempts to destroy national spiritual and moral traditions and a biased revision of history, affecting these values and traditions; encroachments on the life, health and security of Belarusian citizens staying abroad.

Table 4. Main threats to social security

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• Sharp social stratification and high differentiation of the income level of the population; significant differences in the quality of life of urban and rural populations, residents of large, medium and small cities; decrease in the number of able-bodied inhabitants; • lagging behind in the quality of education in a number of promising areas from the level of the world's best educational centres and insufficient number of modern highly qualified specialists of global level; • change in the scale of life values of the younger generation in the direction of weakening patriotism and traditional moral values; etc.	• Weakening of the national and cultural identity of the Belarusian diaspora, significant infringement of the legitimate rights and interests of compatriots; • expansion of cross-border crime, activities of transnational or foreign criminal organisations and groups associated with encroachments on the life, health, freedom and social rights of Belarusian citizens.

Source: Compiled by the author

In the social sphere, Belarus intends to be among the top 50 countries of the world with a high level of human development. At the same time, the state's actions are being aimed at ensuring a decent level and quality of life of the population, including through the growth of real wages and other incomes, improving the pension system and targeted social assistance, and developing a system of state social standards. The most important directions are the creation of conditions for effective full employment of the population, more rational use of labour resources, improving the quality and competitiveness of the workforce. Belarus has the lowest poverty rate within the Commonwealth of Independent States and one of the lowest Gini coefficients in the world. But this has been achieved at the cost of highly regulated labour and pricing policies. According to the Human Development Index 2016, Belarus is in 52nd (↓2) position from 187 states.[16]

However, some elements of a social-oriented economic model are being highlighted, retirement age increasing, utility rates are growing. Conservative trends prevail with the explicit imperative for binding people to their jobs in the inefficient public sector. Forcing measures such as Decree No. 3 "On the prevention of social parasitism", which

required those who worked less than 183 days per year to pay the government \$180 in compensation for lost taxes, provoked great tension within the Belarusian society and led to the first serious protest activities in Minsk and regions in February – March 2017, since December 2010. But they were brutally cracked down on by law enforcement agencies. Its new version, in the form of Decree No. 1, aimed at stimulating employment and self-employment, introduces mandatory payment of state-subsidised services at their full cost by able-bodied unemployed citizens and therefore does not ease the social tension.

Demographic security, which is very close to social security, is considered as a separate element according to the national security concept. It is perceived as the state of protection of society and the state, from demographic phenomena and trends, the socioeconomic consequences of which have a negative impact on the sustainable development of the Republic of Belarus. In the demographic sphere, the main national interests are:

- Steady growth in the size of the Belarusian nation on the basis of a consistent increase in the birth rate and life expectancy, reducing the death rate of the population;
- Increase of the general level of health of the population, protection of the health of mothers and children;
- Strengthening the institution of the family as a social institution, most favourable for the realisation of the need for children, their upbringing;
- Optimisation of internal and external migration flows, ensuring a positive balance of external migration of an economically active population.

Main threats are represented by activation of emigration processes, the growth of unregulated immigration to the country; disturbance of the sustainability of the social protection system; growth of unemployment, including unreported and concealed; depopulation, general ageing of the nation, decline in the birth rate, deterioration of other basic indicators of demography and the health of the nation.

Table 5. Main threats to demographic securtiy

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• Unfavourable age and gender structure of the population; the birth rate, which does not provide a simple substitution of the parental generations; • decrease in the degree of social need for children; the high mortality rate of citizens at the age most favourable for ensuring the reproduction of the population; negative transformations of the family institution (high divorce rate, increase in the number of incomplete families with children, social orphanhood and others).	• Increase in the flow of illegal migrants to or through Belarus.

Source: Compiled by the author

In the demographic sphere, the main priority of the state policy is the comprehensive stimulation of the birth rate, which ensures an extended reproduction of the population. Increasing the prestige of a strong family and improving the support system for families with three or more children are fundamentally important areas for ensuring demographic security. The important tasks for the Belarusian authorities remain: a reduction in mortality, an increase in the life expectancy of the population, protection of the health of the mother and child, and the preservation of the reproductive and general health of the population. In the Health-related index of Sustainable Development Goals 2016, Belarus occupies 120th position from 188 countries.[17]

Information security has been paid much more attention by the Belarusian authorities recently, due to the dramatic influence of information on political stability. The national security concept views it as the state of protection of balanced interests of the individual, society and the state against external and internal threats in the information sphere. The main national interests in the information sphere are:

• Realisation of the constitutional rights of citizens to receive, store and distribute full, reliable and timely information; effective information support of public policy; formation and progressive development of

the information society; equal participation of Belarus in the world information relations;

- Transformation of the information industry into an export-oriented sector of the economy;
- Maintaining reliability and stability of functioning of critical objects of information.

Main threats include, influence of destructive information on the individual, society and state institutions, which harms national interests; dysfunction of critical information objects; insufficient scale and level of introduction of advanced information and communication technologies; reduction or loss of competitiveness of domestic information and communication technologies, information resources and national content; loss or disclosure of information considered as state secrets protected by law and capable of causing damage to national security.

Table 6. Main threats to information security

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• Dissemination of unreliable or deliberately distorted information capable of causing damage to the national interests of the Republic of Belarus; • dependence of Belarus on the import of information technologies, information and information protection facilities, their uncontrolled use in systems whose failure or destruction could damage national security; • inconsistency of the quality of national content to global level; • insufficient development of the state system regulating the process of implantation and use of information technologies; the growth of crimes with use of information and communication technologies; insufficient effectiveness of information support for public policy; imperfection of the security system for critical information objects.	• Openness and vulnerability of the information space of Belarus from external influence; • dominance of leading foreign states in the global information space, the monopolisation of key segments of information markets by foreign information structures; • information activities of foreign states, international and other organisations, individuals, undermining the national interests of Belarus, fraudulent misrepresentation of information facts; • growth of information confrontation between the world's leading centres of power, preparation and conduct of warfare in the information space by foreign states; development of information manipulation technologies; etc.

Source: Compiled by the author

In the information sphere, in order to neutralise internal sources of threats to national security, Belarusian authorities are improving mechanisms for realising the rights of citizens to receive, store, use and dispose of information, including using modern information and communication technologies. A significant stage will be the development and implementation of a comprehensive informatisation strategy, aimed at the development of an electronic system for implementing administrative procedures provided to citizens and businesses by state bodies and other organisations, and the transition of the state apparatus to work on the principle of information interaction. The industry of information and telecommunication technologies will develop at an accelerated pace. While Presidential Decree No. 8 "On Digitalisation of the Economy" that sets out numerous regulatory breakthroughs and allows cryptocurrency-related companies to operate in the Belarusian High-Tech Park, a privileged regime zone for IT companies, the Operational and Analytical Centre, together with the Ministry of Information, are tightening controls over the Internet and information flows (restrictions on connectivity, prosecutions and detentions for online activity, blocking and filtering). According to the World Press Freedom Index 2017, Belarus occupies the 153rd position from 180 (↑4).[18] Belarus is also marked with the "Not Free" status in the Freedom on the Net 2017 ranking.[19]

Environmental security, in accordance with the national security concept, is the state of protection of the environment, life and health of citizens from threats arising from anthropogenic influences, as well as factors, processes and phenomena of a natural and technogenic nature. The main national interests in the environmental sphere are:

- Ensuring environmentally friendly living conditions for citizens; contribution to maintenance of global and regional ecological balance;
- Overcoming the negative consequences of radioactive contamination of the country's territory and other emergencies, rehabilitation of environmentally disturbed territories;
- Sustainable natural and resource provision of the country's social and economic development;

- Rational use of natural and resource potential, conservation of biological and landscape diversity, ecological balance of natural systems.

Main threats are represented by degradation of land, forests and natural complexes, depletion of mineral and raw materials, water and biological resources; radioactive, chemical and biological pollution of soils, land, waters, vegetation and the atmosphere.

Table 7. Main threats to environmental security

Internal sources of threats	External sources of threats
• High concentration of environmentally hazardous objects in Belarus, their location near residential areas and life support systems; radioactive contamination of the habitat due to the Chernobyl accident; • formation of large quantities of production and consumption wastes with a low degree of their secondary use and high-technology processing, increased levels of emissions and discharges of pollutants; etc.	• Global environmental changes associated with climate change, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss; • transboundary transfer of pollutants to the territory of the Republic of Belarus by air and water flows, penetration of invasive species of animals and plants from neighbouring countries; • siting of major environmentally hazardous facilities near the borders of Belarus, the disposal of nuclear waste in adjacent territories.

Source: Compiled by the author

Neutralisation of internal sources of threats to national security in the environmental sphere is facilitated by ensuring economic growth within the economic capacity of the biosphere and improving the environmental situation in Belarus through the introduction of energy and resource-saving technologies, modern systems for the protection of environmentally hazardous facilities, development and introduction of environmentally safe technologies, renewable sources of energy. In the Environmental Performance Index 2018, Belarus occupies the 44th (↓9) position from 180 countries. One of the most securitised issues is construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant by Rosatom, that has provoked great tension in relations with Lithuania who are opposed to the project. On the other hand, if it is successful it will improve energy security and reduce the import of Russian gas by 30%.

STAKEHOLDERS: NO ALTERNATIVES FOR THE STATE

The Republic of Belarus is proclaimed by its Constitution to be a democratic socially-oriented state, based on the rule of law that admits the priority of generally acknowledged principles of international law and ensures the conformity of legislation with them. In practice, however, some democratic institutions and procedures do not function, and power is concentrated in the hands of the president, who has effectively placed the judiciary and legislature under his control. The whole system is crucially influenced and dominated by Alexander Lukashenko himself and the groups around him, principally the presidential administration, which he often manages through a process of divide and rule, carefully balancing different interests which range from hardliners in security apparatus to moderate economic technocrats. Hardliners, particularly those in law enforcement agencies and security services (KGB, Ministry of Interior, Operational and Analytical Centre, etc.), tend to block any market reforms and political liberalisation in Belarus and support closer ties with Russia, while some technocrats support limited modernisation and improvement of economic ties with the West (Ministry of Economics, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Bank, etc,). The president appoints the prime minister and the cabinet, who nominally is the head of government but, in effect, is subordinate to the president.

According to the national security concept, the national security actors carry out coordinated activities aimed at achieving the goal and solving the tasks of ensuring national security in accordance with their legal status determined by law. However, the president carries out the general management of the national security system by exercising his power in this sphere through the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus and its working body – the State Secretariat of the Security Council and through the Council of Ministers (government) of the Republic of Belarus, which are both national security actors. Other stakeholders are represented by the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus (parliament); state bodies subordinated to the president and the republican government bodies subordinated to the government;

Figure 1. Map of stakeholders in Belarus

Source: Compiled by the autor

courts of different levels; local government and self-government bodies. The national security concept views citizens as recipients of security and passive actors participating in ensuring national security through the realisation of their rights and duties (including the performance of the sacred duty to protect the Republic of Belarus) provided by the Constitution, laws and normative legal acts of the president. But they realise their vision of national interests, ways and means of their protection by participating in elections, referendums and other forms of direct democracy, as well as through state bodies and local self-government bodies.

However, the Belarusian political system is highly centralised, with the presidential administration sitting at the apex of a so-called power vertical. The council of ministers is in reality subordinated to the unaccountable presidential administration. Subordinate structures are expected to implement commands and there are no genuine horizontal checks or balances between different branches of government. This has led to a situation in which there is a lack of actors who are ready to take responsibility and even high-ranking authorities try to avoid responsibility where possible. The Belarusian government is made up of the prime minister, his deputies and ministers. The government is accountable to the president and answerable to the parliament. Its mandate covers the budget, domestic and foreign policy, economic and social development, national security and defence.[20]

Local issues are represented by the locally elected councils of deputies. These local councils operate on three levels: primary (villages and towns), basic (towns and regional councils) and regional (oblast). Deputies are elected for a four-year term to address local issues and represent the local population in decisions on issues relating to health, education, social welfare, trade and transport. As they are subject to central control, they are not autonomous in their jurisdiction over the local community. Subnational executive bodies have no direct democratic legitimacy, since they are formed and controlled by, as well as accountable to, the president and central government. The executive chairman at the regional (oblast) level is usually appointed personally by the president, and usually from among his closest associates.

The bicameral parliament known as the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, and consisting of the House of Representatives and the Council of the Republic, lacks the resources and capacity to fulfil its lawmaking and investigative responsibilities. In practice, the presidential administration drafts nearly all legislation acts and initiatives. Pro-Lukashenko parliamentarians predominate in the parliament. The democratic opposition and even registered political parties have no impact on or influence over the state and society. Only two representatives from the opposition and civil society, Anna Konopatskaya (United Civil Party) and Elena Anisim sit in the House

of Representatives (for the first time in 20 years). Their inclusion in 2016 and presence in the parliament does not reflect the true level of support for the opposition, but rather Alexander Lukashenko's willingness to demonstrate goodwill to the EU. Out of 110 mandates, 108 seats in the House of Representatives are taken by pro-Lukashenko parliamentarians. The absolute majority of members of parliament were non-party, 23 were from the pro-governmental Belaya Rus association. The council of the republic voting system is based on indirect election by regional assemblies and appointment by the president.

The activities of civil society organisations continue to be restricted by the authorities. Nevertheless, they are surprisingly active compared to many other post-Soviet societies. Since the late 1990s, the Belarusian Assembly of Democratic NGOs has established a united national coalition. In 2010, a National Platform was created to engage with the Civil Society Forum of the EU's Eastern Partnership. However, the state has also been active in creating government-oriented civil society organisations. Independent NGOs are most active in the arena of Belarusian-European cooperation, the most significant example of coordinating efforts of cooperation being the Belarus National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. The Belarus National Platform tries to consolidate the voice of civil society in EU-Belarus relations and is partly involved in policy dialogue within the formats of the EU-Belarus Coordination Group and Human Rights Dialogue. Among positive trends are a reduction in government harassment, successful advocacy campaigns, use of online crowdfunding platforms, organisational capacity development and grassroots organising.

Various independent think tanks, including the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS), the Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, the Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation (BIPART), the Research Centre of the Institute for Privatisation and Management, the Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Centre (BEROC), Warsaw-based Research Centre Eurasian States in Transition (EAST), the Institute of International Relations (Warsaw, Poland), the Centre for Social and Economic Research (CASE), the Republican Confederation of Entrepreneurship, the Belarus

Research Centre, the Belarus Security Blog analytical project, the Agency for Social and Political Expert Appraisal, and the website of the expert community of Belarus *Nashe Mnenie* (Our Opinion), the Centre for European Transformation, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the Belarusian Association of Journalists, the Human Rights Centre Viasna and the Legal Transformation Centre (Lawtrend) are a great source of expertise in different spheres, but they still remain uncalled by the authorities. They focus on reform and the transformation agenda of the Belarusian socioeconomic model. However, influence of civil society on the decision-making process of the state institutions is limited. The state is interested in engagement with the civil society only when it comes to the need for demonstrating some progress in democratisation. But, independent think tanks and experts are usually recruited for consultations by international organisations (UN, WTO), financial institutions (World Bank, EBRD, IMF), European commission, etc.

Belarusian authorities usually rely on their own sources of expertise represented by the state research and analytical institutions, especially within security services. The most prominent are the National Academy of Science of Belarus, Information and Analytical Centre under the presidential administration, national research institutions or subordinated agencies under different ministries: The Economy Research Institute of the Ministry of Economy, national unitary enterprise "Pricing Centre" of the Pricing Policy Department of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Belarus, National Agency of Investment and Privatisation, Labour Research Institute under the Labour and Social Security Ministry, National Centre of Legislation and Legal Research of the Republic of Belarus, etc. The ministries and state bodies are allowed to establish their own civic and expert councils and even the Security Council has its own. However, usually they exist nominally and consist of pro-governmental experts. Therefore, there are doubts whether they are able to produce relevant analysis and influence the decision-making process.

CONCLUSION. REALITY CHECK

The case of Belarus points out several underlying weaknesses of the concept of societal security developed by the Copenhagen school: a tendency to reify societies as independent social agents, the use of too vague a definition of identity, as well as a claim that individuals have a psychological need to achieve societal security by protecting their group boundaries.[21] Belarusian society cannot be considered as an independent social actor with a certain stable identity. Research on solidarity potential in Belarusian society demonstrates that the existing structure of social identifications, the level and character of mutual trust, the contents of communication, the perception of significant axiological objects, and strategies of the Belarusian population's communicative behaviour and civic participation do not spur on the formation of stable bases for solidary actions of a public political character. In the structure of social identifications of Belarusian society, the biggest group is one's belonging to a group of family and friends (77% of the population), i.e. a close circle, the private sphere of life. And it is difficult to count on wide and stable solidarisation of a public-political character, which presupposes the presence of a stronger identification with abstract (public) notions such as the nation, citizenship, and ideological and political groups.[22] On the other hand, the state still plays the dominant role in all spheres of the society, where the national identity is substituted by the state ideology with focus on the protection of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, constitutional order and the socioeconomic model of Belarus. Therefore, there is still a great question whether the Belarusian society is able to survive without preservation of the sovereign and independent Belarusian state, which actually forms and constructs the contemporary Belarusian nation and its identity. But the state ideology and national security concept have a clear answer on this question of what should be protected first.

In the face of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and geopolitical tension between Russia and the West, Belarusian authorities have implemented several measures, in order to improve the military (hard) security of the state. At the end of 2014, a new defence plan and a special directive

on defence of the state were signed by Alexander Lukashenko, and in 2016, a new military doctrine was adopted. The threat perception has changed dramatically, as it now takes into consideration possible security threats and challenges coming both from the west and the east. Even hybrid warfare is perceived in terms of internal armed conflict, which is provoked by foreign states with large-scale use of military force, including both traditional and guerilla (partisan or terrorist) tactics, where the use of information-psychological and other tools play a supportive role.[23]

This regional security crisis has far-reaching consequences for contractual relations between the state and society. Today, Alexander Lukashenko is proposing a new type of social contract for Belarusian society – the so-called security contract guaranteeing peace and political-military stability (absence of war), but significantly slashing the so-called social package against a background of security crisis in the region and evident crisis of the so-called Belarusian socioeconomic model. However, there is still a great question about the substance of the new social security contract.

Minsk's most significant progress has been in foreign policy, which has deep roots in the state ideology, presenting Belarus as an island of stability. This narrative is projected on the foreign policy and positioning of Belarus on the international arena as "neutral Switzerland" and a regional security and stability provider, especially in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and a new Cold War. Thus, Alexander Lukashenko is trying to preserve the status of Belarus as a regional security and stability provider, keeping a distance from Russia and reaping economic and political dividends from the EU, US, China, international organisations (OSCE, UN) and financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, European Bank on Reconstruction and Development, etc.). It seems that this strategy has reaped some results already, as the normalisation process with the west is continuing and China is paying more strategic attention to Belarus as a key element of the One Belt One Road initiative in eastern Europe. However, foreign policy progress does not help the authorities effectively address the main challenge – the degradation of the Belarusian socioeconomic model.

The lack of political will to introduce reforms alongside the wait-and-see attitude that replaces a strategic plan to develop the national economy is aggravating this challenge, provoking great tension within Belarusian society. In the face of current geopolitical turbulence provoked by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and confrontation between Russia and the west, which can be examined as an existential threat to Belarus due to its geopolitical, economic and security implications, Belarusian authorities focus mainly on improving military and political security, rather than developing a comprehensive resilience strategy. In contrast to resilience or sustainability, the concept of stability runs through the Belarusian state ideology and conservative trends prevail in other spheres (economy, social, information, etc.). Therefore, the system that ensures stability within the Belarusian state and securitises all spheres of life of the Belarusian society can be called total security.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY: THE RUSSIAN DISCOURSE[1]

ALEXANDER SERGUNIN

The concept of societal security is relatively new for the Russian political discourse and is still not embedded in Russian security thinking and national security policies. There is no adequate translation of the term "societal security" into the Russian language. Some scholars translate it as *obshestvennaya bezopasnost* (social/public security). Others prefer to interpret it as *bezopasnost obshestva* (security of the society), which is closer to the original societal security concept coined by the Copenhagen International Relations School. According to this tradition, societal security is about the survival of a community as a cohesive unit. Societal insecurities arise when "a society fears it would not be able to live as itself."[2]

The post-Copenhagen school approaches that try to interlink the notion of societal security with the concepts of human security, sustainability and resilience are slowly gaining momentum in the Russian political discourse and are still not very popular in the academic community or among decision-makers.

This chapter aims to examine how the societal security concept is perceived by both governmental actors and different Russian foreign policy schools. Moreover, the main stakeholders and sources of expertise on societal security will be studied. Interaction between governmental and non-state stakeholders, as well as the impact of the non-state actors on governmental policies, will be discussed.

THE RUSSIAN DISCOURSE ON SOCIETAL SECURITY

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

Russia's official national security documents do not contain the concept of societal security as such but address the related – "soft" security – problems. For example, "The Law on Security of the Russian Federation" (1992) tried to define the very notion of security: *Security is freedom from internal and external threats to the vital interests of the individual, society and state.*"[3] In line with the western political thought, the authors of the document singled out not only state and military security, but also the economic, social, information, and ecological aspects of security. Contrary to the Soviet legislation, which had focused on state or party interests, this document stated – at least at declarative level – the priority of interests of the individual and society. It also established a national security system of the newly born Russian Federation. Along with already existing bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Security (later Federal Security Service), Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Environment, the Law recommended setting up a Security Council, Ministry of Defence, and several committees, including the Border Guards Committee, and so on.

However, this document was too abstract and vague to design a coherent national security strategy. It took several years to develop a special national security doctrine based on a complex approach to security, including its societal dimensions.

The first Russian national security concept of 1997, asserted that Russia faced no immediate danger of large-scale aggression, and that, because the country was beset with a myriad of debilitating domestic problems, the greatest threat to Russia's security was now an internal one.[4]

This was a distinct departure from previous doctrines. For example, the military doctrine of 1993 was based on the assumption that the main threat to Russia's security was posed by external factors, such as, local conflicts or territorial claims of foreign countries.

The concept clearly suggested that the current, relatively benign, international climate afforded Russia the opportunity to direct resources away from the defence sector and towards the rebuilding of the Russian economy.[5] In general, it placed this rebuilding effort in the context of continued democratisation and marketisation. In particular, the document focused on the dangers posed by Russia's *economic* woes, which were described frankly and at length. The concept highlighted a number of major threats to economic security, such as, a substantial drop of production and investments; destruction of the scientific and technical potential; disarray in the financial and monetary systems; shrinkage of the federal revenues; growing national debt; Russia's overdependence on export of raw materials and import of equipment, consumer goods and foodstuff; "brain drain", and uncontrolled flight of capital.

The document also pointed to internal *social, political, ethnic* and *cultural* tensions that threatened to undermine both the viability and the territorial integrity of the Russian state. Among these it singled out social polarisation, demographic problems (in particular, decline in birth rates, average life expectancy, and population), corruption, organised crime, drug trade, terrorism, virulent nationalism, separatism, deterioration of the health system, ecological catastrophes, and disintegration of the "common spiritual space."

The new national security concept adopted by Vladimir Putin, after his coming to power in 2000, in principle retained the focus on internal threats to Russia's national security, although some external threats such as NATO's eastward enlargement and its aggressive behaviour on the Balkans were also identified. The concept-2000 linked the internal threat of terrorism and separatism (clearly with Chechnya in mind) to external threats: it argued that international terrorism involved efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, with a possibility of direct military aggression. However, in dealing with these threats the document called for international cooperation.[6]

The novelty of the national security strategy (NSS) adopted by President Dmitry Medvedev, in 2009, was its introduction of the system of indicators to characterise the state of affairs in the field of national

security. This system of indicators included the following parameters: (a) the level of unemployment; (b) the decile coefficient;[7] (c) consumer price increase rates; (d) external and national debt as a percentage in the GDP (%); (e) governmental spending on health care, culture, education and research as a percentage in the GDP; (f) rates of annual modernisation of weapons, as well as military and special equipment; (g) supply rates for the country's demand for military and engineering personnel.[8]

Although these indicators were incomplete, the very idea of using them to monitor the national security system was innovative and relevant. The NSS anticipated the possibility of regular renovation of the indicator system.

On December 31st, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new NSS. The doctrine paid a great attention to the internal aspects of Russia's security. In particular, security threats such as terrorism, radical nationalism and religious fanaticism, separatism, organised crime and corruption were identified.

To mitigate the above risks, Russia will seek economic growth, development of the country's scientific-technical potential, "the preservation and augmentation of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as the foundation of Russian society, and its education of children and young people in a civil spirit."[9] This includes "the creating of a system of spiritual-moral and patriotic education of citizens."

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY SCHOOLS

Russian schools significantly differ from each other by their perceptions/ approaches to societal security.

The Russian neorealist school hardly acknowledges the very concept of societal security, preferring to use a relatively traditional notion of social/public security. This school tends to interpret social/public security as a component/level of national security which consists of individual, social, and state security. The neorealists identify the following threats to social/public security: socio-economic disparities/

inequalities, poverty, low living standards, poor social security system, street violence and crime, corruption, alcoholism and drug addiction, inefficient health care system, environment degradation, political, ethnic and religious extremism, separatism, threats to information security, cultural integrity and traditional moral and family values, etc.[10] As mentioned above, these concerns have been reflected in the Russian national security documents since the 1990s because they were developed under the influence of the dominant neorealist school.

The Russian neoliberalism movement has several sub-schools as regards understanding of the societal security concept. One interpretation is based on the assumption that societal security is indebted to the human rights tradition (the ideas of natural law and natural rights). This approach uses the individual as the main referent and argues that a wide range of issues (i.e. civil rights, cultural identity, access to education and healthcare) are fundamental to human dignity. The liberals argue that the goal of societal security should be to build upon and strengthen the existing global human rights legal framework.[11] This sub-school focuses on ethnic, religious, cultural and sexual minority rights, believing that, in a healthy society, minorities should be protected and be able to fully express themselves. The neoliberals heavily criticise the Russian government for its inability to effectively implement this concept. They also believe that the best safeguard against societal challenges and threats are a well-developed civil society and its institutions, which are currently lacking in present-day Russia.

Another branch of Russian neoliberalism views societal security as a synonym of community security. According to this sub-school, societal security means societal resilience, namely securing the key elements of a society - economic equality, reflexive cultural traditions and social justice – through robust civic engagement. The community's security agenda also includes, migration, migrants' integration into society, multiculturalism, minority rights, social cohesion. This version of neoliberalism pays much attention to the security of the Russian ethnic communities in the Baltic States.[12] On the other hand, this sub-school examines how resilient the ethnic minorities are in Russia's north-west, such as the Ingrian Finns[13] or Setu.[14]

Another neoliberal sub-school prefers a broader vision of societal security, trying to equalise it with the human security concept proposed by the UN.[15] They accept the UN Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report's definition of human security which includes seven components: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and, political security.[16]

According to this sub-school, the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has unique features, which are formed around its natural environment – the environment that is distinct from that of the other region. The neoliberals believe that the entire BSR community shares some identical norms and values, which provide them with the incentive for a cohesive society.[17] The society is however, affected both positively and negatively due to the ongoing and rapid changes, mainly resulting from the geopolitical, geoeconomic and ecological dynamics in the region and its neighbourhood. While some of the changes bring new opportunities for the BSR, the others adversely affect the community as socio-environmental factors and cultural integrity forming the society is threatened.

According to this sub-school, societal challenges are widespread and cross-cutting, are shared to different extents by the entire population of the region across the borders that separate them in the states of the BSR. This situation therefore calls for a regional assessment of the specific and diverse needs and aspirations of the population beyond those of its respective governments.

The Russian globalist school challenges both the 'narrow' understanding of societal security as public security, suggested by the neorealists and the neoliberal legalist and human rights approaches. At the same time, the globalists agree with those neoliberal currents that prefer a broader understanding of societal security, particularly as human security.

On the other hand, this school tends to interpret societal security as an analogy of the sustainable development concept.[18] They argue that economic growth is insufficient to expand people's choice or capabilities; areas such as health, education, technology, the environment, and

employment should not be neglected. On the other hand, the lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth, and therefore development. The globalists underline that imbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities is an important source of conflict. Therefore, vicious cycles of a lack of development which leads to conflict, and subsequently to a lack of development, can easily emerge. Likewise, virtuous cycles are possible, with high levels of security leading to development, which further promotes security in return.

However, over the last decade the so-called integrated approach to the sustainable development principles and strategies gained momentum in the Russian academic community.[19] According to such an integrated approach, sustainable development is conceptually broken into three constituent parts: environmental, economic and social.

As far as Moscow's sustainable development strategy in the BSR is concerned, the Russian experts identify the following dimensions:

- *Economic* dimension of sustainable development includes: sustainable economic activity and increasing prosperity of the BSR communities; sustainable use of natural, including living, resources; development of transport infrastructures (including aviation, marine and surface transport), information technologies and modern telecommunications;
- *Environmental* dimension has the following priorities: monitoring and assessment of the state of the environment in the BSR: prevention and elimination of environmental pollution in the region; the Baltic Sea marine environment protection; biodiversity conservation in the BSR; climate change impact assessment in the region; prevention and elimination of ecological emergencies in the BSR, including those relating to climate change;
- *Social* dimension includes: health of the people living and working in the BSR; education and cultural heritage; prosperity and capacity-building for children and the youth; gender equality; enhancing well-being, eradication of poverty among BSR people.[20]

The Russian post-positivist school does not suggest a unified approach to societal security. For example, post-modernism, the most

radical sub-school of post-positivism, heavily criticised the "positivist" security concepts, but did not develop any security concept of its own.[21]

Russian social constructivism, another post-positivist sub-school, prefers to interpret societal security through the identity concept. In line with the Copenhagen IR school, the Russian constructivists believe that state security confronts societal security: "state security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has identity".[22] According to this sub-school, societal security, which is socially constructed, can only be ensured if actors' identities are formed in a non-confrontational way.[23] Otherwise, multiple identities clash with each other and do not favour a desirable level of societal security.

The constructivists call for a paradigmatic change of the Russian BSR discourse: instead of perceiving the region as something marginal, hostile and a source of security threats, the Russian state and society should see the BSR as a region with a great cooperative potential.[24] According to the Russian constructivists, the BSR should have a more positive and attractive image and be associated with the ideas of growth, prosperity and innovation. Moreover, Moscow should perceive the BSR as a region of peace and stability, where different identities can be reconciled and harmonised. At the same time, the constructivists continue to monitor some negative processes and factors that still generate imperialistic and nationalistic sentiments within the Russian society and elites, and impede international cooperation in the BSR.[25]

To conclude the discussion on the Russian societal security debate, it should be noted that there are serious problems with embedding the societal security concept in the Russian political discourse. These problems boil down to the following:

- The Russian national security thinking is of a hierarchical nature: as mentioned above, individual, social and state/national security levels are identified where state security – in reality, not at declarative level - is still the most important;
- The Russian society is not an independent social actor. Civil society is still in an embryonic phase and for this reason, neither the society nor an individual can be real referent objects of security;

- The concept of identity is too vague for most of the Russian foreign policy schools and - except the post-positivists - they are not ready to interpret societal security through the prism of this category;
- Societal security does not necessarily matter to individuals whose personal security is much more important;
- Since anti-globalism and inward-looking sentiments are relatively strong in Russia, the resistance, rather than resilience, type of social/community psychology prevails in the country;
- The post-sovereign type of mentality and politics are still unpopular in Russia. Since both common people and the elites believe that Russia operates in a rather unfriendly or even hostile international environment, the theme of national sovereignty, which is closely related to state rather than societal security, is very important in the Russian political discourse.

MAIN STAKEHOLDERS

Normally, in a democratic society, the policy-making process involves two types of actors—governmental (the presidency, numerous executive agencies, parliament, regional and local governments, etc.) and non-governmental (interest groups/lobbies, political parties and associations, religious organisations, think tanks and mass media). However, given the transitional nature of the Russian society and political system, Russia's BSR policy-making has its peculiarities. For example, due to the strategic importance of the BSR for Moscow, the region where Russia has to interact with (sometimes confront) the EU and NATO, Russia's Baltic policy-making is a highly centralised process. Although the sub-national and non-state actors obtained some roles in shaping Moscow's Baltic policies in the post-Soviet era, the centre of the decision-making system firmly remains in the Kremlin and the executive agencies.

Several federal ministries and agencies are responsible for the socio-economic, environmental and cultural policies in the Russian north-west (RNW) and BSR.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Protection is responsible for a wide range of issues, such as regulation of labour relations, social security, demographic processes, retired and disabled people, integration of labour migrants, etc. The Ministry of Healthcare is in charge of providing medical services for the Russian population.

The Ministry of Economic Development is in charge of mid-term and long-term planning and implementation of macro- and mezo-economic strategies in the region. The Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for the implementation of industrial projects in the RNW and BSR. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) oversees the oil, gas and mining industries as well as monitoring the ecological situation in the region. The Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs deals, among other things, with ethnic minorities in the RNW.

The Ministry of Transport (MT) – through its various subordinate units – controls the navigation on the Baltic Sea, including maritime safety and environmental aspects. The same ministry – through the Department of State Policy on Maritime and River Transport and Russian Maritime Register of Shipping – is the main governmental body charged with the implementation of various International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) regulations concerning commercial shipping in the BSR. The Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring and the State Space Corporation are responsible for providing the governmental organs and ships with meteorological forecasts and information on icy conditions (in the winter season) in the Baltic Sea water area. The Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters is responsible for search and rescue operations and oil spill prevention and response in the BSR – both on the land and at sea.

A number of government agencies such as the Defence Ministry, Ministry of Interior and Federal Security Service (including the Border Guard Service and Coast Guard) are charged with providing the RNW with internal and external security.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) represents Russia in its international relations, including bilateral diplomatic contacts with the BSR states, negotiations on the regional issues and activities in

the framework of various regional and global organisations and fora, such as the UN, IMO, Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Helsinki Commission, Nordic political and financial institutions, etc. Other ministries and agencies are also regularly involved in Arctic policies. For example, the MT, together with the MFA, conducted negotiations with the IMO on the navigation rules in the BSR. The Russian Coast Guard cooperates with the similar services of other Baltic Sea coastal states. The Ministry of Education and Science is responsible for academic and research cooperation with the BSR countries in the bilateral and multilateral formats, including the implementation of the Nordic-Russian Cooperation Programmes in Higher Education and Research.

In 2000, President Putin established several federal districts headed by presidential envoys. The north-western federal district (NWFD) comprises 11 members of the Russian Federation, including those in the BSR, and it has a capital in St. Petersburg. In November 2011, the Russian government approved the Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development of the NWFD up to 2020. The document identified a number of societal threats and challenges: negative demographic processes (depopulation of the region); the lack of a skilled labour force; problems with integration into the local society of foreign labour migrants; the need to make the district attractive for investors and young people; disparities between various NWFD regions in terms of living standards and the level of socio-economic development; underdeveloped healthcare system, as well as transport and energy infrastructures in some districts' regions, etc.[26]

The plethora of actors creates a problem of coordination of the above governmental agencies and establishment of a proper division of labour between them. Russia's Security Council, a collective body composed of the heads of ministries and agencies dealing with various aspects of national security and chaired by the President, serves as the top coordinating body for Moscow's societal security policies. According to the Russian legislation, the council determines the foundations of Russia's domestic and foreign policies; identifies the country's vital interests, as well as internal and external threats to its security; supervises the country's military, economic, social and information

security; makes recommendations to the President on the issues of external and internal policies, and drafts presidential decrees on national security matters. All strategic documents related to the RNW and BSR were discussed and revised by the council before they were signed by the President.

Some political analysts believe that the Presidential Administration, rather than the Security Council, is the real maker and coordinator of Russia's Baltic policies.[27] This body collects information for the President, drafts presidential documents and legislative initiatives, nominates candidates for the key governmental positions, plans the President's schedule, as well as his domestic and foreign trips, etc. Unsurprisingly, many of these functions overlap with those of the Security Council and make the latter a nominal player which simply approves what the Presidential Administration suggests.

To sum up, the problem of coordination of executive agencies' BSR policies has not been solved so far. Even under Putin (famous for his centralist spirit), there is still some unhealthy competition and tension between various governmental institutions responsible for the RNW/BSR. Russia still lacks a single (governmental) voice in Baltic affairs and Moscow's international partners are sometimes unsure of whom to listen to and contact.

The Russian Parliament (Federal Assembly) is another player in the federal political arena. In well-developed democracies, the legislature is a crucial and integral part of the policy decision-making process. However, in the case of Russia the situation is still different. It should be noted that, with the adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993, the President became a key figure in policy-making. The bicameral legislature has relatively limited powers in the fields of both domestic and foreign policies.

On the other hand, the Federal Assembly is able to influence the executive in some ways. It has some voice in the budgeting process and may cut or increase appropriations for particular executive agencies. The President needs the legislature's approval of his top-rank and ambassadorial appointees. The lower house, the State Duma, and the upper one, the Council of the Federation, ratify and denounce international

treaties. Parliament also drafts legislation related to domestic and foreign policies.[28] However, its power over legislation is less effective because of the extensive use of executive decrees, and the President's rights of veto.

The legislature can also adopt non-binding resolutions which have limited impact on the executive, but cannot be fully ignored by the President and the government. The legislature may undertake investigations. The Council of the Federation exercises the sole parliamentary say on the sending of armed forces abroad and changing external and internal borders. Legislators can also appeal to public opinion to block some executive's initiatives. Finally, the Federal Assembly develops cooperation with foreign parliaments and parliamentary assemblies of international organisations (CBSS, CIS, Council of Europe, European Parliament, NATO, OSCE, etc.).

However, neither of these prerogatives affords parliament much leverage over policy. The Russian parliament's powers and impact on foreign policy cannot be compared to those of, say, the U.S. Congress.

As far as the sub-national level of government actors is concerned it is represented by the *members of the Russian Federation (regions) and municipalities*. Prior to the early 1990s (when the Soviet model of federalism was a camouflage for unitarianism), the Russian regions and cities almost had no say in policy-making. However, with the rebirth of the Russian federative system many sub-national units became rather active, both in domestic and foreign policies, including the Baltic affairs.

The RNW sub-national units try to develop a sort of societal security strategy of their own. The environmental aspect of the RNW regions and municipalities' societal security strategies has the following priorities:

First and foremost, today the RNW sub-national units focus on the prevention and reduction of pollution, rather than on cleaning up the environmental mess, as was previously the case. Such an approach is seen as a more efficient and forward-looking strategy than elimination of the accumulated ecological damage.

One more priority is rehabilitation of damaged natural environmental systems (damage assessment, targeting the priority areas, clean-up programmes, monitoring).

Solid and liquid waste treatment is seen by the RNW regions and municipalities as a serious problem which requires urgent solutions. For this reason, some sub-national units included construction of waste treatment plants or safe storages to their development plans.

Some units adopted targeted programmes to protect endangered species. Some RNW regions and urban centres aspire to develop monitoring systems in various areas to prevent natural and man-made disasters, air and water pollution, endangered species, etc.

The RNW regional and local governments pay little attention to the purely human security problems, preferring to focus on the economic and environmental issues. The "human dimension" of the societal security strategies is mostly represented by the regional and municipal programmes on civil defence to protect the local population from natural and man-made catastrophes.

Almost all sub-national units' development plans mention the need for international cooperation, including the venues such as, the CBSS, Helsinki Commission, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UNDEP and UNESCO programmes, country-to-country, region-to-region, town-to-town collaboration, etc.

International cooperation became an important instrument of the societal security strategies of the RNW sub-national units. This phenomenon acquired the name of para-diplomacy. The concept of para-diplomacy is used to distinguish international activities of sub-national and non-state actors that have limited capabilities and legal powers in the foreign policy sphere, as compared to national governments.

RNW actors regard this type of external policy as an adequate and preferable response to the numerous challenges that they face in their day-to-day life. It is viewed by many regions and municipalities, not only as an efficient instrument for solving local problems, but also for ensuring their sustainable development.

RNW actors have managed to develop an arsenal of specific methods of para-diplomacy that fall into two categories – direct (seeking legitimacy and international recognition *via* the adoption of local laws, signing partnership agreements, establishing representative offices abroad, attracting foreign investment, improving a city's international

image, cooperating with international organisations, city twinning, participating in Euroregions) and indirect (influencing federal legislation, exploiting the national parliament, capitalising on federal diplomacy and infrastructure in the regions, exploiting international organisations). A combination of direct and indirect strategies offers the best guarantee of para-diplomacy's success.[29]

RNW sub-national units have managed – with and without Moscow's help – to exploit an institutional network shaped by supranational, intergovernmental, and sub-national agencies and made it available to the BSR. This comparatively dense network needs better coordination, organisation, and division of labour to eliminate bottlenecks, bureaucratic procedures, parallelisms, and duplications.

The sub-state (non-governmental) level of policy-making is usually represented in the democratic society by political parties, interest groups and NGOs. However, civil society in Russia is still in embryonic form and for this reason its impact on RNW/BSR policy-making is either relatively insignificant or sporadic/chaotic. The peculiarity of Baltic politics is that Russia's political parties and business community have relatively little interest in the BSR (as compared to other regional dimensions of Moscow's foreign policies) and keep a rather low profile in this sphere. Some sectors of the energy, fishery and transport industries are the rare exceptions of the rule, being occasionally involved in power struggles around Baltic politics.

The Russian energy lobby, the most powerful player among the various interest groups, is rather passive in Baltic policy-making for at least two reasons: First, since this region has no large oil and gas deposits, the BSR represents the interest for the energy lobby only as a transit point. Second, given the unfriendly environment for the Russian oil and gas transit projects in the BSR, the energy lobby relies on the Kremlin's support in promoting its interests in the region. The Russian government and energy companies (most of them are in fact state-owned) are successfully developing some public-private partnerships, such as the Nordstream, Baltic Pipeline System, Lukoil terminal near Vyborg, etc.

The shipbuilding lobby represented by the St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad and Vyborg shipyards regularly puts pressure on the

Russian government to encourage it to modernise the Baltic and Northern fleets, as well as the Russian commercial fleet. Given the degradation of the Russian navy in the post-Soviet period and the IMO regulations concerning the ban on heavy fuel in the Baltic Sea, and the need to refit the commercial fleet in accordance with the Polar Code (entered in force in 2017), the shipbuilding industry hopes that it will be provided with both state and private orders for the foreseeable future.

The environmentalists are the most influential and politically active segment of the Russian civil society. The environmental movement has rapidly spread in post-Soviet Russia and for a while became quite influential in Baltic politics. Indeed, a great number of post-*perestroika* leaders started their political careers as environmentalists. The Russian 'greens', for example, succeeded in promoting Academician Alexei Yablokov to the post of State Counsellor of the Russian Federation on Ecology and Health Care, thus becoming their major voice in the government.

The environmentalist NGOs were indispensable in identifying major ecological problems of the RNW and BSR as well as in encouraging Russian local, regional and federal governments to cooperate with neighbouring states and international organisations — UN Environment Programme, Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (remains to date one of the most efficient EU-Russian cooperative programmes), CBSS, Helsinki Commission and Nordic institutions.

SOURCES OF REGIONAL EXPERTISE ON SOCIETAL SECURITY AND THE IMPACT OF THE EXPERT COMMUNITY ON GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES

Since the Russian civil society is still in an embryonic phase, including its expert sector, very few RNW NGOs serve as a source of societal security expertise for the governmental actors.

Perhaps the most influential expert-type NGO is represented by the Strategic Partnership "North-West" (SPNW), which was established

in 2012 to replace the Association of Economic Cooperation of the North-Western Members of the Russian Federation (created in 1992). The SPNW was established by the 11 members of the Russian Federation which form the NWFD. Its steering committee is headed by the presidential envoy in the NWFD. The SPNW represents a unique platform for interaction between the governmental structures, business and expert communities. The Partnership (then Association) was responsible for the development of the NWFD Strategy for Socio-Economic Development up to 2020 (2011), and its update in 2016.[30]

The SPNW initiated a series of expert seminars to harmonise/synchronise the NWFD Strategy-2020 with the EU Strategy for the BSR (2009). On the Russian side, this initiative was patronised by the Ministry of Regional Development (then by the Ministry of Economic Development after the dismissal of the MRD) and MFA. Unfortunately, this rather fruitful dialogue between the European and Russian experts was interrupted with the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, and resumed only in May 2017. As a result of growing tensions between EU/NATO and Russia in the BSR, in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, the SPNW lost its interest in the region to some extent and turned its attention to other – more promising – regions, such as Nordic Europe and especially the Arctic. In particular, the SPNW drafted the Russian Arctic strategy of 2013 and participated in drafting the Law on the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, which is now pending before the Federal Assembly.

The Centre for International and Regional Policy is another authoritative source of expertise on international aspects of societal security. The CIRP was founded in St. Petersburg in 2001, to foster cooperation with governmental and non-governmental partners, as well as with international organisations from the BSR. The Centre not only produces expertise for the Russian and foreign state actors and NGOs, but also pays great attention to youth programmes, such as short-term training courses, summer and winter schools for students, young researchers and political activists from Russia and the BSR countries.[31]

The Association for Cooperation with the BSR Countries – "Norden" – (established in 1996), aims to develop civil society institutions in the

NWFD and promote network-type cooperation with NGOs from the BSR countries. Its most important priorities include culture, ecology, social protection, gender equality, civil society's development, etc.[32]

The public policy centre "Strategy", which was established by a group of liberal-minded deputies from the St. Petersburg legislature in 1993, aims at developing civil society institutions, not only in the NWFD but also throughout the whole post-Soviet geopolitical space (CIS member-states). In particular, promotion of the ombudsman's institute at regional and national levels in Russia and the CIS countries is one of the most important priorities of the Centre. Anti-corruption activities (including projects on making regional and municipal budgets transparent) are one more priority for "Strategy". This NGO assisted various NWFD regional and municipal governments in developing transparent budgets and establishing monitoring systems to prevent corruption activities. It should be also noted that in 2002–2004, this NGO executed an ambitious international project on soft security in the BSR that resulted not only in publications[33] but also in establishing a regional NGO network.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fact that the societal security concept is almost missing in Russia's official documents and academic/expert discourse, the societal security problems – in various forms – is gradually gaining momentum, both at the level of practical policies and among scholars. The interpretation of the concept by different Russian schools ranges from the narrow one (communal security) to the maximally broad understanding (human security, sustainable development). This is natural for a polity in transition, where civil society is not mature enough, where a state-centric approach to national security still prevails and where the individual and society still cannot be referent objects for security.

On the other hand, a governmental mechanism responsible both for decision-making/planning and implementation of societal security policies is emerging in Russia. This is characteristic for various levels of

the state apparatus – federal, regional and municipal ones. Although most of the societal security strategies are lacking an integrated/systemic approach, and tend to focus on either economic or environmental issues, the positive dynamics and slow progress in promoting a societal security agenda in Russia can be identified.

One more sign of progress is the emergence of an NGO network (at least in the NWFD) that can be a source of expertise on societal security for the governmental bodies. Although the governmental structures do not always listen to independent/NGO experts, a sort of (irregular) dialogue is gradually taking place in the NWFD and some success stories can be identified (see the previous section). This positive experience should be further developed and replicated in other areas of interaction between the government and expert community.

ENDNOTES

[1] This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (grant number 16-18-10315)

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[7] The decile coefficient (DC) is a correlation between the incomes of 10% of the wealthiest and 10% of the poorest population. This coefficient reflects the level of income disparity and social differentiation. The DC varies from 5 to 15. Experts believe that if the country's DC is more than 10, there are grounds for social instability and even an uprising. According to the Russian Committee on Statistics, the Russian DC for 2010 was 14 (http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/urov_32kv.htm)

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SOCIETAL SECURITY: CONVERGENCE AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

BORIS KUZNETSOV

The country-chapters in this volume are about different interpretations of the societal security concept by the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) states. They focus on the soft security national agendas and pay little (or no) attention to the common BSR societal security problematique. This is explained mostly by the post-socialist countries' obsession with protection of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, interests, identity, cultures, and so on. Only the Nordic countries – being especially interested in the BSR region-building – attempted to push societal security-related issues onto the regional agenda (for instance, in the chapters by Stokholm Banke and Hjortshø; Morsut; Ómarsdóttir; Syk and Rådestad) However, even they moved to a more traditional/hard security agenda in the aftermath of the Georgian and especially Ukrainian crises.

On the other hand, however, some authors point out that certain international relations (IR) schools (for example, the neoliberals) tend to believe that the BSR has unique features, which are formed around its natural environment – an environment that is distinct from that of other regions. The neoliberals believe that the whole of the BSR community shares some identical norms and values which provide them with incentives for a cohesive society. The society is however, affected both positively and negatively due to the ongoing and rapid changes, mainly resulting from the geopolitical, geoeconomic and ecological dynamics in the region and its neighbourhood. While some of the changes bring new opportunities for the BSR, the others adversely affect the community, as socio-environmental factors and cultural integrity forming the society is threatened.

According to the neoliberals, societal challenges are widespread and cross-cutting, and are shared to varying extents by the entire population of the region across the borders that separate them in the states of the BSR. This situation therefore calls for a regional assessment of the specific and diverse needs and aspirations of the population beyond those of its respective governments.

This chapter examines the BSR common societal security agenda that makes the region a single (and at the same time quite diverse) community. There are two groups of drivers – internal and external – that run the regional societal security dynamics.

COMMON SOCIETAL SECURITY DOMESTIC AGENDA

As many authors rightly state, there are several societal security threats and challenges of domestic origins. For example, Juurvee, Kowalska, Potjomkina and Vizgunova, Sergunin, Sivitski and Vitkus identify several categories of the soft security problems which the post-Communist countries have to face domestically:

- *Social security.* Internal sources of threats include, sharp social stratification and high differentiation of the income level of the population; inadequate motivation of employees for effective work and economic activities, the spread of moods of social dependency; unjustified imbalances in the sphere of wages and pensions; professional and qualitative and territorial imbalance of labour supply and demand and low internal labour mobility of the population. Also, they mention such sources as significant differences in the quality of life of urban and rural populations, residents of large, medium and small cities; a decrease in workforce; a lack of reasonable and high-quality housing, ongoing housing problems of citizens; insufficient organisational and technological levels of development of the social sphere. Societal problems also include things such as an inferior quality of education in a number of promising areas compared to the level of the world's best educational centres, and an insufficient number of modern, highly

qualified specialists. An increase in the epidemic incidence and in the number of people suffering from socially dangerous diseases, as well as an increase in the number of people with disabilities are also recognised as internal sources of threats;

- *Physical instability.* The main threats are represented by the growth of national and transnational organised crime, street violence, criminal and other unlawful attacks against persons and property, cases of corruption, etc.;
- *Political instability.* Manifestations of socio-political, religious, ethnic extremism and racial hostility in the BSR countries, human rights violations and attacks on basic socioeconomic and political freedoms in the region;
- *Demographic instability.* The main threats are represented by the migratory processes, the growth of unregulated immigration to the country; disturbance of the sustainability of the social protection system; growth of unemployment, including unreported and concealed; depopulation, general ageing of the nation, a decline in the birth rate, deterioration of other basic indicators of demography and the health of the nation;
- *Environmental degradation.* The main threats are represented by degradation of land, forests and natural complexes, depletion of mineral and raw materials, water and biological resources; radioactive, chemical and biological pollution of soil, land, water, vegetation and the atmosphere;
- *Information/cyber security.* The main threats in this area include, the effect of destructive information on the individual, society and state institutions, which harms national interests; dysfunction of critical information objects; insufficient scale and level of introduction of advanced information and communication technologies; reduction or loss of competitiveness of domestic information and communication technologies, information resources and national content; loss or disclosure of information considered as state secrets protected by law and capable of causing damage to national security;
- *Spiritual/moral instability.* A loss by a significant part of the BSR citizens of traditional moral values and landmarks, attempts to

destroy national spiritual and moral traditions and a biased revision of history, affecting these values and traditions.

The proposed remedies appear the same in various post-socialist BSR countries: economic growth; economic, social and institutional modernisation; rule of law; administrative and legal reforms; anti-corruption measures; social cohesion programmes; investment to human capital; radical reform of the educational systems and so on.

As shown in the chapters authored by Stokholm Banke and Hjortshø; Morsut; Ómarsdóttir; Syk and Rådestad, the Nordic countries are concerned with a different set of societal security threats and challenges – large-scale migration, gender inequalities, social inclusion/exclusion debate, climate change mitigation strategies, information security and hybrid threats. However, these countries are ready to help the post-socialist nations, either in bilateral or multilateral formats.

BALTIC SEA REGION SOCIETAL SECURITY AGENDA

As Sergunin notes, some IR schools call for a paradigmatic change of the BSR discourse on the future of the region: instead of perceiving this area as something marginal, hostile and a source of security threats, both theorists and practitioners should see the BSR as a region with a great cooperative potential and, as such, should get a more positive and attractive image and be associated with the ideas of growth, prosperity and innovation. Moreover, all the regional players should perceive the BSR as a region of peace and stability, where different identities can be reconciled and harmonised. At the same time, the negative processes and factors that still generate imperialistic and nationalistic sentiments within the regional societies and elites and impede international cooperation in the BSR should be identified, monitored and prevented in a timely manner.

Stokholm Banke and Hjortshø, Juurvee, Morsut, Ómarsdóttir, Syk and Rådestad, Potjomkina and Vizgunova, Sivitski and Vitkus have almost the same list of soft security threats to the BSR: uneven regional development, social inequality, poverty, poorly adapted segments of

society or manifestations of intolerance, large-scale migration, climate change, natural and man-made catastrophes, trans-border organised crime and cybercrime, international terrorism, so-called hybrid threats, etc.

Some chapter authors believe that the interpretation of the societal security concept as a sustainable development strategy could be helpful. They suggest the following description for the BSR soft security agenda:

Economic dimension of sustainable development includes: sustainable economic activity and increasing prosperity of the BSR communities; sustainable use of natural, including living, resources; development of transport infrastructure (including aviation, marine and surface transport), information technologies and modern telecommunications.

Environmental dimension of sustainability has the following priorities: monitoring and assessment of the state of the environment in the BSR: prevention and elimination of environmental pollution in the region; the Baltic Sea marine environment protection; biodiversity conservation in the BSR; climate change impact assessment in the region; prevention and elimination of ecological emergencies in the BSR, including those relating to climate change.

Social dimension of sustainable development strategy includes: health of the people living and working in the BSR; education and cultural heritage; prosperity and capacity-building for children and the youth; gender equality; enhancing well-being, eradication of poverty among BSR inhabitants.

It should be noted that, despite the growing tensions between Russia and the rest of the BSR countries in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, these nations have been able to build proper strategies and institutional mechanisms to cope with the societal security threats in the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). For example, to implement the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the CBSS has developed the Baltic 2030 Action Plan (June 2017)[1] which offers a framework to support macro-regional, national, and sub-regional implementation of the sustainable development strategy for the BSR. The Baltic 2030 Action plan includes six priority focus areas, representing

a practical way to address the complexity of the 2030 Agenda in the BSR. The Focus Areas are deeply interconnected and reflect the holistic approach to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs):

- Partnerships for sustainable development

Macro-regional, multi-stakeholder, inclusive partnerships are at the core of the Baltic 2030 Action Plan. According to this document, all stakeholders shall take responsibility for increasing regional cooperation and achieving sustainable development. Existing and new partnerships in the BSR should focus on exchange of knowledge and development of innovative, concrete and practical solutions to common challenges.

- Transition to a sustainable economy

Transnational cooperation is crucial for successful transition to a sustainable economy. This focus area includes several inter-connected challenges: to increase energy efficiency and provide affordable clean energy, reduce waste, manage resources wisely, adopt sustainable consumption and production practices and lifestyles, create sustainable agricultural systems, reduce water pollution and protect ecosystems, ensure productive employment and decent work for all, promote research and innovation, support "silver", "circular", "blue" and "green" economies. Interestingly, Moscow whom the Baltic States and Poland often accuse of 'energy imperialism' has enthusiastically supported these initiatives.

- Climate action

Work on climate change should integrate both mitigation and adaptation, which requires enhanced regional cooperation. This focus area encompasses several related dimensions: emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction management related to climate and weather risks, monitoring emerging health risks, food security risks, responding to stresses in regional ecosystems, and other challenges. The goal in this area is to mainstream climate change adaptation into all planning and sectoral development processes to strengthen the resilience of infrastructures and society and to support the implementation of the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the region.

- Equality and social well-being for all

The BSR includes countries that are rated among the world's most equal – but also some of the world's most rapidly changing societies, moving in the direction of rising inequality. Gender equality and the rights of children are given special priority in this focus area. It also supports cooperation in the shared demographic challenges: ageing population, migration, economic and social inequalities, health-related challenges, social inclusion; and addressing crime and violence and acts of discrimination which people face in the BSR.

- Creating sustainable and resilient cities and communities

Populations, economic activities, social and cultural interactions, as well as environmental and humanitarian impacts, are increasingly concentrated in cities, and this poses massive sustainability challenges in terms of housing, infrastructure, basic services, food security, health, education, decent jobs, safety and natural resources, among others. At the same time, supporting positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas – by strengthening national, macro-regional, and sub- regional development planning – is crucial.

- Quality education and lifelong learning for all

Rapid social and technological changes bring the need to develop an approach to quality education and lifelong learning throughout the BSR. This focus area includes a special emphasis on scientific literacy and research, STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) education and innovation, which can support sustainable development from an economic, social, and cultural perspective.

The Baltic Agenda 2030 Action Plan represents not only a regional sustainable development strategy, but also provides a useful and firm link between a regional organisation and a global institution (UN). In other words, with the help of this action plan the CBSS is able to translate the UN global sustainability strategy to the regional one, which takes into account the local peculiarities, and better serves the BSR societal security needs.

At their CBSS 25th anniversary meeting (Reykjavik, June 2017) the foreign ministers and high-level representatives highlighted further

priorities for the Council's societal security strategy:[2] They encouraged the CBSS to continue working actively to achieve tangible results within its three long-term priorities: regional identity; sustainable and prosperous region; and, safe and secure region.

More specifically, they invited the CBSS to identify and launch new project activities, with a view to achieving concrete results within each of the following subject areas:

- *Sustainable development.* The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement marked the beginning of a new era in global cooperation for sustainable development, although the U.S., one of the biggest polluters of the world, decided to withdraw from this agreement under the Donald Trump administration. The CBSS plays an important role in delivering regional responses to the global challenges outlined in the 2030 Agenda, including through increased cooperation on mitigation and adaptation to climate change. As mentioned above, the CBSS responded to this UN initiative by adopting the Baltic 2030 Action Plan to meet the global SDGs at regional level;

- *Youth.* Youth are the future of the region. Learning about, and from, each other contributes to strengthening regional identity. In this context, the Baltic Sea Youth Dialogue is an instrument for building transnational trust and mutual understanding, in particular in challenging times, and should provide the basis for sustainable BSR youth cooperation in media, education, science and the labour market;

- *Human trafficking.* The CBSS task force against trafficking in human beings has successfully been operating since 2006 and has earned international acclaim. The current global migration reality has led to a significant rise in the number of refugees and displaced persons in Europe who are at risk of being exploited by traffickers. Against this background, it is important that the task force continues its endeavours to prevent trafficking in human beings. Referring to the successful CBSS conference of 2017, on soft security and migration, the CBSS was encouraged by the foreign ministers to further promote cooperation on this topical issue among the BSR countries;

- *Child protection.* The CBSS expert group on children at risk has been highlighting issues of regional concern since 2002, such as children in alternative care, promoting child-friendly justice, preventing trafficking and exploitation of children, as well as promoting the best interests of children in migration. Child protection issues are highlighted in the 2030 Agenda as an important priority of the societal security strategy. The CBSS expert group has extensive experience from its work on child protection and is in a strong position to follow up on the 2030 Agenda;
- *Civil protection.* Since 2002 the CBSS Civil Protection Network has been developing activities to strengthen resilience towards major emergencies and disasters in the region. Increases in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather conditions make it important to accelerate these efforts through enhanced cooperation at all levels of government and in line with the objectives of the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Some experts believe that this dimension of the CBSS activities is the most important one and tend to equalise the societal security concept with the ability to resist to natural and technogenic catastrophes in the BSR.[3]

At the same anniversary meeting, the ministers invited the CBSS to appoint an independent group of advisors, including representatives from civil society. The task of the independent group would be to elaborate a report with recommendations for a vision for the BSR beyond 2020, and on the future role of the CBSS and the means to expand its impact as a forum for political dialogue and practical cooperation in the region. The independent group should present its report and recommendations to the CBSS for consideration before the end of the Swedish CBSS Presidency 2017-2018. Further reflections on implementation of the report with recommendations should take place during the Latvian CBSS Presidency (2018-2019) with a view to forming the basis for a decision on the issue at political level.

The CBSS Swedish Presidency 2017-2018 designed its programme in line with the Baltic Agenda 2030 Action Plan. The priorities of the Presidency are Sustainability, Continuity and Adaptability, which are all under the umbrella of Agenda 2030. Sweden considers it of

importance to continue with work and projects that are successful in promoting the CBSS long-term strategies, addressing everything from human trafficking and organised crime to the quality of the Baltic Sea, climate change and migration.[4]

CONCLUSIONS

Although the BSR discourse on societal security is mostly inward-looking and related to national security format, as demonstrated by the authors of the country chapters, the regional dimension is slowly gaining momentum in the Baltic academic and policy-making community.

Despite the ongoing tensions between Russia and the West, which reached critical stage in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, the BSR countries, in fact, behave as a "societal security community" (to paraphrase Karl Deutsch's theory of security community). They identified an almost identical set of soft security threats and challenges, both to the individual countries and to the region at large. These societal security threats include uneven regional development, social inequality, unemployment (especially among the youth), poverty, manifestations of intolerance, religious and political extremism, separatism, large-scale migration, inconsistencies in education systems, climate change, natural and man-made catastrophes, transnational organised crime and cybercrime, international terrorism, so-called hybrid threats, etc.

The BSR community was able to develop common approaches for coping with soft security threats. It suggests the same arsenal of methods and tools for problem-solving, improving the situation domestically and regionally, as well as producing a forward-looking, long-term sustainable development strategy. The CBSS was chosen as a proper regional institution to implement a common societal security strategy exemplified by the Baltic 2030 Agenda Action Plan. Although the geopolitical tensions in the region remain strong and various countries differ in their interpretation of the societal security concept and sustainable development strategy, the general dynamic in the BSR is relatively positive and gives some grounds for cautious optimism.

ENDNOTES

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CONCLUDING REMARKS. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES, SUB-REGIONAL APPROACHES AND PROSPECTS OF SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

MIKA AALTOLA, ANDRIS SPRŪDS AND ELIZABETE VIZGUNOVA

Societal security remains an essentially contested notion. Although security considerations and issues are omnipresent, the debate and assessment of societal security in the Baltic Sea region are only slowly and incrementally entering the security agendas of the regional players. At the same time, approaches to societal security are not only varied, but also dissimilar. This reflects the diversity of the region and its stakeholders, strategies adopted by national governments and, eventually, the role of societies in addressing and promoting societal security.

The purpose of this concluding part is to sum up the similarities and differences between different conceptualizations of societal security; their relation to other "securities" in the countries of the Baltic Sea region; and to identify sub-regional specifics. A number of questions are addressed: First, what are the national approaches to governance of security? Second, which sub-national and sub-regional developments and stakeholders interact with these national approaches? Third, can one witness the emergence of sub-regional clusters that share similarities of the models of governance and main strategic narratives with regard to societal security?

The concluding part is divided respectively into three major parts. Firstly, it analyzes the applicability of the Nordic model of societal security to the Baltic Sea region. Secondly, regional players are conceptually clustered in sub-regions, where the main narratives

revolving around security overlap. Clearly, despite some similarities, each of the country cases is characterized by distinct internal histories and external influences that shape the discourse. Lastly, the authors offer a number of recommendations as regards to the policy relevance of societal security issues in the region.

THE NORDIC MODEL: RELEVANCE FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION

The Nordics are often seen as a prototypical case of developed civil societies and advanced practices for societal security. The overview of the country chapters reveals a more nuanced picture. Although the Nordics have developed in the same direction, when it comes to having highly open and modern state platforms, together with active civil societies and externally oriented economies, there are also major differences. One such difference is the role that external threats have played in the development of the national security cultures, especially in terms of geopolitical vulnerabilities. Finland, Norway, and Sweden represent cases of total defence where the solid inclusion of societal actors is seen as a major resilience and deterrence-producing factor. Societal security is seen as a national defence asset and state- level strategies for societal security have been developed. Iceland and Denmark differ more from the total defence culture and their geopolitical exposure has contributed to a less comprehensive understanding of overall security and with a less defined role for societal security.

The overall security culture in Sweden is characterised by the development of practices centering around the concept of total defence and emergency preparedness practices after the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the citizen-centric notion of human security has gained prevalence. National defence played a less prominent role in the overall security scenarios, as the likelihood of territorial threats was seen as close to zero. Recent years have increased the importance of resilience-building and countering hybrid threats, therefore, reintroducing some of the elements of the total defence culture. In several respects, the

Swedish case is close to that of Finland – an inclusive definition of societal security with prominent roles given to societal actors and to the protection of the open society model as a part of a consensus-oriented state platform.

As in Sweden and Finland, total defence is a key characteristic of the Norwegian security culture. Society's role is seen as supportive of this national effort. The emphasis on this tradition facilitated the emergence of awareness that the society also faces other types of risks and threats. The importance of building societal resilience has led to a comprehensive understanding of overall security, and to building of collaborative practices of preparedness. As in Sweden and Finland, the former emphasis, whereby the role of the societal actors was to support the efforts of the armed forces, has now become more mutual, as the armed forces play a role together with the societal actors in protecting key societal functions. This development has also meant that the definition of stakeholders has become more inclusive. As more key actors have been integrated, the list of perceived risks and critical issues to be considered has correspondingly expanded.

The Danish case is interesting among the Nordic neighbours. The Nordic model is more salient in Sweden and in Finland as an explicit doctrine. However, as the image of security has become more complex because of the emergence of hybrid threats and thus – a need of societal resilience – many aspects of the model are increasingly being applied. Bringing in more actors to build resilience has expanded the realm of security collaborations among societal actors horizontally, and between them, and state-level strategic actors vertically. The sense of urgency in building societal resilience is highlighted by many of the same factors than among the Nordic and Baltic States: modern, open, and liberal states that are dependent on export-driven economies. This relatively horizontal state-model means that synergy-production and active collaboration between the key actors of the society – businesses, associations, and citizens – in security matters, is welcomed by many.

Iceland is a unique case among the Nordics. The tradition of total defence led by the armed forces has not played a similar role to that among the other Nordics. Iceland remains unarmed with relatively

scant exposure to military conflicts. The debates on security are usually related to the external dimension and alliance relationships. The recent emergence of resilience as a concept and practices of preparedness have also played a role in Iceland. When the state-level defence coordination is absent, the societal security discussions have contextualised resilience in a different way compared to the other Nordics. Resilience refers more to public safety than in the other Nordic countries.

The Finnish model of comprehensive security treats different aspects of life (state, health, environment, society, cyber, among others) as interlinked sides of the same holistically understood security. In conceptual terms, the model is horizontal. The inclusive definition of actors further highlights the horizontal approach. However, in terms of who takes the lead in organising and coordinating the strategic vision, the model is vertical. Cross-cutting interconnections between the different levels and spheres of security exist, but they are not reducible to single priority, e.g. state security. However, it is clear that the state that takes on coordinating responsibilities has a major role. On the flipside, state capabilities are not considered to be enough to independently produce security. It needs networked actors from different levels in order to sustain its coordinating responsibility.

Overall, the Nordics have been quick to adapt to the key emerging security practices relevant to open and highly connected states. Resilience of the society is seen as important in itself, and as a part of comprehensive security. Societal independence is protected by the inclusion of its key stakeholders, the concept of security has been expanded, and the state's coordinating role has been maintained. National defence remains a cross-cutting function for most of the Nordics. The debates on securitisation reveal that a balance between the needs of resilience-as-defence and resilience-as-societal protection is actively being sought among the inclusive sets of stakeholders. Furthermore, the Nordics have quite a lot of institutional capital in terms of membership of international organisations and transnational networks. The accumulation means that the internal resilience-building also has a strong external dimension. Actors such as the EU and NATO, are also seen as vital in the protection of domestic societal security. The

European and global multi-level governance system produces security-enhancing strands that tie into the societal fabric, thereby, rendering them more resistant to disruptions.

The Polish understanding of societal security is affected by seeing it as a component of the national defence and security policies. The approach is comprehensive, similar to the Swedish and Finnish cases. The integration of economic, information, societal, and political security into the overall vision of security, however, also bears resemblance to the Russian and Belarusian top-down models. However, the Polish civil society has been relatively well-established since the end of the Cold War. This means that it has independent constitutional elements and resilience when it comes to the protection of its key characteristics. Although the comprehensive element does not start from enhancing these societal elements for their own sake, the Polish security model currently exists in a relatively democratic political context. The current geopolitical situation has led to heightened awareness of the external threats. This has also brought about the securitisation of the state to society relationships, as is also the case in the Nordic and Baltic States. The emphasis has been on the hybrid nature of external threats that target the society with the aim of harming the nation. The focus on the hybrid threats and entities is primarily a geopolitical one. However, in the Polish case, the strategic aim of safeguarding the unity of the nation has also had an anti-liberal emphasis that has had ramifications for the comprehensive approach in relation to the civic society.

In the three Baltic states, the term itself is relatively new. However, there is a clear willingness to adapt some of the aspects of the concept in line with the general modernisation of the countries to accord to the open state platform with more independent societies and innovation-based economies. In Estonia, the overall security concept is driven by the need to secure the state against defence threats. Here, the total defence concept of the Nordic states becomes relevant. The overall model is comparable to the Finnish approach (as is Estonian geopolitical "positioning"). Resilience is increasingly seen as a cross-cutting term used to understand how the societal aspect is related to the comprehensive security. The protection of the open society is a task of

the societal actors in coordination of the state-level and related actors. In this way, the model is based on the state having the coordinating role but relying on a collaborative arrangement with society-level actors, who are defined in a relatively inclusive way. In the case of all the Baltics, NATO membership is a key factor that needs to be considered. The role of the armed forces is complemented by the international level of national security production. NATO as a security community influences and conditions the security cultures in the Baltic States; as a consequence this factor adds another layer above the state-level and its coordinating role.

The Baltic countries share general trends with some divergence of emphasis in their approach to societal security. In Latvia, the term societal security is related to the conventional concept of public security, which refers to security and the enforcement function of the state. Thus, this approach lacks some of the key elements of the Nordic understanding of the societal security that refers to the safeguarding of the constituent element of the autonomous sphere of society. However, the understanding is clearly not as top-down as in the case of Belarus and Russia. Rather, the state is seen as the guarantor of the nation's basic democratic elements and freedoms, in accordance with the liberal ideals of the protection of open society. The Lithuanian situation has lately been driven by the reactions to the changing geopolitical challenge. There is wide consensus to invest resources in national defence and, like Estonia, Lithuania has reached NATO's 2% standard measured in terms of GDP. The conscript army has been restored and preparedness has been highlighted. As a result, as in many countries of the region, resilience of the society has been framed in the context of the experienced geopolitical insecurities. The concept of hybrid warfare further securitizes the society in terms of holistic understanding and as a function of national defence. Society's preparedness for defence has become the measure of societal security. Thus, Lithuania has been influenced by the same two trends in societal security as almost all of the regional democracies: societal resilience against external intervention and the threat posed to the society of foreign hybrid influence operations that do not cross the threshold of open military conflict.

In Belarus and Russia, the development of the civil society has not caught up with those of other regional states. In relative terms, the strong role of the state is even further enhanced because of this weakness. A top-down relationship prevails in many sectors of life. This relationship also characterizes the societal security. When the civil society is weaker, the national interests can take priority over different fields of life. National security translates into what is considered to be societal security. What are usually considered to be societal level security issues become functions of state security. National security is meant to secure the state against internal and external threats. Societal insecurities matter when they can be seen as threats to state priorities and strategic positions.

The top-down relationship can lead to a more narrow or broad national securitisation of the other spheres of life. Under a strong state and top-down model, the model applied in Belarus secures constitutional rights, freedoms and quality of life of the citizens. Other objectives such as national independence and sovereignty, and territorial integrity are meant to protect the state as a political body. Although the list of "securities" is a broad one: information security, social security, and economic security – it is still thin, in the sense that those securities are defined as functions of national security. The central question is how a particular sector of life can give rise to issues of national security. The security value of different sectors is not in the sectors themselves, but in their possible negative spillover to the sector of national security. This comprehensive model of state security still leaves out a great deal of the independent dynamics of each security sector that are unrelated to the state level concerns. The actors of the state-centric models that value a centralised unilateral agency are the formal institutions of the state, from the president downwards. This certainly demonstrates divergence of national perspectives and limits to applicability of the Nordic approach to societal security.

SUB-REGIONAL CLUSTERS AND SOCIETAL SECURITY NARRATIVES IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

After reviewing the different approaches to the governance of "securities" in the Baltic Sea region, it is fitting to examine the main narratives associated with societal security. The examination of narratives allows to determine whether issues, linked to societal security, despite the absence of clear-cut regional clusters, have made their way into the public and official discourse, therefore opening up space for more horizontal (or comprehensive) governance models of security. This can be done by firstly investigating the semantic level – in many regional languages, there are no exact concepts for "societal security" and "resilience", thus other words are used which do not carry exactly the same meaning (or have an ambiguous meaning). Secondly, even when the country cases are characterised by a lack of a clear definition of what these concepts mean, one can review the strategic debates/narratives on issues where both "society" and "security" are present and which are securitised.

SMALL, OPEN ECONOMIES IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: THE NORDIC "CHAMPIONS"

The authors in this collection of articles seem to agree that the Nordic endeavours for resilience stem not only from their size, but their high degree of openness. The Nordic neighbours seem to take stock of a plurality of systemic factors that shape their self-perception, including international multilateral institutions, securing a small country's place in the globalised world. A second factor that drives their self-perception is activism in the post-9/11 era, described by increasing engagement in major hot-spots globally. Importantly, these two are also linked to the emphasis on a liberal values-based approach to international affairs. A third factor, which clearly plays an important role, is the idea of the unprecedented territorial security of the European states in the post-Cold war era. However, this has not freed the Nordic neighbours of their perception of their attachment to geography – in fact, it is

their geographic "positioning" that determines not only the ability to cooperate on societal security matters in the north, but also pay attention to global dynamics. A clear example in this case is Sweden, where the environmental/climatic crisis across the globe is seen as changing the understanding of security in the region. It therefore seems that the Nordic understanding of security is intrinsically linked to the following factors: (a) a broad consensus on the major threats, facing the societies, as well as the need to tackle these threats together; (b) ncreasingly blurred borders between state security, societal security and human security; (c) the narratives of total defence, security and safety, welfare and preparedness. National security in the Nordic states mostly focuses more on the safety of society as that of the state.

In Denmark (and paradoxically, as Denmark is the birthplace of the Copenhagen School), no direct references to societal security as such are made in the official documents. National security, however, draws on terms which are connotated with societal elements. Instead, the term *tryghed* refers to "*physical safety, well-being and social inclusion.*" The term is closely linked to the idea of the Danish welfare state – one in which the interests of all societal groups are aligned; it is often expressed as an overarching goal of welfare state policies, therefore bringing about "welfare society" or *velfærdssamfund*. Welfare society is what encompasses the Danish nation-state, thus exhibiting the link between the original definition of the Copenhagen School which focused on protecting the identity tissue of society. However, a certain tension between these two understandings exists, as the welfare state provides continuous support, whereas societal security focuses on maintaining the well-being of citizens in times of crisis. Besides the previously mentioned narrative, revolving around Denmark as a small and open economy on the international stage, an adverse effect of the global connectivity – related to terrorism, migration, cyber security, organised crime, and Russian disinformation – are also broadly discussed.

In Norway, the term *samfunnssikkerhet*, despite the difficulties of translating it into English, is often interpreted both as safety (referring to unintended threats) and security (relating to international threats).

However, standing in contrast to regional players, the Norwegian policy-makers have defined *societal security* as the "*ability of society as such to maintain important social functions and to safeguard citizens' lives, health and basic needs under various forms of stress.*" A more recent interpretation (and perhaps due to an error of translation) brought about a new dimension to the term, arguing that societal security is a "*society's ability to protect itself against, and manage, incidents that threaten fundamental values and functions and that put lives and health in danger. Such incidents may be caused by nature, by technical or human error, or by intentional acts.*" The main difference between the two definitions is the shift from the society as an object to be protected, to the empowerment of the society, which, aware of its fundamental values, seeks to protect itself – which arguably emerges from the tragic events of the 22nd July 2011 attacks. It also seems that the Norwegian case exhibits a very broad range of issues which revolve around societal security, among these, digital vulnerabilities and ICT security, natural hazards, terrorism, sabotage and other serious crimes.

In the Swedish case, the authors draw attention to the overlapping narratives, instead of definitions. Societal security is translated into two overlapping approaches – that of emergency preparedness, which came to signify both the departure from the narrative of total defence and involving all actors of society, and a focus on domestic security and non-military threats. The second approach is that of human security, which the author links to societal security. She states that the "*aim of a human security narrative of societal security is to connect the protection of individuals from risks to that of empowering people to be able to handle crisis situations in a more effective way.*" Ultimately, the (yet another – third, and the long-standing) narrative of total defence is most likely still a potent force in shaping the thinking of Swedish security strategists. It seems that the emphasis on societal security as a governance and a regulatory mechanism is what dominates in Sweden. The Swedish chapter also shows a particularly interesting contradiction that relates to governance by networks; namely, that "*it is possible to see tendencies of isolationism in terms of the relationship between governmental agencies where agencies decreasingly identify themselves*

as a part of the state as a whole, but rather as organisations in their own right." Therefore, handling security issues that affect the entire society in a well-coordinated way becomes challenging in this environment.

Iceland, despite the lack of a clear-cut definition of societal security, focuses primarily on large-scale disruptions (arguably as a consequence of the 2008 financial crash, as the economic and financial sector is closely linked to the primary role of a welfare state). The well-articulated concerns are horizontally addressed across various stakeholders, implying that societal security is gaining ground as a realm of security, therefore becoming the top priority of the policy-makers. However, semantically, public security – or *öryggi,* meaning both safety and security – is still consistently used, mostly because the public appears to feel safe (at the very least, from external threats). However, this also means that the population's concerns of the state "*consistently failing to prioritise the needs of the citizens,*" and especially taking into account the mass protests which followed Iceland's default, show a potential clash between the alternative societal security narratives of the population and the official ones of the state.

Ultimately, Finland is a country which is particularly marked by its "*geopolitical understanding of its positioning.*" The authors of the country chapter explain that the feeling of "in-between" has the clear understanding of belonging to a sub-region of security, one which rests on the values characteristic to the welfare state (which are also closely linked to those of the Nordic model), is still viewed as an example of "*what Europe should look like in the future.*" In the case of Finland the ideas of societal security and national security have become increasingly interconnected. Indeed, among the securitised issues, "resilience" seems to offer some solution to the problematical ties, arising from the vulnerabilities of asymmetrically interconnected situations for small and "open" states like Finland. However, recently, nativist solutions are being offered to threats such as Arab Spring, major internal conflicts opening up spaces for radicalisation and human migration, and other disrupting flows. Indeed, it seems that the trans-border solutions (such as the EU and NATO) are not offering rapid solutions that are required by the concerned populations.

THE THREE BALTIC STATES AND POLAND: A SELECTIVE INCORPORATION OF NORDIC PRACTICE IN NATIONAL SECURITY THINKING

Since 2014, and the beginning of the Russian incursion in Ukraine, "hybrid warfare" (understood as a mixture of potential threats) has become another securitised issue across the region – and strongly in the three Baltic States and Poland. Almost identically, issues related to economic security, socioeconomic gaps and welfare (not in the sense of a welfare state, or the state providing at least minimal welfare), especially in the light of societies still recovering from the 2008 global financial crisis, are a recurrent topic in the discussions related to protecting the social tissue in the Baltic Sea region. In the meantime, the debates on the securitisation of European-level issues also cause a dual effect: on the one hand, they seem to consolidate the prioritised position of conventional security; on the other, they also seem to bring issues related to preparing for emergencies and increasing resilience of societies. This is also the previously mentioned sense of being sheltered (as in the case of the Nordic countries) or exposed to threats that plays an important role in the countries of this sub-regional cluster. Consequently, what characterises the three Baltic States and Poland is: (a) a gradual modernisation of societies, accompanied by a gradual strengthening of civil actors; (b) increasing discussions revolving around resilience and a dilution of the strong role of the state in national security provision; and, (c) a growing understanding of the need to introduce a comprehensive/whole-of-society approach to national security.

The securitisation of state-society relations in its own right has become clearly pronounced by emphasising the threats emerging from the informational space in all three Baltic States and Poland. In Latvia and Lithuania, the potential of informational attacks spreading "*misleading information directed against the national security interests*" and therefore spreading mistrust in the state are seen as directly linked to weakening the national and cultural identity. Indeed, the separate information spaces are also seen as "*decreasing the possibility for the state*

to effectively address the whole-of-society," therefore impeding all groups of society to develop a sense of belonging to the state. The approach is somewhat different in Estonia, as the government emphasises strategic communication as a tool to enhance society's resilience. Additionally, the Estonian approach emphasises the networks of people and the media that must provide their support to overcome the challenges posed by an "*attack with cognitive methods.*" Interestingly, this also means that the increasingly sensitive perception of military threats, emerging from Russia, have paradoxically enhanced the awareness of societal security threats targeting Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia respectively.

In Estonia's case, the securitisation of other social aspects, such as crime and drug addiction, driven by the uneven socioeconomic development, began around 2001. Additionally, bearing in mind the need to maintain a tightly knit and resilient societal tissue, new soft threats, such as the "*development, social inequality, poverty, poorly adapted segments of society or manifestations of intolerance were seen as factors that could affect the stability of the state*" have gradually been brought to the agenda. Importantly, as the situation in Crimea ensued, hybrid warfare appeared in the public discourses, therefore securitising a mixture of vaguely-defined threats, such as "*indirect or direct hostile influencing*" and disinformation. Other novelties, brought about by the 2015 migration crisis, relate to "*the polarisation of society due to adverse opinions*" and manifestations of intolerance. It must be noted that the military challenges in Estonia's close proximity have reflected on the perception of threats as regards Estonia-proper security. Additionally, as Estonia is a newcomer to the Euro-Atlantic security structures, it is only gradually coming to terms with being a "*democratic, open society* [that] *could be affected by the spread of extremist, hostile or hate-based ideologies.*" Semantically, the term *kerskus* (or what is commonly understood as resilience in English) translates into a society's ability to recover quickly from the impact of the unexpected. The term has undergone significant development since 2001, when psychological defence first made its way into the Estonian Military Defence Strategy.

In Latvia, the understanding of the role of society in ensuring national security has also undergone significant progress. On the one

hand, the modern understanding of security focuses primarily on ethnic tensions and Russian propaganda and disinformation; however, the post-modern influences have also pushed to incorporate issues that relate to economic and social disparities. Indeed, the 2016 State Defence Concept points out that security challenges posed by the consequences of the economic crisis – such as social inequality, the quality of life of the inhabitants – are decreasing Latvia's resilience to external threats. However, and similarly to Lithuania, state sovereignty, despite considerable progress in engaging societal factors, is still prioritised as the most important achievement of the post-1991 era. This revelation goes hand in hand with the fact that the translation of societal security – *sabiedrības drošība* – in Latvian is often erroneously applied, whereas it deals primarily with the older concept of public security. In the meanwhile*, noturība*, an equivalent of resilience, has come to encompass both conventional and "soft" dimensions of security and is now becoming more widespread in the Latvian narratives. Ultimately, in Latvia, it is human security that trumps societal security in popularity and utilisation.

In Lithuania's case, the subordination of the societal to the state security interests are still strongly pronounced. As the author notes "*there are no grounds to claim that problems of societal security in Lithuania are becoming equivalent in terms of significance to state security problems,*" and that independence and the sovereignty are still the driving forces behind the Lithuanian security thinking. However, the "soft" threats, raised in the Lithuanian National Security Strategy of 2017 – such as information threats or social and regional exclusion, poverty, as well as the demographic crisis – are a notable achievement, showing signs of sub-regional convergence with the other Baltic Sea region states. In Lithuania, societal security has no adequate translation at semantic level. Mistakenly, the term "social security" is often used instead; clearly, the use of it in the context of the state welfare policy distorts the initial concept. On other occasions, as in Latvia, the term is used in the context of "public security", which relates to protection against crime and police activities – once again not fitting the definition.

Poland emerges in somewhat of an "in-between" position. Despite a strong civic society component and the comprehensive approach to security seeming to resemble the approaches of Finland and Sweden, the approach to national security remains primarily state-centric. Similarly, to the Baltic States, the concept that is referenced most in national strategic narratives is that of resilience. A different similarity – this time with its Nordic neighbours – relates to its relatively recent determination to "*tightening cooperation with non-governmental organisations and other social entities in the promotion of defence and defence activities.*" However, one cannot isolate the recent inward-looking focus of the Polish government, shunning the regional approach to integration, propagated by the EU, and emphasising the "Polish way" as containing Polish-proper values.

"SOFT" THREATS AND TOTAL SECURITY: THE SUBORDINATION OF SOCIETAL SECURITY TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Despite the great detail paid to a variety of securities in the fundamental conceptual documents of Russia and Belarus, national security is still the primary lens through which other sectors of security are viewed. This also means that the main narratives, revolving around security, can be interpreted as "soft security" issues which the state tackles, as other societal actors remain on the margins.

In semantic terms, the Russian and Belarusian definition of security, as in the Polish case (and thus related to the Slavic root of the word) is "*freedom from internal and external threats to vital interests of the individual, society and state.*" In Russia, the list of the "soft" threats, addressed by the state, has remained relatively static since 1997, on the background of the rapidly evolving approaches to threats that characterise other regional players. This clearly exemplifies the willingness of the security strategists in Russia to resist regional convergence and globalisation. This is also why national security is strongly linked to the internal state of affairs (such as unemployment,

consumer price increase rates, external debt, alongside the rates of annual modernisation of weapons) and only some transnational issues (terrorism, religious fanaticism, separatism and organised crime). However, one can note that the vibrant academic community in Russia is spurring a discussion around the terms *obshestvennaya bezopasnost* (social or public security) or *bezopasnost obshestva* (security of the society), which is closer to the original societal security concept coined by the Copenhagen School.

Despite the very different "social contracts" that characterise the Russian and Belarusian societies, both countries share a strong grip on the maintenance of total security "*subordinated to the strategic task of ensuring political stability within the country*". In Belarus, "*total security clearly separates the society and state in Belarus and subordinates the first to the second one.*" The approach to security in Belarus is the opposite of that of total defence, where the comprehensive approach to security treats all aspects of life as linked to the whole notion of security. Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast to the Nordic example, it is the absence of a clear consensus of a national identity which begs the "*question whether the Belarusian society is able to survive without preservation of a sovereign and independent Belarusian state.*"

Perhaps an immediate conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that, not only is a gradual dilution through modernisation of the role of the state as a security provider becoming more pronounced in the sub-regional clusters; it is also the "softening" of security issues on a cross-regional basis. In the wake of asymmetric warfare, the states reviewed in this volume are increasingly focusing on threats that require resilience. Ultimately, the sub-regional cross-cluster links (for instance, Estonia and Poland striving to approach security comprehensively, therefore exhibiting similarities with the Finnish model; Latvia paying greater emphasis to resilience) also show that the region is still undergoing considerable change.

SOCIETAL SECURITY IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION TODAY: BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the geopolitical circumstances in Europe had seemingly opened a space for diluting the national borders and blurring the understanding of internal and external security threats – and conventional security threats themselves. However, the renewed tension in the Russia-West relationship has become a clear signal that democratic peace in Europe has failed. However, paradoxically, and despite the conventional security arrangements still occupying a large space in the public narratives, resilience and "soft" security/threats have become better articulated in the national security strategies of the Baltic Sea region.

Origins of the conceptual history of the term "societal security" date back to Nordic (more specifically – Danish) thinking in the 1990s. It saw society as a cohesive entity with its own security considerations that were related to the sustainability of its constitutive elements that should be safeguarded. One key aspect of this book is, therefore, the spread of this idea in the region since that time. Simultaneously, it is important to recognise that the question is not only relevant in terms of the one Nordic model, but also in terms of "family resemblance" between the approach that bears similarities and dissimilarities to the model. Framed in this way, the key research question is more on discerning the different approaches to the theme of societal security. The third key aspect has to do with the relationships the concept has to the other domains of security as central issues for each of the country cases.

The relevance of the original model for the understanding of diverse approaches to societal security in the region has a geographical dimension. The Nordic model has more hold in the Nordic region where it is part of the overall inclusive understanding of security as a comprehensive conceptualisation that leaves room for the autonomy of the society and its safeguarding. Outside of this realm of security culture, the model also bears some "family resemblance" to the practices in the Baltics, Poland and, to a larger extent, to Germany.

Russia and Belarus, despite some similarities, originate partly from other cultural strands than those connected with the expansion of the Nordic model. The difference between the regional models is also expressed by different terms or narratives that characterise the model. In some states, the term "societal security" is new, and therefore applied conflating it with public or social security; interpreted as societal resilience; or is non-existent. For example, in Russia, the translation of the term is not yet fully established. One can also mention country-proper terms, such as "societal potential" in the case of Poland, or "total security" (as opposed to total defence) as in the case of Belarus. This situation is clearly different from the Nordic "flag-bearers", where the narratives of emergency preparedness, human security and prevention, bearing close connection to total defence and comprehensive approach, have been developed for decades.

Two important issues appear striking and somewhat connected to the broader political and economic discussion taking place in the European continent. In broader terms, the volume illustrates that the focus on societal security is intrinsically linked to the fear of one's society, one's values and one's way of life. Identities on a cross-regional basis can serve as "beacons" for development, as proven by the years of Nordic security and defence cooperation; however, the fear of the other, which is widespread and writes itself into the context of the securitised European and cross-border issues, has the potential to lead to problems concerning the delineation of actual threats from mere disturbances, weakening civil liberties and popularising ambiguous views on foreigners. This is also clearly exemplified by the populist parties in the political spectrum of the Baltic Sea region, leading to consensus-driven parties to consolidate their programmes to fight the radical elements. This, however, brings broader implications to the political spectrum across Europe, once again re-focusing on drawing borders and identity questions.

Furthermore, the authors of the volume have alluded to situations, where an underestimation of threats that relate to societal security takes place, prioritising the state over the needs of society instead. One of the issues which seems to be recurrent on the agenda of societal movements

of the 21ˢᵗ century is privacy and data protection – an issue which has the potential to "make or break" the future consensus between various participants of the comprehensive approach to security. Another issue is the subordination of socioeconomic issues to a perceived (and a necessary) struggle for the territoriality and sovereignty of states, indicating to an embedded contradiction between societal security and national security.

There are no clear-cut solutions or answers to the abovementioned issues. However, a number of recommendations as regards the future of the academic field and practice can be drawn.

- *Firstly*, the number of securitised issues in the "agendas" of the players of the Baltic Sea region clearly indicates that there is no clarity about what societal security actually refers to. The "freedom" granted by the introduction of the concept of securitisation by the Copenhagen School has enabled a countless number of otherwise low-politics issues to raise high on the agenda of policy-makers. Thus, a clear delineation of what constitutes – and what does not constitute – a societal security issue should be marked;

- *Secondly*, the attempt to conceptualise a regional approach of the Baltic Sea region begs the question outside the scope of this volume: how would the regional organisations, supposedly the ensurers of peace on a regional basis, tackle societal security threats and ensure that greater coordination between European countries takes place in this sector? The regional organisations of the European continent now more than ever seem to be undergoing a credibility crisis, which closely links to the inability of the supra-national institutions to ensure security within the EU. Which mechanisms of governance, checks and balances, and built on which values will the members of the broader EU rely on in the future?;

- *Thirdly,* a closer link between societal security and human security should be maintained, primarily with the purpose of avoiding increasing nativist discord across Europe. The use of arguments in favour of national solutions to trans-border problems are serving as a virtual threat to the attempts to maintain the European security structures currently in place;

- *Fourthly*, the narratives revolving around societal security (public security, resilience, *inter alia*) play a much larger role across the region. Indeed, besides the Nordic states, which are somewhat cohesively characterised by the Nordic model, the application of the elements of the Nordic best practice is selective in the agendas of other regional players. Additionally, many of the definitions – "soft" threats, information security, among others – are becoming increasingly blurred and acquire significance within each national security thinking. Therefore, it remains crucial to address challenging communalities – among these, intolerance, religious and political extremism, separatism, migration, climate change, unintentional catastrophes.

The joint effort can enable the regional actors to come together, share best practices and promote converging regional agenda on societal security. This publication has been a deliberate step in this direction; one of a thorough assessment, in order to raise awareness of the Baltic societies over the regional picture.

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